Boganmeldelse

Kotek, Joel,  Students and the Cold war

Translated by Ralph Blumenau,  ST. MARTIN’S PRESS, INC., ISBN 0-312-15877-7 ©Joel Kotek 1996

Kotek er lektor i historie ved Centre d'études en recherches internales [sic] et stratégiques, Université libre de Bruxelles og bogen bygger på hans disputats. Han præsenterer Olof Palme som en hovedkraft i splittelsen af studenterbevægelsen. Splittelsen, og resultatet deraf ISC, støttedes/finansieredes af CIA, men fra begyndelsen af ikke af den amerikanske studenterbevægelse, NSA. [så Palme hjælper CIA mod NSA !!!!] Det er endda så galt, at Palme informerer den amerikanske ambassade om de "kommunistiske" deltagere i IUSkongressen i Prag (1950). [Jeg anvender gåseøjne, fordi i hvertfald en af de indberettede indberettes som cryptokommunist, medlem af Clarté (Vi var mange ikke-kommunister, socialdemokrater og partiløse, mange senere SFere i Clartè).]

Kotek er på i hvert fald et punkt,som jeg har kunnet kontrollere (Svend Beyer-Pedersen) helt ude i hampen, så langt ude, at man kan undre sig over at skriftet har kunnet godkendes som disputats. Svend og 15 andre skulle i.h.t. Kotek (128) være blevet 'likvideret' (230853) af danske kommunister. Beyer-Pedersen bliver "summoned from Copenhagen", men "was successful in evacuating his family to Copenhagen."; så allerede en simpel logik-test skulle have kunnet afsløre denne del som tvivlsom.

Citater:

