The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Petroleum Dependency
For- og bagsideillustrationen er fantastisk god ! og dertil smuk.
Der er små overskuelige kort over: U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility (ikke helt klart), p. 3 - Saudi Arabia and the Surrounding Region , p. 32 - Major U.S. Bases in the Persian Gulf Area, p. 92 - Iraq: Major Pipelines, p. 102 - Caspian Sea Basin Showing Major Pipeline Routes, p. 134 - Colombia: Cano Limón-Coveñas Pipeline, p. 141 - Persian Gulf / Caspian Sea Region, p. 151 - Western China and Central Asia, p. 163
Doktrinerne: Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, Carter.
Michael Klare gennemgår Cheney-gruppens rapport: National Energy Policy (NEP), af May 17, 2001. Denne rapport fastlåser USA som stor olieforbruger og dermed som stor olieimportør og dermed i stadig krig for at bevare kontrollen over olieimporten. Cheney søgte hjælp hos sine olie-fæller, ikke mindst hos Enron, som også Robert Zoellick havde arbejdet for, p. 58. [Man afledte opmærksomheden fra gruppens arbejde, ved at koncentrere diskussionen om Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.] Det er isoleret USAs kontrol med olien det handler om, og det ubegrænset i tid og rum. Europæerne må ikke få den ide selv at sikre sig. Derimod skal NATO bruges til at sikre USAs herredømme over Verden og olien, f.eks. i Afrika ! Alligevel skriver han, at USA - af hensyn til de økonomiske konjunkturer - har en interesse i, at alle større forbugerlande har en tilstrækkelig forsyning med olie. Hans beskrivelse af den amerikanske regerings bestræbelser er en styrkelse af Naomi Kleins grundlæggende synspunkt.
Klares forslag er at satse på alternativer overalt, hvor de kan findes/skabes. Også for at bevare olie til børnebørnene.
Tabellen "Figure 3 PROVEN RESERVES OF THE MAJOR OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES, AS OF END 2002, p. 19 kunne indeholde forklaringen på, at Iraq skulle besættes, at Iran står næst på listen og denne hypotese vil jeg anse som bekræftet, hvis Venezuela kommer ind som nr 3. Iraq-krigen handler om olie.
Når man læser Klares forord, hvor han helt fornuftigt gør op med "[p]rofessor Samuel P. Huntington's influential 1993 Foreign Affairs article,"A Clash of Civilizations?" så virker det, som om han mener, at ressourcekrige er noget nyt. Men allerede i slutningen af 1800-tallet vidste vi, at den, med at "kristne de vilde" og bringe civilisation og medicin ud, var et røgslør over, hvad der bedst kan beskrives som røvertogter. Den samme indsigt har Klare på side 146. I Angola & Sierra Leone handler det om diamanter, i Congo, guld, kobber, [coltan], i Borneo & Cambodia, tømmer. Etniske og religiøse forskelle spiller en rolle, men mest som noget høvdinge, krigsherrer og demagoger bruger til at mobilisere støtte. (Meget karakteristisk glemmer Klare ofte - men ikke altid - at nævne de udenlandske magters udnyttelse heraf), p. x. Den samme undladelse finder vi på side 126). På side 148 hedder det: "But with the end of the cold war, geopolitical competition appeared to give way to ethnic and religious antagonism as the driving force in international security affairs." Hvis vi understreger ordet "appeared", så nærmer vi os nok virkeligheden. Det er vel sådan, at efter afkolonialiseringen, Bandung-konferencen, o.s.v. blev det at tale om ressurser, som at bande i kirken (for det var jo de nye uafhængige landes ressurser, det drejede sig om). Så kom det til at hedde russisk/kommunistisk indflydelse. Da Sovjetunionen nedlagde sig, så blev ordene "ethnic and religious antagonism". Virkeligheden er der ikke lavet om på. Det er ganske uklart for mig i hvilken udstrækning Klare udlægger bevidst røgslør og i hvilken han tænker uklart !
Han mener, at afhængigheden af udenlandske ressourcer tidligere kun sjældent har skabt regeringens politik. (p. xii). Drabet på Lumumba og støtten til Mobutu giver vel ellers kun mening i det lys. Men "In formal political discourse, petroleum is considered a national security matter" d.v.s. det vedkommer forsvarsministeriet og det er nyt (p. xii). Indtil olien blev optaget som et sikkerhedsproblem, skjulte man ressourcemotivet. Klare ser starten på denne politik i Roosevelt IIs møde med Kong Abdul Aziz ibn Saud i februar 1945. Roosevelt havde forgæves forsøgt at overtage den saudiske olie med Petroleum Reserves Corporation (p. xi. og 12). I stedet blev det til olie for beskyttelse [efter 1973 udvidet til olie og beskyttelse af USD mod beskyttelse af Huset Saud].
Den stadige fanatiske støtte til Israel strider i øvrigt mod de sikkerhedsinteresser, der knyttes til olien - så sagen er noget mere kompliceret.
Tampa, Florida, huser "headquarters of the U.S. Central Command (Centcom), the nerve center for all U.S. military operations in the Persian Gulf region, including those now under way in Afghanistan and Iraq." Ansvarsområdet strækker sig fra Ægypten i vest til Kyrgyzstan i øst. p. 1 - 3.
Klare skriver (p. 2) at Centcoms styrker kæmpede i "the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88", det kan da ikke være rigtigt !? på hvilken side skulle det være ?