... it soon appeared that ever since 1952 the CIA had financed and vas still financing, by way of a whole series of ‘screen’ foundations, the overwhelming majority of youth and student organizations, not only in the United States, but throughout the free world. Vi
The key to understanding the American involvement lies in the policy of systematic infiltration that the Bolsheviks had initiated in 1919. Its constant aim, relentlessly pursued and never openly avowed, was to Control Western civil society. Vii
By 1950 the communists had succeeded in effectively controlling all the international mass organizations that had been set up after the Liberation, such as the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the World Peace Council, the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) and the bodies that are of special interest to us here: the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Students (IUS). Vii
Invariably, however, the real purpose was to safeguard the interests of the Soviet Union and to disarm its enemies. Vii
The system of infiltration was systematized in 1935 at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, which dropped the attack on the Western bourgeois democracies and instead sought an alliance with them against the fascists. Viii
Infiltration was particularly effective in Great Britain. Viii
On the surface the WFDY, which was created in London in November 1945, was pluralist and non-political. Ix
The same happened a year later in Prague, where the International Union of Students was created. There, too. The apparently pluralist nature of the meeting did not prevent two crypto-communists being elected to the posts of President and Secretary-General. X
The WFDY and the lUS were the only two international youth organizations to be recognized by the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Controlled as they were by the communists, this meant that from 1945 to 1950 the representation of young people at the international level was a Soviet monopoly; and it was exercised along the most Stalinist lines, attacking the Marshall Plan and the European movement, supporting Tito in the Trieste crisis, backing the North Koreans and so on. X
The Western counteroffensive began and was worked out in London. Ernest Bevin and the Foreign Office thought up the World Assembly of Youth. Stanley Jenkins, of the British National Union of Students (NUS), together with Olof Palme, laid the foundation for the International Student Conference. X
It was not a shortage of resources that was the cause, but the upheaval in American society that came to be known as McCarthyism. This generated such hysteria that it was impossible for the American government to give any support to organizations such as the WAY, the ISC or even the American National Student Association (NSA). All these stood for liberal and progressive policies that were regarded with suspicion and outright hostility by the reactionaries who dominated Congress and intimidated the US administration. Xi
This was understood by Tom Braden, a former member of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). He saw that there was only one way to counter the Soviet manoeuvres: to set up a system of secret contributions, channelled through fictitious wealthy private foundations that would be beyond the control of Congress. He therefore created within the CIA a Department of International Organizations, responsible for putting this plan into action. Such anti-communist bodies as the ISC and the Congress for Cultural Freedom were its beneficiaries. Xi
This work is an abridgement of a 700-page thesis presented in 1992 to the Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris. Xi
International Student Conference (ISC/COSEC), founded in Stockholm in 1950. Xii
The Cold War began in 1917 with the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia. Xii [!!!!!!]
1952 saw the beginning of American government involvement by the provision of clandestine CIA finance for the non-communist international youth and student organizations. Xii
ln 1945 only the Young Catholics and the Young Socialists denounced communist manoeuvres. Xii
Communism and Youth: A Strategy of Enticement (1907 to 1934) 1
Although it is true that other countries, notably the United States, also had recourse to oblique strategies, it was the Kremlin that used them most. 1
The First Congress of the League of Young Communists, better known as the Komsomol 1918. 2
The first stage, in the spring of 1919, was to create an international section within the Komsomol. 2
Zinoviev, the first President of the Third International, the Comintern, which was founded in 1919 2
Willi Münzenberg was given the task of establishing the Young Communist International (known, from its Russian initials, as the KIM) ... Münzenberg created the KIM by a straightforward hijacking of the already existing International Union of Young Socialists. 2
Münzenberg and his friends. In defiance of Moscow they decided to hold the Congress in Jena (April 1921). 2
.. the meetings of the Third Congress of the Comintern, during which the few resolutions passed in Jena were roundly condemned. 2
The seat of the KIM was transferred to Moscow. 3
the Anglo-Soviet Trade Treaty, the total failure in March of the communist insurrection in Germany, the defeat in Poland. 3
The eviction of Willi Münzenberg from the KIM did not signal his departure from the communist movement: quite the contrary. Lenin was conscious of his formidable organizational abilities and enlisted him in a new task commensurate with his talents. In 1921 Russia was afflicted by famine, and Lenin asked Münzenberg to contact bourgeois and socialist relief agencies, such as the Nansen Committee, and to coordinate and increase the efficiency of the activities devoted to aid for Russia. ... Secours Ouvrier International 3
THE KIM AS AN INSTRUMENT SERVING SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY (1921-25) 5
The first front organization openly aimed at Youth was the Anti-Imperialist League, created in Brussels in February 1927 by Münzenberg 5
Anti-Fascist and Anti-War movement that Münzenberg conceived and launched in Amsterdam in August 1932. 6-7
(Henri Barbusse, Romain Rolland and Albert Einstein.) 7
Youth Anti-War Movement. Its Preparatory Committee met in Paris on 22 September 1933 7
World Youth Congress Against Fascism and War. 7
December 1933, the World Congress of Students against War and Fascism 7
Youth Council Against War. 8
... the undergraduates of Oxford, who in 1933 carried a motion at the Oxford Union that ‘This House will not fight for King and Country’. 8
Raymond Guyot, a future General Secretary of the KIM, was found guilty of antimilitary agitation in 1929, and, after a period in hiding, was arrested in 1932 and jailed in the Cherche-Midi prison. France, 9
The Young Communists and the Popular Front, 1935-39 10
... in August 1935 when the Seventh Comintern Congress ... adopted the concept of the Popular Front. 10
Arthur Koestler recounts how, when in 1931 he had decided to join the German Communist Party in Berlin, he had been told that it would be more useful to the Party if he kept his opinions to himself. 11
Raymond Guyot, then the General Secretary of the KIM, confirmed in the World Youth Review: ‘Hitler’s Trotskyist agents must be unhesitatingly denounced, mercilessly crushed, all the more firmly because they go under the name of revolutionaries, socialists, and pacifists’. 12
... opposition of the International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY) 12
Section Française de l’international Ouvrière (SFIO) expelled from the leadership of the Socialist Youth Movement the militants of Action Socialiste. 12
Spain .. Santiago Carillo, the who belonged simultaneously to the KIM and the Young Socialist International. 12-3
16. Full name: the National Union of Students of England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Scottish students had their own organization, the Student Union of Scotland (SUS). Note 227
submarines ‘moles’ 14
Labour League of Youth 17
The University Labour Federation 18
The National Union of Students 18
The British Youth Peace Assembly 19
It is not by chance that there are so many Czechs on this list. Together with the British, they were to become, even while still in exile, the group most actively involved in the rebuilding of European youth movements after the war. 20
The First World Youth Congress in Geneva, from 31 August to 6 September 1936, 20
Her sponsorship of the Vassar meeting had in fact brought her a lot of mail from certain Catholic circles who were already considerably irritated by her support for the Spanish Republicans and for birth control. Mrs Roosevelt, 24 who detested witch-hunts, 24
The Young Communists and the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 1939-41 25
In France, for example, confusion reigned. The last legal issue of l’Humanité, which was confiscated as soon as it appeared on 26 August 1939, carried the headline ‘l’Union de la Nation Françaises contre l’aggresseur Hitlérien’. 25
Later, after the defeat of France, the communists even negotiated with the German authorities to have L’Humanité legalised and offered to bear witness against Leon Blum when he was put on trial.^ 26
Willi Münzenberg He had been expelled from the Party in 1938, and in the spring of 1940 was found strangled near Saint-Marcellin, more than likely assassinated by NKVD agents. 27
... the decree of 26 September 1939 by which the Daladier government banned the Communist Party, the Federation of Young Communists, the Union of Young French Women and the French Union of Communist Students. 27
INFILTRATED ORGANIZATIONS FALL INTO LINE 28
British Youth Parliament, ... immediately condemned British imperialism and advocated independence for India. 28
The issue of July 1941 really deserves to figure in some anthology. 33
In a third article, ‘an Indian student’ attacked the hypocrisy of Britain: ‘this war, though paraded as a war against Fascism and for democracy is a war for the preservation of the status quo, for the consolidation of Imperialism, and for the continued exploitation of the 450 millions of the colonies of the British Empire’. 35
39 This letter is part of a six-page dossier prepared in May1946 by Morgan Phillips, the General Secretary of the Labour Party, to prevent the University Labour Federation (under its new name the Student Labour Federation) being received back into the socialist fold. Labour Party Archives, note 231
On 15 May 1940 the annual conference of the Labour Party expelled the ULF and its honorary president, D. N. Pritt, who had succeeded Greenwood. The Labour Party turned against (crypto) communists (and also against authentic socialists who espoused pacifism). 36
THE DRIFT OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS 36
Every year the NUS organized a congress. ... The congress had no statutory character at all. Any students could attend. 36
While it was agreed by nearly all that the present war could have been avoided if the Government had pursued a policy of collective security 37
American Youth Congress (AYC) ... became one of the most active proponents of American isolationism. 40
Congressman Dies’ House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). This was a committee the House of Representatives had set up in 1938 to keep an eye on pro-Nazi organizations but which, in a climate of anticommunist hysteria in the United States was, after the Pact, equally aimed at communist organizations and those believed to be communist. 40
The Grand Anti-Fascist Alliance, 1941 to 1945 44
The communists of France were summoned to collaborate with de Gaulle, those of Yugoslavia with Mihailovic, those of Czechoslovakia with Benès - and those of the youth movements with non-communist youth, in the common struggle against the Hitlerites.
All people of good will were mobilized for the defence of the USSR. When on 3 July 1941 Stalin addressed his people, he called them ‘brothers and sisters’, no longer, as before, ‘comrades’. The churches were reopened and the Orthodox Holy Synod was restored. 44
For young communists Operation Barbarossa was a blessing in disguise. Though they had been too disciplined to show it, they had found the Hitler-Stalin Pact hard to swallow; but now they and the various front organizations they controlled could revert to their pre-Pact anti-fascist speeches and slogans as if these had never been abandoned. 45
aug 39 - jun 41 i.e. 2 år
University Forward also altered its anti-colonialist rhetoric. In February 1943 we read that
only the clearest anti-fascist lead can show the Indian people that the way to independence lies not with the disruptors, the hooligans, the provocateurs.46
So on 28 September 1941, in the famous Hall of Pillars of the Soviet Trade Union House in Moscow, there was an ‘International Meeting of Anti-Fascist Youth’. 48
SECOND STAGE: 1 OCTOBER 1941 - CREATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL YOUTH COUNCIL (IYC) 48
What matters is that at this period she behaved exactly like a communist. 49 [!!!!!!!]
One ma|or organization refused to join it: this was the Standing Conference of National Voluntary Youth Organizations or SCNVYO. The SCNVYO would not take part in a body it know to be under communist control; and its struggle against front organizations will be described in Chapter 5. Note 30, 234
THIRD STAGE: DECEMBER 1941 - CREATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF STUDENTS (ICS) IN BRITAIN 51
Eduard Goldstücker recalls:
The Nazi attack allowed the Czech communists to modify their position vis-à-vis the Benès Provisional Government in London. Until then there had been no question of us joining the Czech army in exile: The Czech Communist Party had its own military structure in London which refused to participate and forbade its members to do so. After June; 1941, the communists joined it en masse. 51
COMMUNISTS LEGITIMISED: THE ROLE OF SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS 53
In a speech to the Youth Alliance in the spring of 1942 he spoke of a Soviet Russia in which ‘a religion based on idealism was practised seven days out of seven’. 53
That the Soviets were paying and would continue to pay the heaviest burden in the antifascist war cannot be denied; but that the British people should feel guilty, when they had stood alone against Hitler until the summer of 1941, is more difficult to accept. 54
Opposing the IYC were the Foreign Office and the Home Office, the latter under Herbert Morrison, the most anticommunist of socialists. 55
[Cabinet. January 1942 ] These organizations are not connected with any political party, and their avowed objects are unobjectionable. Some of the persons concerned with these organizations are, however, believed to have connections with the Communist Party’. 56 [!!!]
4TH STAGE: NOVEMBER 1942. THE CREATION OF THE WORLD YOUTH COUNCIL (WYC) 56
14 and 15 November 1942, the World Youth Council. 400 young people from 29 countries took part ... Svend Beyer-Pedersen from Denmark 57
... ; so only the Dane Svend Beyer-Pedersen (a fellow traveller who at the time was pro-Soviet) 58
4 MAY, 1943: DISSOLUTION OF THE YOUNG COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL (THE KIM) 59
On 15 May 1943 the members of the Comintern executive signed a resolution announcing the dissolution of their movement. 59
... the American Young Communist League changed its name and, at its convention in Manhattan on 15 December 1942, transformed itself into American Youth for Democracy. 60
[Canadian High Commissioner in London til reg.]: World Youth\ Council. The latter body, although its membership is open to youth of all shades of opinion, is connected with subversive organizations. [1942] 60
There are other indicators of suspicions about the WYC. For instance, during his extended stay in the United States, Beyer-Pedersen was interrogated at length by the FBI on the subject of Palacek, whose naiveté (or else opportunism) caused him to be thought of as a Party ‘submarine’. Pedersen went straightaway to the Danish embassy [det var vel Kaufmann] in Washington to complain about this interrogation and was told ‘that the Council was in fact working for the Communist Party’. Of course Pedersen refused to believe a word of this; but on his return to London, he had to admit that Kutty Hookham must be working for the communists. 61
The Yalta Conference (4-11 February 1945) 62
13 February, Soviet troops liberated Budapest. 62
In Yugoslavia, where Tito’s partisans had driven out the enemy almost on their own, a National Front government was proclaimed. 62
In Czechoslovakia likewise, liberated by Soviet troops and some Americans, a National Front programme was announced. 62
8 May, saw the unconditional surrender of the Third Reich. 62
In Hungary the Communist Party collected only 17 per cent of the votes in the elections; but Laszlo Rajk became Minister of the Interior and the Moscow-oriented Peter Gabor took control of the political police: 62
In the French elections on 21 October the Communist Party, with 26.2 per cent of the vote. Became the largest party in France and took junior posts in the government. 62
There were also communist ministers in Belgium and Italy. 62
THE BIRTH OF THE WFDY 63-5 prøver at omskrive den officielle historie, (expl. Torill Johnsens, 64)skal nok læses i sin helhed [?????]
They all present the gathering as an event sui generis, organized in the context of the Grand Alliance, and never in the context of Stalinist tactics. The democratic and representative character of the event is never called into question. Quite the reverse. The first few years of unity are looked back on with nostalgia. 63
PREPARING FOR THE WORLD YOUTH CONFERENCE 65
The idea of a world conference was born in June 1944, soon after the Allied landings in Normandy; but the details were not arranged until 1945. 65
On 1 January 1945 Vaclav Palacek and Kutty Hookham officially invited the youth of the world to a vast gathering, which they intended to hold in London at the end of August 1945. 65
The World Youth Conference, which so far had embraced only youth organizations from the allied countries, to the exclusion of those from neutral or enemy countries, now announced its wish to become an organization truly representative of he youth of the whole world. 65
Right from the start, the communists held the keys of the conference. 65
Contrary to what one reads today, the reactions to the proposals for a World Youth Conference were not greeted with great enthusiasm, not even amidst the euphoria of victory. Almost immediately there was a hostile reaction in Britain from the Standing Conference of National Voluntary Youth Organizations (SCNVYO). This was the chief coordinating body for youth movements of a purely educational nature for the under-18s, which were usually led by adults: a bishop, for instance, represented the young Catholics. ... Its minutes show how it distrusted the initiative emanating from so nebulous and politicized a body as the World Youth Conference. 66
In June, after several discussions, the SCNVYO finally decided to have nothing to do with the Conference and soon began to organize a national and international boycott of the Conference. 66
Association de la Jeunesse Catholique de France (ACJF), a key member of the Union Patriotique de la Jeunesse Françaises (UPOJ). The SCNVYO and the leaders of the ACJF understood each other very well, the latter being even more convinced that the Conference was part of a communist manoeuvre. Much as the UPOJ would have liked the ACJF to figure as a separate participant in the Conference, it set up an ad hoc delegation to participate under the UPOJ name, headed by a ‘young’ Frenchman aged 42, Jean Jousselin, the General Secretary of the French Scout movement, who swiftly fell prey to the communists. 66
the overwhelming majority of European young socialists decided to boycott it. 66
19 socialist representatives from nine other countries - Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, Italy, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania - took part in the meeting and followed the Pole Richard Obranczka, who was assistant secretary of the Polish Socialist Party, in opposing any united youth organization’ note 22 238
Contrary to the legend, prolonged discussions within the British government resulted in an attempt to prevent the conference from taking place in Britain; and this policy was abandoned only after the General Election of July 1945. This explains the hitherto unexplained postponement of the Conference from the summer to the autumn of 1945. 67
In a period of less than three months, from 4 April to 16 June, no fewer than 15 memoranda were circulated about the subject, either within the FO or between the FO and other government departments, for example the Home Office. 67
What attitude should therefore be adopted? Should the initiative be openly supported; or should the government simply make certain facilities available - granting entry visas and so on - without lending any official backing; or should the initiative be quashed on the grounds of the information available about the organization? 67
On 26 May the Home Office sent its reply to the Foreign Office, which flatly contradicted Pollock’s analysis:
I am directed by Mr Secretary Morrison to say that, according to his information, the World Youth Council is under the control of the Communist Party and, in accordance with the Cabinet decision [fra 1942] to which you refer, ought not to receive official support . 68
Foreign Office; 2 June 1945 3. For your confidential information organization is under control of Communist Party telegram tekst gengivet 68-9
Massey, High Commissioner: the issue might be reopened: ‘I should inform you, however, that some responsible opinion here believes that the Home Office was actuated by undue suspicion, and it is possible that this decision may be reversed when a new Home Secretary is appointed’. Massey had spoken prophetically: Winston Churchill’s defeat in the General Election of July 1945 would save the World Youth Conference. 71
The next day the Foreign Office informed its 45 missions abroad to take no further notice of the negative decision of 2 June. 72
On the other hand the American authorities drew up a list of communist delegates. Grand Alliance or no Grand Alliance, the United States, even before the Cold War, was thoroughly anticommunist. 72
Clearly Bevin was anxious to counterbalance the communist influence. And wanted to expose the youth movements overseas to propaganda influences other than those of the communists. ... He undertook, firstly, to appoint a Foreign Office official who would specifically concern himself with youth affairs; and then to help in the creation, as soon as the Conference was over, of an alternative youth organization that would be genuinely representative. The foundations of the World Assembly of Youth were thus already being laid. 73
“The Foreign Secretary nevertheless feels that these disadvantages are more than offset by the fact that the Conference will provide an opportunity for so many delegates to penetrate the Iron Curtain which separates us from Eastern Europe, and that nothing but good can come from the opportunity which the delegates will have of obtaining personal experience of the free conditions existing in this country.” [Bevin] 74
Chuter Ede ... The success of these satellite organizations depends to a large extent on their appearance of respectability and their prestige with the public. ...the presence of ministers at the meetings ...other forms of assistance ..Should the procedure defined by the Coalition Cabinet of 1942 be adhered to - that is to say, to alert the Home Office and to leave it in charge of decision. 75
THE MEETING OF THE WORLD YOUTH CONFERENCE in the Albert Hall in London in November 1945, 500 delegates from 63 countries 76
One would look in vain for any trace of communist or Marxist vocabulary. The Conference limited itself to calling ‘upon democratic youth organizations to assist in the establishment of a just and durable peace; 77
Despite appearances, this was a congress that was manipulated from start to finish. The WFDY was communist even before it had been set up. This is one of the discoveries of the research for this study, and is in fact one of its central theses. [Der er ingen dokumentation, henvisninger el. Lign.] 78
73 Bevin ville have SCNVYO med, 78 there was little the Western delegations could do, especially given that they were already greatly weakened by the voluntary absence of principal youth organizations such as the SCNVYO. [ ????????]
A TAILOR-MADE WORLD FEDERATION OF DEMOCRATIC YOUTH 79
The resolutions passed by the Conference, which had been carefully prepared by the secretariat, all went the communist way. Many of these were directly political: they supported the democratic struggle of the EPON in Greece,’‘ of the nationalists in Indonesia and so on, and called for free access to information about atomic science. 80
The organization’s triennial congress and annual council had no real weight compared with the Secretariat, whose permanence belied its theoretical subordination to these policy-making bodies. That is why the communists held four of the five places: Guy de Boysson (France) was President, Frances Damon (USA) Treasurer, and Herbert Williams and Kutty Hookham were secretaries. The only non-communist on the Secretariat was a fellow traveller, the Danish lieutenant Svend Beyer-Pedersen.80
Palacek is a good example. Soon after the communists seized power in Czechoslovakia in 1948 the former President of the World Youth Council was arrested, accused of spying for the CIA and sentenced to 13 years in prison. He spent the next eight years in Pankrác prison in Prague, and in the camps of Mirov (Moravia) and Jachymov, the latter known for its uranium mines. His wartime friendships were of no avail to him. 81
note 88 .... . It was as a broken man that he was finally rehabilitated in 1966 by the Supreme Court; but he had sufficient strength left to become, in 1968, cofounder of Club 231, the club of former political prisoners who had been unjustly sentenced under Article 231. 241
Harold J. Laski, ‘Students and Politics’. The Nation, New York, 21 December 1946, pp. 727-8; During its progress it became clear, in fact, that the conference was dominated by the communist youth who had arranged its programme and procedure so that the strategic control of the conference’s policy was almost wholly in their hands. 82
The third note, dated 11 January, was by Mrs Powell and is of unusual vehemence: citeres over 84-5
The Creation of the International Union of Students 86
The meeting that created the International Union of Students (lUS) took place in Prague in August 1946, less than a year after the founding of the WFDY in London. 86
The lUS was born in 1944, somewhere between London and Prague. In London, when the war against Hitler was almost won, it seemed important to consider the future of the student movement. The International Council of Students, which had been created in 1941 (see above, p. 52) continued to function until the end of 1944 when, according to its general secretary Margot Gale, it decided to wind itself up to make room for a better form of international cooperation. 86
The NUS called a meeting of students from the allied countries for 24-25 March 1945. ... Thirteen nations took part. 87
It was decided to set up an International Preparatory Committee to plan a constituent congress for 10-11 November 1945. It was made up of seven countries: Canada, China, the USA, France. England, the USSR and Yugoslavia, 87
The second controversy was about the ‘politicization’ of the new body. Most of the Western student unions wanted it to be completely non-political and to concern itself with purely student activities. 88
But by the end of the meeting the balance of power within it had tilted decisively towards the communists, because the London meeting enlarged the Preparatory Committee. Though Canada was dropped, representatives were added from Belgium, Denmark and India. Two seats were kept open for a Latin American and a Dominion country, both yet to be specified. The communists now had a majority on the Preparatory Committee, which :hey had not had before. 88 [??????]
Josza Grohman had spent four years in Nazi prisons. He had been a ‘submarine’ since 1937. 88 [?????]
He also exerted pressure to get the embryonic organization to join the WFDY. Although they were now in a minority, the non-communists successfully opposed these ideas. 89 [!!!!!!!!!!!]
... the minority representatives formed a “bloc” to take common counsel. 89 [det de/han skælder kommunisterne ud for]
PROFILE OF STUDENT UNIONS IN THE WEST
France England The United States og det er det hele 89-93
UNEF was passive during the war, even if it did not actually collaborate. Those students who did resist (communists, socialists, Young Christian and so on) formed the Forces Unies de la Jeunesse Patriotique. 89
‘Charte de Grenoble’, was the foundation document of student syndicalism and the rebirth of the UNEF. It defined the student as ‘a young intellectual worker’, and proclaimed its intention to be rid of all state or political tutelage, to go beyond student problems considered in isolation, and to integrate students into the general life of society. ‘There are no specifically student problems, but there are student aspects of general problems’, - such was the new motto of the UNEF. 90-1
One of these, the London School of Economics, which since the 1930s had been dominated by the communists, played a very active part in the NUS. 91
They defended tooth and claw the doctrine of ‘students as such’, while systematically promoting the interests of the Soviet bloc. [??????] 92
Which student organization should represent India on the preparatory committees? 92
us National Student Association (NSA) ... This left-wing minority was systematically opposed by the four Catholic delegates 92 !?
THE INTERNATIONAL PREPARATORY COMMITTEE 93
The Soviets controlled it from the beginning. 93
The UNEF delegation - discreditable role during the occupation weighed on it so much that it could not prevent the UPOE being represented alongside it.- The UPOE was represented by a communist, Joseph Roger, ... The communists controlled the Danish, [????????????] Czech, Yugoslav and Indian representatives. 93
note: 35. The list refers to the third session of the IPC in Prague, 8-3 April 1946, and was found in the archives of COSEC at the Institute of Social History in Amsterdam. Ref: IUS/VIII 1-3.
Although Madden quibbles today about his formal membership of the Party, Josza Grohman and Jiri Pelikan, the Czech fathers of the lUS, have confirmed that he was a communist ‘submarine’. Madden agreed to be resident in Prague, together with Carmel Brickman, another ‘submarine’ in the NUS. He and Grohman swiftly emerged as leaders of the IPC, becoming respectively its President and its General Secretary. 93
... the Czech government was not communist (although its prime minister Fierlinger was a cryptocommunist. ... It strove very hard to mitigate this division by presenting itself as a bridge between East and West, and until 1948 it successfully presented itself to the world as such. The Soviets aimed shortly to bring Czechoslovakia entirely into their orbit, by infiltration if possible, but by brute force in 1948 when infiltration had not done its work sufficiently well. 94
It is possible, on the basis of the few documents found in its archives, to form an idea about the state of mind that prevailed throughout 1946 within the Foreign Office. The experience with the World Youth Conference and the awareness that they had unwittingly helped the Soviets to create a new subversive international organization had traumatized officials in charge of cultural relations. Some of them had now come to see communists everywhere and behind every international event. 94
“Peaceful penetration from within by exponents of communist ideology have been specially noticeable in the field of youth organizations.” 94
94 jvf 96 social work jvf students ?????
THE PRAGUE CONGRESS, 18-31 AUGUST 1946 (IUS) 97
... nearly 300 students from 38 countries. ... represented the main political and religions groupings 97
Danmark var med 97
... Credentials Committee refused recognition to the delegation from the Italian national union because of the way it was made up. It will be recalled that the French delegation consisted not only of its national union, the UNEF, but also contained a representative of the communist-inclined UJRF. 98
You did not have to be a communist to be opposed to Franco or to reject the corporatist spirit of most the Western national unions. [hvorfor glemmer han det i øvrigt i sine analyser ????] note 52, 245
note 58. To me the figures appear to be the minimum, since my oral and archival researches have enabled me to identify communists, fellow travellers and/or submarines in many other delegations: that of Denmark, for example. Was heavily infiltrated by the communists. 245 ??????
Therefore I have no choice but to declare that the Dutch Union of Students will not become a member of the lUS. 102
Non-communists such as Ellis, Trouvat and Meert occupied important places and gave the impression to other noncommunists that the movement had been launched on a sound basis. 103
BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRAGUE COUP (NOVEMBER 1947 TO FEBRUARY 1948) 104
IUS ... they created a secretariat in Prague to deal with current affairs when the Executive was not in session. This step, which contravened the decision of the 1946 Prague Conference not to have a secretariat, made the IUS the instrument of a body that, except for the black American Bill Ellis and the Cuban Vasquez, was made up entirely of communists. The most important section of the Secretariat was already the Colonial Bureau, which was later formally set up by the IUS Council of August 1947. 104 [det er vel det UK FO ikke kan lide]
The 1947 Council refused to admit the Swiss National Union to membership: the strict political neutrality of the Swiss was said to make them ineligible. 105
- nearly 98 per cent of that sum from the following five countries: USSR, Kcs 1 669 090 ($34 000 at 1946 rates); Yugoslavia, Kcs 174 000; Finland, Kcs 20 187 ; Denmark, 106
The World Youth Festival in Prague, 1947 107
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT’S COUNTEROFFENSIVE AGAINST THE WFDY 107
Ernest Bevin and Herbert Morrison, Philip Noel-Baker and Hector McNeil were just some of those who were now intensely suspicious of the WFDY and the IUS. For the past two years the Foreign Office had tried to counter the WFDY by setting up a rival non-communist body - the future World Assembly of Youth (WAY) 107
Philip Noel-Baker: “I annex a brief summary of the history of the Federation. It will be seen that the Federation has every appearance of a creation of the Soviet Government for their own political purposes. In fact it seems to be a clear example of the increasing tendency of the Soviet Government to create, or penetrate, international bodies of an apparently harmless character for the purpose of spreading communist ideas and propaganda. In practice that means that they are used for propaganda against Great Britain. (WFDY) 108
cabinet minutes of 29 July 1946: ... . If we opposed the Federation, would this not merely encourage the growth of communist influence in it? 109 !!!
... McNeil reported back to the Foreign Office:
Sir Stafford Cripps, however, suggested that we, the Foreign Office, might from Paris get copies of the resolutions accepted by the WFDY ... and examine how many of these resolutions were really communist in tone. 110
The World Youth Festival, which was shortly to take place in Prague, would show up the British and the Americans in a pathetic light. 111
ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PRAGUE FESTIVAL 112
Initially it was to have taken place in Copenhagen: according to a Foreign Office document, Svend Beyer-Pedersen persuaded not only the Danish National Union to organize the festival, but even the Danish cabinet to make a grant of 500 000 kroner. .... The Danish Prime Minister and the Danish Minister of Finance were unable to reach agreement on this point, and in order to avoid the fall of the Danish Government the Festival Plan was abandoned, ... Jan Masaryk then agreed that the Festival would take place in Prague. 112
1946. On 25 November that year President Truman set up a temporary commission to investigate the loyalty of federal officials. 115 ff
As long ago as 1938 the House of Representatives Congress joined in. As long ago as 1938 the House of Representatives combat Nazi, fascist and communist influences in the United States. 115
The protests of a Czech translator, Mijimir Sonkup, who accused them of violating Czech civil liberties, were of no avail.^^ Svobodne Slovo, a socialist national daily paper, denounced that incident under the evocative headline ‘Gestapoism at the Festival’ 119
[State Department] It was considered wrong to divulge information that came from secret intelligence; and ‘in any case, it is not a legitimate function of a Government agency to go so far as to advise private individuals or organisations concerning the conduct of their activities’. Little did the State Department imagine the scope that the American cultural counteroffensive would assume within a few years. 121
THE VIEW OF THE FRENCH EMBASSY 122
And in his ‘brief assessment of French activity’ the ambassador commented on the large and pluralist French contingent, ‘some 4,500 in all’. ... The only snag had been the colonial question. The Festival had offered a magnificent platform to colonial youth the world over, including those from Vietnam, Algeria, and Morocco. 122
BRITISH REACTIONS 123
Two hundred and twenty young conservatives had issued a press communiqué which complained that ‘all we got was Communism stuffed down our throats for breakfast, lunch and dinner.’ 123
The Students after the Creation of the Cominform 125
It took the leaders of the Western communist parties a little time to learn how definitive and irremediable the rupture was. Until September 1947 they thought they could still return to office in coalition governments. But they would be sharply called to order at the meeting that created the Communist Information Bureau, or Cominform. [ctr. Jeg troede, at Komintern havde formel styring, mens Kominform var formelt informativ]. 125
But the Cominform was to be neither a decision-making body nor an executive one: its function was simply to register and pass on Soviet orders to all the countries and organizations under its control. 125
THE WFDY EXPELS SVEND BEYER-PEDERSEN 127
So on 18 December 1947 Pedersen was summoned from Copenhagen to Paris by a small committee made up exclusively of the resident communists. This special meeting decided unanimously to suspend not only him but three Danish organizations (Liberal/Radical Youth, Conservative Youth, and Syndicalist Youth) and the Swedish Liberal Youth. 127
... but he actually had to go into hiding: his former comrades several times threatened his life and that of his children, according to two reports, the first by the State Department’ and the second by the Foreign Office. 127

Mr Pedersen was successful in evacuating his family to Copenhagen, where he found that Danish communists were already active against the Liberal and Conservative elements in youth work, and that 15 individuals had been 'liquidated' by the Danish communists within the period of one month. He immediately demanded and obtained police protection and guard for himself and his family in his home in Copenhagen. He has however been informed by his government that his position may become untenable and that he should be prepared to take immediate steps to leave the country.' [kilden opgives således, note 7, 'A Report on the development and activities of the WFDY', by Mrs Powell (?), FO 924/673. Secret, March 1948, p. 3.] side 248, 127-8
In March 1948 a Foreign Office official reported that Pedersen had gone underground. Pedersen was in fact assassinated in Copenhagen some years later, on 23 August 1953, though a link between the events cannot be established. 128
February 1948. The South-East Asian Youth Conference for Peace and Independence. CALCUTTA 129
When, during the next few months, insurrections broke out in Burma (March), Malaysia (June) and Indonesia (July), it was swiftly asserted in the West that Moscow had used the conference and the local communist parties to prepare them. ... A more searching analysis by Ruth T. McVey ... According to her the Calcutta conference was more designed to promote the Zhdanov doctrine of the two camps than to prepare revolutionary insurrections .... ,. The doctrine of the two camps was directed against those Asian governments and nationalist parties that, like Nehru’s, were not openly pro-Soviet .... The Conference decided that the WFDY should set up a Colonial Bureau, as the lUS had already done in August 1947. 130
As late as December 1947 Espoirs, the bulletin of the Gaullist students, still welcomed the announcement that the American national union, the NSA, was joining the lUS. 131
It was much the same in most other Western national unions. As 1948 began they all thought it was incumbent on students to show, through the IUS, that there was both a possibility and indeed a necessity for peaceful coexistence. It was not so much despite but because of the Cold War that the national unions of Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia and the United States decided to remain within the IUS. 131
THE FIRST SERIOUS CRISIS: THE lUS AND THE PRAGUE COUP 131
February 1948. The lUS, following the example of the WFDY, offered its immediate and total support to the communist Action Committees of the National Front, which the Union of Young Czechs (SCM) and of Young Slovaks (SSM) had created at the behest of Klement Gottwald.132
beskrivelse 132, sml Hansen m fl
note 28 Jaroslav Boucek, the Czech delegate at the WFDY, informed the readers of the WFDY’s information bulletin that the SCM and the SSM had demanded the expulsion of traitors from the cabinet and the creation of a new government headed by Gottwald. 250
At first President Benès would not accept the resignations of the democratic ministers; but Prime Minister Gottwald insisted that they be accepted and a new government formed. 132 [var Gottwald allerede premierminister ???].
Throughout the country, communist ‘action committees’ forcibly seized public buildings. And violent demonstrations broke out in Prague. The Party mobilized its working-class members through the People’s Militia and its students through Action Committees under Jiri Pelikan. [!!!!!]
On 25 February, responding to a call from Navratil, president of the Prague Student Union, some 10 000 students marched on Hradcany Castle in support of President Benès and the ministers who had resigned. 132
... in the end Benès submitted to Gottwald’s demands. 132
Immediately after the war, Courts of Honour had been set up to purge the universities of collaborators; but these tribunals had been closed down at the beginning of 1947, when 1800 cases were still waiting to be dealt with. The Action Committees now revived the tribunals. 133
Jim Smith ... presented to the IUS Secretariat a memorandum that demanded condemnation of police violence, denunciation of the enforced dissolution of the Czech national union, and so on. ... Jim Smith resigned immediately and drew up a damning report about the IUS and its President. 133
Socialist-National Party, whose leader. V. Krajina, was ‘a secret agent of the Americans’ and ‘a collaborator’ who wanted to form an anticommunist government. (IUS rapport) 134
The Danish and Swedish national unions disaffiliated immediately. [???? sml. Ref IUS kongr udvandring] Those of the United States, Canada, Belgium and Australia broke off negotiations for affiliation. 135
THE NUS AND THE PRAGUE COUP 135
Stanley Jenkins, a student at Cardiff Technical College. 137
Executive to send Jenkins to Prague, officially to represent the NUS at the Sokol Festival in July; unofficially to check the information provided by the IUS Secretariat. 137
Stanley Josephs from Manchester went on the offensive by quoting a violently anti-British resolution that had been passed by the IUS Executive in Bucharest in May 1948: ‘The attacks of the imperialist forces, led by the USA and Great Britain, constitute the major threat of a new war’.137
Stanley Jenkins, whose report was heard in tense silence. Jenkins’ temperament was cool and distant, and he never gave the impression of wanting to dominate or even convince his audience; but he was somebody to whom one listened with respect. His description of his experiences in Czechoslovakia was striking. He gave examples of the extreme tension and fear that had gripped Czech students 137
Rather he proposed a strategy of constructive opposition within the IUS. In essence, he formulated what was to be NUS policy over the next two years. 137
The Executive ‘recommended’ that the lUS commissions of investigation should be more representative in character and that the IUS should investigate more intensively the procedure for entry to the universities. [??????] 138
Jenkins’ speech had the effect of moving the NUS from being an organization allied to communism to becoming a vigilant and critical partner. 138
THE FRENCH “YES, BUT...” AT NICE ... April 1948, 138
In Britain the Foreign Office was glad to see itself steadily less isolated in its anticommunist crusade. 139
From now on the French and British student unions were in the same camp: that of constructive opposition. 139
'With astounding recklessness’, writes De Bernis, the IUS had sent a letter to French students in which the UNEF was reproached for not having taken up a clear enough position on the war in Indo-China. .... The UNEF Executive took a very serious view of this, not least because it had itself condemned ‘the fratricidal war in Viet-Nam’ in February 1948. At its meeting in July 1948 it unanimously demanded that this letter be withdrawn. 140
He quoted Trouvat to the effect that ‘this would be the first time that an IUS meeting would take place in a Western country 140
FAILURE OF THE FIRST ATTEMPT TO SET UP A RIVAL STUDENT ORGANIZATION (BRUSSELS, SEPTEMBER 1948) 140
The Danish national union had disaffiliated, but it too refused to go. Fenn Laursen, the president of the DFS, wrote to Frits Schneiders and Morzer Bruijns, the Dutch student leaders at Leyden University, that the IUS must be given one more chance: ‘If you let the Iron Curtain go one inch more down by refusing to cooperate with Eastern Europe, it means that we are one step nearer the war’. The DFS still had bilateral relations with each of the east European unions, which it did not want to put at risk.
Only eight national unions (from the USA, Austria, Scotland, Sweden, Canada, Holland, Switzerland and Belgium) took part in the Brussels discussions, and even then with some reservations. Contrary to the expectations of some, the Americans were no keener than the Danes or the French on a rival organization. 141
THE SECOND SERIOUS CRISIS: THE lUS COUNCIL IN PARIS AND THE MARSHALL PLAN 142
The Paris council meeting lasted nearly eleven days, began with a reception at the Élysée 142
The national unions of Denmark, the United States, Sweden, Switzerland and Canada were present, but merely with observer status: 143
[Blumenau ... comment in my diary:] That the Soviets know how not to abuse the majority which they can undoubtedly command on the Council is a real tribute to their maturity’. 144
I have come to the conclusion that I have made a very grave mistake when I voted for the Main Resolution on that last evening in Paris. ... : ‘In Paris I was blind to the essential tactics of the thing and, above all, false to my real principles’; and from that time onwards he was an advocate of disaffiliation from the lUS. 145
THE NUS REMAINS IN THE lUS, BUT LEAVES THE WFDY 146
The year 1949 would sec the creation in Britain of the National Association of Labour Student Organizations (NALSO), which was very hostile to the Communist Party and particularly to its student section, the Student Labour Federation (SLF). 146
FRANCE LEAVES THE lUS: LE TOUQUET APRIL 1949 147
The Gaullist students of the RPF exploded with anger. They paid less attention to what Trouvat had actually said than to the fact that he had no business to take a part at all in a demonstration at which the Vietnamese flag had been flown. They demanded the resignation of ‘Trouvat-Ho Chi Minh’. 147
At the congress at Le Touquet, Trouvat’s report was accepted, but he himself was censured (by 149 to 81, with 17 abstentions) for having taken part in the demonstration on 21 February. After a passionate debate the Congress then decided, by 158 votes to 104 with eight abstentions, to withdraw from the lUS, though it agreed to continue to take a part in its practical activities. 147
THE THIRD SERIOUS CRISIS: THE ARREST OF THE YUGOSLAVS AT THE SOFIA COUNCIL 148
Stalin had hoped that the Yugoslav Communist Party would overthrow Marshal Tito. When that did not happen, he had ordered the Cominform to excommunicate Yugoslavia. 148
The first serious incident between the lUS and the Yugoslavs happened during the second World Youth and Student Festival in Budapest. On the day it opened, 14 August 1949, the Yugoslav representative on the Preparatory Committee was arrested and, without any explanation, expelled from Hungary. The Yugoslav Executive demanded that the lUS and the WFDY should lodge an official protest with the Hungarian authorities. The lUS refused to condemn Hungary, but did invite the Yugoslavs to its forthcoming council meeting in Sofia. 148-9
The drama began even before the Sofia council meeting had been officially opened. A few hours after their arrival in Sofia the Scottish and Danish representatives, Dick Pirie and Stig Andersen, [????? vi var jo meldt ud] witnessed five members of the Yugoslav delegation, led by Tomovic, one of the founding fathers of the lUS, being arrested in the hotel corridor by the Bulgarian police; later they were forcibly deported from the country.« 149

White Book on the aggressive activities of the Soviet, Polish, Czech, Romanian and Bulgarian governments directed against Yugoslavia, (Belgrade; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1951).

Note 86 253
Of course the British, French and Danish representatives protested to the lUS Secretariat; but the lUS sheltered behind the official Bulgarian communiqué, and in the Council meeting the Yugoslav students were denounced as ‘fascist agents, henchmen of imperialism, and traitors to peace’. 149 [svenskerne ????????????????]

Note 89. Pat Baker, ‘Report of the 4th IUS council in Sofia, p. 5, NSA Archives, Hoover Library, Box 40. P. 253

LONDON 1949: MEETING OF THE WESTERN NATIONAL UNIONS 151
... the conference brought together all the most important non-communist national unions: those of South Africa, England, Scotland (these being the only three who were still members), Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the United States, France, Ireland, Italy, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, West Germany and the Netherlands. 151
The NUS leadership explained that it expected a Western presence to be able to reform the lUS from within. 151
But the British case was not well received by the other unions. 151
The most trenchant criticisms came from the Swedish national union, and especially from 22-year-old Olof Palme, chairman of its international committee. 152

note 98. See Bertil Östergren, Vem är Olof? (Stockholm, 1984). 253

THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE lUS EXECUTIVE MEETING IN LONDON 152
THE FOURTH SERIOUS CRISIS: THE EXPULSION OF THE YUGOSLAVS (FEBRUARY 1950) 154
The Executive therefore devoted a good part of its session to this matter, and even agreed to give a hearing on 6 February to Jaksa Bucevic, a representative of the Student Section of the People’s Youth of Yugoslavia 155
Grohman: Second question: Did the Yugoslav student organization support the fight of the democratic students of Greece, especially in connection with the incident when Greek fascists were allowed to enter Yugoslav territory and attack democratic Greek students from behind?... Bucevic: ...The Greek democrats in our country will confirm that we have not helped the Greek monarcho-fascists; and the statement that we did so is a fiction. 155
Magnussen (Danish non-communist) 155
??? Georgieva: Only 140 students have been arrested, according to Mr Bucevic. Actually 390 have been expelled and 400 have been persecuted... Bucevic: The figure of 140 refers to Belgrade only. ??? 155
The outcome of the proceedings was not in doubt. In vain did Jenkins point to a lack of proof and propose that, before any decision was taken, a commission of enquiry should be sent to Yugoslavia: his was the only vote (Magnussen being only an observer) that was cast against the otherwise unanimous decision to break off all relations between the IUS and the SEJPY. ‘More than ten member organizations of the IUS’, it was said, had written in to demand this rupture. 156
SUSPENSION OF NUS MEMBERSHIP, CARDIFF, FEBRUARY 1950 156
19 February 1950. By 86 to 27 with 24 abstentions, the NUS, ... voted for a temporary suspension of IUS membership .... by 67 to 25 with 14 abstentions, it refused. to join the new World Assembly of Youth). 156-7
Even though the suspension was temporary, a page had been well and truly turned, to the delight of Olof Palme. On 23 April the Swedish NUS officially welcomed the British decision and at the same time proposed the creation of an alternative structure that, in order not to scare off the British, should consist of no more than an annual conference.

Note 115. Its communiqué of 23 April 1950 is reproduced in full in the
Danish student magazine Studentenbladet, no. 9 (31 May 1950), pp. 11-13.

There was also great satisfaction at the Foreign Office: ‘Tito’s regime seems to serve an admirable subsidiary purpose in persuading such as Jenkins and Zilliacus of the falseness of communist propaganda. I think we may congratulate ourselves on the way NUS disenchantment with the IUS has come about without pressure from us’. 157
[Jenkins] A recent visit of his to India ... He was accused of having been ‘financed by Indian industrialists’, of ‘maligning the militant student movement led by the AISF”, of ‘denying or acting as apologist for Nehru’s brutal terror and supporting the leaders of the AISC, tool of reaction in the student movement’.157
note 120. A summary of the group’s conclusions appeared in Student Chronicle, June 1950. They were favourable to the Yugoslav case: 1. Yugoslavia could not be considered a fascist country. 2. The information provided by the IUS was thoroughly distorted. 3. Arrests had certainly taken place after the Cominform resolution: 450 students were in prison for espionage or propaganda. 4. A thousand students had been expelled, but 800 of them had been readmitted. 5. The condition of students in Yugoslavia were good. 254
Another apple of discord had appeared between the NUS and the IUS: it related to the Stockholm Peace Appeal. This condemned the use of atomic weapons, but not that of other armaments which, in the absence of atomic weapons, would have given the Soviet Union a massive supremacy over the West. At an IUS executive meeting in Moscow, Bill Rust had scandalized the Soviets by refusing, during a televised ceremony, to sign the Stockholm Appeal as it stood. Viewers would have noticed, when it came to Rust’s turn, that it seemed to take a long time for him to write his short name: it was in fact because, alongside his name he had written the proviso: ‘whilst these principles apply to all weapons of mass destruction’. 158
CONFIRMATION OF FRENCH DISAFFILIATION, BUT THE ELECTION OF DE BERNIS 158
THE FIFTH SERIOUS CRISIS: THE KOREAN WAR AND THE SECOND IUS CONGRESS 159
Only one Foreign Office report has survived on the subject of preparations for the Prague Congress; and this shows the worry of the British officials that there might after all be a reconciliation. 159
The State Department too was very alert this time. ....The State Department’s first reaction was to advise Erskine Childers against taking any part,’ even though Childers expected to ‘defend the American position and use the Congress as a springboard for a new International to oppose the communist IUS’. 159
The State Department sought to gather as much information as possible about those who nevertheless did go to the Congress: 65 of its embassies and consulates were asked to find out what they could.’ Replies came in from all round the world: in Dakar, for instance, the American authorities contacted the ‘Director-General of the Interior Ministry with responsibility for Security and Subversive Activities’ to ask for details of Senegalese delegates. The Quai d’Orsay acted in a similar manner 159
SEPTEMBER 1950: A STALINIST CLIMAX
548 delegates, 164 observers, 444 visitors and 18 fraternal delegates - altogether 1174 students from 78 countries and territories - took part in the second IUS Congress in Prague from 14-26 August 1950. 159-60
[Grohman] His attacks on the Marshall Plan, the Yugoslav fascists and Jenkins immediately made it obvious that the spirit of the Congress would be one of confrontation, not of compromise. His report, wrote De Bernis, ‘was of a sectarianism seldom before achieved: it is a curious way to create unity to denounce all those who are not in agreement as enemies of unity and peace (this comes out on every page) and not to face the problems that this creates’. 160
The climax of the hysterical hatred deliberately staged by the organizers of the Congress came with the speech of Stig Andersen, the Danish observer. His speech was far less provocative than that of Jenkins. He merely explained that ‘the Danish students could not endorse the Stockholm Appeal’, but at this mild sentence pandemonium broke loose. 164
DE BERNIS COMPROMISES THE UNEF 164
[Jenkins] He and Palme now conducted the consultations that would lead to the creation of a new Student International, the ISC/COSEC. During the Congress the Western national unions (of South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, USA, France, England, Scotland, Canada, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark) had four times met informally to take stock of the possibilities for international cooperation on the Western side. 165-6
The results of Prague were welcomed by the Foreign Office, which had kept a close watch on the proceedings of the Congress and on what the NUS and Scottish students had done there. 166
They had some reason to fear retribution: John Marquesee, a CISC activist and one of the few Americans who had identified himself in Prague, had publicly supported the anti-American resolution on the Korean War. ... soon afterwards the American press reported that Cornell University had ‘reconsidered’ Marquesee’s student status. 166
26 July 1949 had seen the creation, in Brussels, of the World Assembly of Youth. 167
The Creation of the World Assembly of Youth 168
,, and 1949 saw the beginning of a still further tightening of ideological discipline by the purging of a whole swathe of old communist politicians whom Stalin suspected of harbouring subversive sympathies with Tito. 168
The West, too, tried to eradicate subversives - genuine or suspected communists - as McCarthyism got under way. 168
The British TUC and the American CIO had already withdrawn from the executive of the World Federation of Trade Unions in January 1949. At the end of the year they formed, with other noncommunist trade unions, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). 168
note 1. The ICFTU was created in London at a meeting from 28 November to 9 December, 1949. See Foreign Relations of the US, 1949, vol. V, Washington, 1981, pp. 851/2. 256
The Foreign Office arranged two meetings for Lady Cripps, the first at 10 Downing Street, for which Svend Beyer-Pedersen had been specially brought over from Copenhagen, and the second with Ernest Bevin himself. 169
The note ends by pointing out what was at stake in the following summer’s Conference at Church House, Westminster [aug. 1948], which the Foreign Office had instigated: ‘We hope that this conference will give rise to a permanent organization which will be genuinely representative of youth.... 169-70
Bevin also made sure of Labour Party support. 170
THE FIRST COUNCIL OF THE WAY (BRUSSELS, 1-7 AUGUST 1949) 172
Now the British had organized, set afoot and financed the WAY; but because it was a liberal organization, it was possible for them to be defeated in the first elections. 173 [jvf med tidl:]
... he explained to his American (and Catholic) friend Donald Sullivan that the choice of Sauvé had not been accidental: ‘It seemed preferable that the President of the WAY should be neither too typically European nor be an official Catholic leader’. Nor would it have been appropriate for the President to have been an American, since this would risk creating the impression that the WAY was ‘a purely American creation, which we know to be absolutely not the case’. Finally, the Quebecker ‘had the advantage of being young and of being a kind of bridge between our continents’ . 173 [!!!!!!!!!!!!!!}
Of course, as democrats, they accepted their defeat with good grace. 173
The International Student Conference 174
Olof Palme, the chairman of the International Committee of the Swedish Federation of Students (SFS), was the heart and soul of the drive to create a new organization. The traditional neutrality of Sweden did not stop its student leaders from having the best of relations with the American authorities. We find Palme, on his return from the Prague Congress, which he had attended as an observer, informing the American embassy in Stockholm that he had decided to create a new non-communist International. We learn from a telegram of the embassy [Robert F. Woodward] to the State Department that he had also given them the names of the Swedish communists who had been present in Prague. 174 [!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]
Hans Göran Franck, leader of the [communist) delegation to Prague President of the crypto-communist organization Clarté. ... In the same file there is a translation the embassy had made of an article Palme had written about the Prague Congress for the conservative Svenska Bladet (29 August 1950), Note 2 257
So in October 1950 the SFS, together with all the other Scandinavian national unions except that of Finland, issued invitations to the first International Student Conference, to meet in Stockholm in December. The Swedish Ministry of Education provided the finances. 174
[NSA] It drew its leaders - often members of minority groups: blacks, Catholics and especially Jews - from the most liberal strata of American society. Their hostility to communism was matched only by their opposition to McCarthyism. ... ‘ those who trampled on our freedoms in the United States and ... who perpetuate or support colonialism’. 175
The NSA was still hesitant about the course it should follow, and its Congress voted not to enter into the question of a new organization. 175
The future of international student cooperation seemed to hang on the NUS Council at Liverpool in November 1950. Among the 130 observers were the leading figures of the student world: on the one side Olof Palme and the Yugoslav Jacsa Bucevic; on the other Tom Madden and the Australian Ebbals from the IUS. Grohman and four other lUS leaders had been refused entry visas, whilst Berlinguer was turned back at Heathrow. 176
... the vote was extremely close: 81 for staying within the lUS against 79 with four abstentions. A call vote was then demanded. 176
After two hectic hours the Liverpool council decided by 98 to 40 with 14 abstentions to organize, as soon as possible or at least before the next NUS council meeting in March, a national referendum on lUS membership. 177
Of course the IUS welcomed the historic vote in Liverpool as ‘a great victory’. But it was taken very badly by the British authorities. 177
[UNEF] The Gaullists and the far right, led by Jean-Marie Le Pen, raged against him [De Bernis]. 178
De Bernis was replaced by Sarvonat. 178
[UNEF] Its new leaders, however, had no desire to join the maximalist camp there: shortly before leaving for Stockholm, Sarvonat declared to Combat that there was no question of creating a Western bloc: 178
The State Department telegraphed the embassy: ‘Dpt interested in encouraging formation new international organization. At same time believe too overt display of official interest might hamper rather than stimulate such action by natl student unions’. 179
Sixty-eight delegates from 21 national unions ... took part in the Stockholm meeting. Given the recent upheavals, the creation of a new International, which some delegations had secretly hoped for, was never on the agenda. 179
note 24. Those of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, England, Scotland, Finland, France, Iceland, Italy, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, West Germany, Turkey, South Africa and Yugoslavia. The last two of these participated as observers. A number of East Europeans in exile also attended as observers, among them the Czech Jaroslav Zich. 258
Palme realized it would be dangerous to rush matters. He now spoke up for a loose system of cooperation, and the Conference gave priority to discussions on how this could be achieved on a basis of strict equality and mutual respect. So that the large national unions should not dominate, the proportional voting system in use at the IUS was abandoned in favour of each national union having one vote. 179
Only Allard K. Lowenstein, the American President, ventured to call for the creation of a permanent structure, endowed with a central governing body and designed as a weapon against the IUS. In a passionate speech he proclaimed loud and long that the time had come to counter communist propaganda among the students through a genuinely democratic body: 179
Though Lowenstein’s proposals met with surreptitious support from the smaller European unions (Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria and West Germany), they were ‘indignantly’ rejected by the heavyweights. His speech, so the minutes record, was ‘officially regretted’ and was even immediately condemned by a gathering that wanted to be strictly non-political. Even Sarvonat protested: ‘By making a speech reflecting the foreign policy of the United States, he has stepped over the limits which the national unions at this conference have accepted’. [!!!!!!!] 180
After lengthy discussions the Conference adopted a compromise motion put forward by New Zealand. This established a very loose organization without a permanent central executive; but each year an International Student Conference (ISC) should meet to formulate a practical programme. Its execution would then be delegated, with specific projects being entrusted to designated national unions. 180
... not much more than this could have been expected. This was also the conclusion reached by the American embassy, which welcomed the results of Stockholm, and especially the programme of help for underdeveloped countries. 181
The results of the vote were again very close ... 18 000 voted for disaffiliation, 15 000 for continued membership. [NUS] 181
In November 1951 the annual congress of the NSA took place in Minneapolis. It began by condemning McCarthyism, and then in effect supported Eisenberg against Lowenstein, pronouncing itself against any ‘western union of students’ because ‘the great majority of the students of Europe and Asia would consider that as a step towards a break with the IUS and would not therefore accept it’. 181
Although at Stockholm the UNEF had opposed any idea of a Western International, it reversed its position and arranged a conference in Nancy in the autumn of 1951 with the idea of creating a West European international union. Sarvonat was a convinced federalist, and it seems that he was all the more willing to play the European card as he hoped for near limitless funding from the newly formed European Youth Campaign (which between 1951 and 1959 was to receive $1.3 million from the CIA). But the British and the Scandinavians were hostile to the idea and had no difficulty in scuppering the French initiative. The Scandinavian countries sent only one observer to Nancy: Olof Palme. 182

Celina Bledowska and Jonathan Bloch, KGB/CIA Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Operations (London: Bison Books, 1987)

THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL STUDENT CONFERENCE: THE CREATION OF COSEC IN EDINBURGH, JANUARY 1952 183
That, in fact, would happen in Edinburgh a few months later with the creation of a coordinating secretariat, or COSEC. 182
... the system of ‘delegated responsibility’ had turned out to be quite ineffective. 183
The second ISC welcomed not only 23 members, but also ‘fraternal observers’ (who took full part in the proceedings but did not vote) from the national unions of Israel and Indonesia, and ‘observers’ from those of Hong Kong, Iraq, Malaysia, Brazil and South Africa. 183
The Western governments were not yet quite ready for this step; but they were slowly moving from passive observation to active intervention in student affairs. This change showed itself in the first instance over the choice of a permanent secretary for the ISC. Who should be appointed to this strategic post? For the NSA and the State Department the answer was obvious: Dean Acheson thought that Olof Palme would be the ideal person: 184
Palme has replied he is unwilling due his duties within Swed resulting from Presidency of SFS and that he is planning accept position in Swed Fonserv some time in fall 1952. 184
Washington decided to communicate directly with the Swedish Foreign Office, with which ‘the SFS was in constant touch’, and to urge it to persuade Palme: 184
[noterne virker ikke konsistente i dette afsnit]
Third symbol: Halsted Holman before the Un-American Activities Committee 187-8 [!!!!!!!!!!!!!!]
The World Youth Festival of Berlin, 1951 189
On 26 January 1951 Henri Queuille, the French Minister of the Interior, acting on advice from the Sûreté Nationale, expelled three of the four front organizations with headquarters in Paris: the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Federation of Democratic Women and the World Federation of Democratic Youth. The fourth. The World Peace Council, was expelled three months later. They were all given one month to wind up their affairs in France. 189
In February 1949 the IUS and the WFDY had been accepted as ‘consultative organizations’ by UNESCO; but this status was withdrawn in December 1952 because their partisan attitude did not conform to the fundamental principles of UNESCO. 189
Most of those who came from the West were therefore communists. The young people from Africa and Asia, on the other hand, had less experience of the communist movement, and they knew little of the history of the IUS and the WFDY. The visits of many of them were subsidized by a Solidarity Fund set up for this express purpose. At the Festivals they heard only the communist version of events: the allegation that the non-communists had abandoned them during their struggle against colonialism was hardly ever challenged. [der slap den ud !!] The success of the Soviets with the youth of Asia and Africa was incalculable. [det var jo, som beskrevet ris til egen røv] 190
The choice of Berlin was highly significant in the context of the Cold War. In Asia the flash point was Korea, where the war had just begun; but in Europe it was Germany: the Berlin blockade had failed, and the Pleven Plan envisaged the integration of the German army into a West European framework. 190
In West Germany Konrad Adenauer had the FDJ banned by his Council of Ministers (27 June 1951). 192
29 August the Italian authorities withdrew Enrico Berlinguer’s passport. 192
In May 1951 the Labour Party Executive declared that participation in the Festival was incompatible with party membership. 193
Jerome Waldo Goodman, editor of Harvard Crimson. 193
Lists of Other ‘subversives’ poured in from all over the world. 193
In February 1950 the three Western High Commissioners, the West German government and the Berlin Senate set up an ad hoc committee known as the August Committee. Its main purpose was to prepare the best possible reception for the thousands of young people who were bound, despite all East German efforts to discourage them, to visit the Western sectors. ... Positive measures included free entry to theatres and many cinemas; the publication of a special guidebook to West Berlin; a UNESCO exhibition on the Rights of Man; a pavilion devoted to the European Recovery Programme and another to the European Coordination Assembly; special broadcasts on Radio Free Europe; and the distribution of two million pamphlets and satirical booklets (for example ‘Wir brauchen keinen Marshall Plan’; ‘Berlin baut auf; and one written by a former official of the Freie Deutsche Jugend, entitled ‘Feinde Deutscher Jugend’ [det var jo væsentlig klogere !!] 194
note 29. McCloy had complained that the Germans had dragged their feet somewhat: they were obviously more nervous than the Americans about attracting quite so many visitors from the East. 261
Measures that might be described as negative were designed to keep as many young Westerners as possible away from the festival: passports, visas and permits to cross the Federal Republic were refused. 194
In the afternoon of 2 August the French authorities informed American officials in Vienna that a train carrying 650 Frenchmen was about to leave Innsbruck and would be Crossing. the American Zone of Germany via Passau, en route to Berlin. Vienna immediately telegraphed HICOG that the train should be stopped and the delegates sent back to the French Zone on the ground that they had no transit permits. That operation ended in failure because the special train went via Linz. 194-5
On the advice of the British authorities, they intercepted and turned back a British and a French train at Saalfelden. That operation involved a skirmish between American troops and the 2000 young passengers, during which several of the latter were hurt. 195
,,, the Festival .. welcomed nearly one and a half million participants, ... East Germans, 1 418 831; West Germans, 12 649; non-Germans, 22 158. The non-Germans came from 104 countries and included 4000 from France, 1500 from Italy and 900 from Britain. 195
Paradoxically it was the young East Germans who caused the greatest trouble to the GDR authorities. Many of these left Berlin feeling that they had been tricked. They had been promised an unceasing programme of festivities, but tickets for them, as we have seen, were few and far between; and for most of their free time they wandered aimlessly around the town, often seriously hungry. 196 [som vi gjorde til Europese Academie week i Amsterdam en gang i de tidlige 60ere. Det kræver omtanke og talent at organisere den slags].
The Americans counted 1 004 206 crossings into West Berlin by East Germans. ...where hot meals, sandwiches, exhibitions, free concerts and film shows, helicopter trips and so on awaited them. [revers] [her var det Vesten der vandt !!! statistik 197]
Between mid-day and 1300 Aug 15 FDJ chairman Erich Honecker broadcast rousing speech via loudspeakers to thousands of reliable, hard-core, FDJers assembled at 10 camps in Berlin Muggelsee, proclaiming militantly ‘we are going to accept the invitation of Mayor Reuter to visit West Berlin.... Some 8000 moved in.... 198
A West German charge on horseback drove most of the group back towards the Soviet sector and by 18.30 all the rest had been pushed out. Some were wounded and there were 115 arrests, including that of an East German policeman. 198 [ja så står der 1:1]
[George A. Morgan, the director of HICOG] .... Defections from beyond the Iron Curtain were few and the contacts with the West and with circles not connected with the Festival were extremely limited. 199
... the Festival demonstrated the importance and effectiveness of psychological warfare and the possibility of matching the communists at their own game. As McCloy wrote: ‘Unsuspected opportunities for Western psychological warfare have been revealed’.
This was the cue for the CIA to enter the picture. 199
The Great American Counteroffensive 200
This chapter will examine how it came about that the CIA built up a network of secret financial channels and confidential contacts to help youth and student organizations; why it was given responsibility for the International Student Conference (ISC) and the World Assembly of Youth (WAY); and why these bodies were not financed openly by the State Department or by other Western governments. It is clear that finance was badly needed: the ISC and the WAY were close to bankruptcy.
On 2 June 1952 Avrea Ingram, the new Vice-President of the NSA, reported to Dentzer on his recent visit to the Netherlands. The Dutch national union had been charged by the Edinburgh Conference with setting up COSEC, the Coordinating Secretariat of the ISC. The Dutch student president had been very pessimistic: COSEC seemed doomed from the start for lack of funds. 200
... the salvation of these bodies would depend on the involvement of the United States, the strongest and wealthiest country of the free world. Olof Palme had grasped this in 1950. After the Prague meeting he had written to Robert West that the NSA was the one great hope, and that it was essential to cooperate with the various American agencies to resolve the financial problems that he. West and the others had highlighted in Prague. ‘Last week I succeeded to have an interview with Paul Hoffman (he is also a Kenyon [College] man), and he showed considerable interest. So if you ever approach the Ford Foundation, he will have some idea what it is all about.’ The NSA leaders agreed with Palme that in a country as rich as the United States it should not be too difficult to raise public or private funds for their international activities.
Contrary to their expectations, the many approaches the NSA made to private companies and foundations were fruitless. 200-1
[note 10. 13 June 1951, confidential letter from Francis J. Collingan, head of the international Exchange of Persons Division (IEP) [State Dep.] to Kenneth Holland (Institute of International Education), NARA 800.4614/6-1351] 262:
As you know, in some parts of the world, students become prominent in government and in communal life immediately after the end of their studies. It is important that these future leaders should be friendly towards the United States. As you also know, in many countries youth as such is a political force of considerable importance and regularly ... exercises great influence in national development.... With the exception of trade unions and of intellectuals, no communist target groups have received as much assiduous attention from the Cominform as have students and youth. 201
A secret agreement with his own government seemed a reasonable price to pay for the survival of an organization in which he believed profoundly. That is how the NSA - and through it, the ISC - came to accept money from the CIA. Nor did it take long for almost all the other Western youth organizations to become involved. [Dentzer, NSA] 202
It was McCarthyism that was scaring off public and private institutions from helping the NSA. Much as the government wanted to meet the communist challenge, in the present hysterical climate it dared not help bodies such as the NSA and the ISC, which generally defended liberal and progressive causes. 202
Without being a left-wing organization, the NSA was radical enough to be a bete noire in many conservative American circles: it had supported the presidential candidature of Henry Wallace in 1948, opposed colonialism. Supported civil rights and academic freedom, had many black and Jewish members, and had had an outspoken radical leader in Lowenstein. It had been the first student organization to oppose McCarthyism, and had been the only one to organize racially integrated meetings in the Southern states. 202-3
If, therefore, it was felt necessary to help the Western youth organizations in their competition with the communists, it would have to be done secretly; and only the CIA could do that. 203
THE CIA: A SHADOW MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 204
The erroneous perception of the USSR was due, at least in part, to the absence of any American intelligence service worthy of that name. 204
[1947] The pragmatic President Truman had come to the conclusion that one could not negotiate with Stalin, and had decided ‘to stop these bastards whatever happens’. 204
So the CIA had been created by the National Security Act of 26 July 1947. The Act limited the CIA to intelligence and counterintelligence .... George Kennan ... proposed that this limitation be overcome by the creation of a separate organization for so-called ‘special’ actions; and on 18 June 1948 the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) had been set up. ... to counter the USSR’ by special operations of a political, psychological, economic and even paramilitary order. Headed by Frank Wisner, ... former ... of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). 204
The chief theatre of the OPCs operations was to be Europe, especially France and Italy. 204
Although it was originally separate from the CIA, it occupied premises within the CIA nd made use of its administrative apparatus. In December 1951 the OPC was put under the control of Allen Dulles, Assistant Director of the CIA, and the two organizations formally fused on 1 August 1952. 204
The CIA enabled the US administration to plan and carry out wide-ranging secret operations that were outside the control of Congress. 204
... but Allen Dulles had come to the conclusion that the only way of effectively fighting the communists was by allying with the non-totalitarian left. In 1947 he had already helped to finance the split in the French trade union movement when Leon Jouhaux had broken away from the CGT to form the rival CGT-Force Ouvrière; and in 1949 the CIA had helped the British and American trade unions to set up the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). 204-5
19. Allen Dulles had been a brilliant intelligence officer in the Swiss outpost of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). After the war he worked as a consultant to the various American intelligence organs before becoming Assistant Director of the CIA in August 1951.
20. Tom Braden had been an isolationist until the German attack on Poland. In 1940, aged 20, he enlisted in the British Army. He fought with the 8th Army in North Africa and Italy. Then he joined the OSS. He was parachuted behind the French and Italian line, with the mission to finance trade union movements in their resistance to the Nazis. After the war he used both his experience of organizing clandestine operations and the contacts he had established with the trade unions: ‘The control of trade unions was always a high priority for the communists. It was one of the activities on which they spent the most money. This was, for instance, the case in France. We responded with the Force Ouvrière. It was the same in Italy’ (interview with the author). Noter, 263
A key adviser to Dulles, who played a significant role in shaping the Strategy of the CIA, was Tom Braden, a former hero of the 0SS. 205
[Braden] The young CIA held several trump cards: we had contacts with most of the trade union leaders and socialists in Europe and America.... We selected certain organizations which needed help to fight the communists. ... At the OSS we had had experience of Europe. We understood the political situation there. After the war, we knew we would have to work with the Left. Today that has all been forgotten: even the present CIA personnel don’t understand it.... Why was the non-communist left so important? It’s because there weren’t many bankers, lawyers or stock exchange speculators among the patriots and democrats. I had been in the French maquis... and we had learnt in the war that it was the left which rose against the occupation, not the bourgeoisie, which supported Pétain. 205
[Cord Meyer, who was to succeed Braden] Our help went mainly to the democratic parties of the left and of the centre. The right wing and conservative forces had their own financial resources; the real competition with the communists for votes and influence lay on the left of the political spectrum, where the allegiance of the working class and the intelligentsia was to be decided. 206
So the CIA worked with the former Trotskyist Mel Lasky at the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and with Jay Lovestone at the AFL/CIO (Lovestone had once been General Secretary of the American Communist Party, but was converted to passionate anticommunism by the Stalinist terror campaign). Such a relationship would have terrified American conservatives. McCarthy was suspicious, and he tried to attack the CIA through Tom Braden; but Dulles appealed to Eisenhower, and the President managed to call McCarthy off. 206
After the Korean War the budget and staff of the OPC increased considerably. Between 1949 and 1952 its annual grant grew from $4.7 million to $82 million; its staff from 302 in seven stations to 2812 (plus 3142 paid contacts abroad) in 47 stations. 206
Whilst the OPC (its division for clandestine operations) supported the non-totalitarian left, the OSO (its espionage division) made as much use as possible of the expertise of former Nazis such as Klaus Barbie. 206
[Braden] We had many foundations! We never used the large and genuine American foundations like the Rockefeller, Ford or Carnegie, except once in the case of the Ford Foundation. We preferred to use Mid-West bankers or industrialists. We would give them $20 million with which they would set up a foundation which would then offer its services to one or other of the specialised organizations. 206
In these organizations the CIA had ‘agents’. They were not usually agents in a strict sense, but were individuals who knew what the arrangements with the CIA were. In most cases it was an official who had already been elected: the President or the International Vice-President. But occasionally it was a real undercover agent from the CIA. 206
note 26. Interview. In the case of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, the money, to the tune of $800000 to $900000 a year, came from the Hoblitzell Foundation of Dallas. The money financed its publications in various languages: Encounter in English, Monat in German, and so on. (Ranelagh, The Agency, op. cit., p. 246). In the spring of 1951 a French branch was created, in the name of L’Association Françaises des Amis de la Liberté. 263
THE FOUNDATION FOR YOUTH AND STUDENT AFFAIRS (FYSA) In 1952 a former NSA leader who had been involved in the negotiations leading up to the Stockholm Conference was working in the CIA. 207
World University Service. Note 28, 263
FYSA SAVES THE ISC 207
NSA budget 1950-67, note 31, 264
ISC/COSEC was also directly financed by the CIA; and Bill Dentzer was again the key individual: I left the presidency of the NSA at the end of August 1952. One month before I went to Leyden to be joint secretary of COSEC, CIA officials contacted me and asked me to help them to extend the secret funding of the NSA to the ISC. 208
note 34. The seven main contributors YUS (Yugoslavia), SFS (Sweden), 264
The main objective of the organization is to have the non-communist national unions leave the lUS, and to weaken and isolate the communists. 209, men transkript fra CIA rapport.
Conclusion: A Bipolar System of Equilibrium 210-224
At the peak of its influence the CIA subsidised not only the WAY and the ISC: there seemed to be hardly any non-communist youth organisations it did not support. 210 expl. Følger
The European Youth Campaign received money through the American Committee for a United Europe. 210

Nikolai Yakovlev, The CIA against the USSR, (Moscow: Édition du Progrés, 1983,

An example of how far the Americans were prepared to go in its secret war against the two communist international youth movements is the forged brochure, almost certainly of CIA provenance, that was produced during the fifteenth anniversary of the IUS in 1961. It had the same title and layout, the Prague address and so on; and it could easily have been taken for an IUS publication had it not been for the highly ironical tone it adopted: 211
,,, the anti-Nazi demonstrations of November 1939. 211 Czech.
FRANCE AND THE BUCHAREST FESTIVAL, 1953^216
Special attention was paid to delegates from Algeria (all of whom were said to be members of the UTDAP) and from other French colonies: 216
It is not possible to ascertain who exactly in the ISC was in the know about the secret funding by the CIA. 217
Whether they knew the exact origin of the funds they received is really neither here nor there, given the extraordinary consensus between ‘those who knew’, ‘those who did not know’, and ‘those who did not want to know’. Let us take he case of Olof Palme. 219-220

31. Dagens Nyheter, 23 February 1967. Palme om ISC/CIA

But if he had been in the pay of the CIA, would he not unhesitatingly have accepted that post? 219
1967, Palme, then Minister of Transport, 219
32. The American government played a part in persuading the NSA, the American Youth Congress and the ISC to approach the young nationalists of Algeria. The FYSA used the ISC to finance the Union Générale des Travailleurs Algeriens (UGTA) and provided a scholarship scheme for young Algerians (see a letter requesting help from the Secretary of the UGTA to the American Youth Congress, in the latter’s archives (suppl. 3, Box 15). As Denis Shaul, NSA president in 1962/3, wrote, ‘It was vital in the late Fifties... to work with the leaders of the Algerian independence struggle - even though the State Department’s official position was, at least implicitly, to back our ally France.... It would have been obviously impossible at that time for the Government to support openly an organization that was attempting to work with progressive, often very left wing, groups abroad’ (Dennis Shaul, ‘We were right’, an article in Mademoiselle, August 1967, which was printed in parallel with one by Richard Stearns, entitled ‘We were wrong’) 267
Despite the Atlantic Alliance, the American government was not enamoured of British and French colonialism. During this period it systematically undermined the positions of Britain and France in North Africa, the Middle East and the Far East. 220
The CIA needed the American left, and the American left was flattered to be needed. Each served its own needs in serving the other’s. 220

The New Republic, ‘Playing it Straight. Who did what and why for the CIA?’, 4 March 1967, editorial, p. 4.

It is also important to stress that the CIA never used the ISC or any other youth organization for espionage activities: that was not its aim, which was simply to create an alternative to communist organizations. 221
The relationship between the youth organizations and the American government changed radically at the end of the 1960s. A generation of baby-boomers entered the universities, and these were concerned not so much with French as with American imperialism. It was ‘Good-bye Algeria; good morning, Vietnam’. 221 [sml beskrivelsen af NSAs holdning ved skabelsen af ISC ???]


On 14 February 1967 Rampart placed an advertisement in the New York Times that announced that its next issue would reveal the way in which for fifteen years the CIA had infiltrated and subverted the American student movement. 222

The WAY lingered on; but it was soon reduced to a staff of two at its headquarters in Copenhagen, [????] and it had only one European member: an unrepresentative Danish committee, [?????????????] since the official Danish youth movement, the DUF, would have nothing to do with it. The IUSY (International Union of Socialist Youth) was also thoroughly discredited and took years to recover. For the next 20 years and more - until 1989 - the WFDY and the IUS again had the field all to themselves, as they had had during the Stalinist period. 223
se 181

Orla Jordal, 2007

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