Centcoms hovedopgave blev oprindeligt fastlagt som the Carter Doctrine of January 23, 1980, der fastslås det som en vital interesse for USA at sikre forsyningen med olie fra den Persiske Golf, p. 4.
Klare mener, at olieimporten er et dræn på USAs økonomi. Her glemmer han aftalen med Saudiarabien om, at de geninvesterer hele beløbet i USA. Det, der virkelig underminerer USAs økonomi, er outsourcing af al amerikansk produktion til Kina - og så i stigende udstrækning, at de andre olielande ikke beskytter den truede USD. Se oliesiden.
Men selvfølgelig spiller olieprisen en rolle for konjunkturerne.
Figure 1 The Dependency Dilemma U.S. Oil Production and Consumption: history 1950-2000; Projections 2010-2020 p. 14 viser, at i april 1998 nåede man til, at USA importerer mere end halvdelen af den olie, man forbruger. p. 13.
To tredjedele af forbruget går til transport (p. 16). [Det skyldes de byplanløsninger - eller rettere mangel på samme - man vælger og biler med et helt urimeligt benzinforbrug, OJ].
På side 18 fastslår Klare, at mere og mere af den importerede olie vil komme fra lande, der er "unstable, unfriendly, or located in the middle of dangerous areas (or some combination of all three)." p. 18. Her glemmer han, at uroen oftest skabes/forstærkes/vedligeholdes af USA, fordi uro trykker prisen (Naomi Klein: The Shock Doctrine). Men vist er uro svær at styre og det medfører iblandt prisstigninger
Han har begrebet (noget af), hvad der skaber problemer. Men han tror/lader som om han tror, at der er tale om religiøs ekstremisme. Det er besynderligt, at amerikanere ikke vil forstå,
at man reagerer på: at de tror, at de har ret til andres naturrigdomme,
at de skaber ufred,
at de sender deres tropper ind,
at de optræder som om, de ejer hele verden.
Det er disse "amerikanske værdier", altså de amerikanske værdier vi andre oplever, som ganske generelt afvises - ikke de "amerikanske værdier", der omtales i The American Constitution. Dem er vi rigtig mange, der gerne så virkeliggjort. F.eks. respekt for ejendomsretten - irakernes ejendomsret til den irakiske olie osv., respekt for indgåede aftaler, f.eks. den mellem Gorbatjov og Reagan om de konventionelle styrker i Europa, respekt for menneskerettighederne også i Guantanamo... se også Mumia Abu-Jamal og Mumia 2
Nu vi er igang med ønsketænkningen så: Lad os også få en genoplivning af Bandung-principperne.
Når fattige lande begynder at udnytte deres olierigdomme, bliver disse ofte monopoliseret af den regerende elite, skriver Klare. Det er sandt, men sker det uden hjælp ? Er det ikke sådan, at "udlandet" hjælper disse eliter både til magten og siden til rigdommen - fordi man derved skaffer sig naturrigdommene billigere. (Naomi Klein igen). Det var jo det, der skete under Jeltsin i Rusland - og som Putin heldigvis er ved at få ryddet op i, netop fordi Rusland har andre ressourcer end olie o.lign., bl.a. en veluddannet befolkning.
"Meanwhile, America's indirect support of Iraq in that conflict [krigen med Iran] undoubtedly contributed to Saddam Hussein's sense of invincibility - and so influenced his decision to invade Kuwait in August 1990." p. 24. Her glemmer Klare, bekvemt, at den amerikanske ambassadør, April Glaspie, inden besættelsen af Kuwait fortalte Saddam, at USA ikke ville have synspunkter på et indre-arabisk opgør. Alligevel besluttede man at se det som en trussel mod Saudiarabien.
Det står ikke klart for mig, om det er Klare, der er uvidende, ikke kan beslutte sig for en opfattelse, eller om det han beskriver er den uenighed, blandt de besluttende, som er ganske naturlig.
Saudierne var ikke glade for at få stationeret amerikanske tropper og betingede sig en hurtig tilbagetrækning, så snart Saddam var drevet ud af Kuwait. Amerikanerne stolede kun på deres egne styrker til opgaven, men saudierne kunne også have anvendt bin Ladens afghanske arabere, der havde drevet Sovjetunionen ud af Afghanistan.
USA havde anerkendt ibn Sauds regering i 1931, men diplomatiske forbindelser oprettedes først i 1939 og residerende ambassadør kom der først i 1943. p. 31. Det var det år, hvor Roosevelt erklærede, at forsvaret af Saudiarabien var af afgørende betydning for det amerikanske forsvar (p. 33).
Operation Desert Storm (1991) omfattede 500.000 amerikanske soldater (p. 52) og endte med en permanent amerikansk base i Kuwait, og fremskudte våbenlagre i Kuwait og Qatar. p. 53. Ikke-flyve-zonerne i Iraq, 1991 - 2000, styredes fra "Prince Sultan Air Base outside Riyadh" p. 53. Løftet til kong Fahd blev altså ikke overholdt - [en væsentlig del af baggrunden for bin Ladens al Qaida mobilisering.].
Kapitel 2 hedder Lethal Embrace: The American Alliance with Saudi Arabia. "American firms first began looking for petroleum in Saudi Arabia in 1933, when the Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL) obtained a sixty-year [!! som man nu forsøger at få i Iraq] concession over a large area in al-Hasa (the Eastern Province) along the kingdom's Persian Gulf coast." p. 30-1.
En vigtig del af "samarbejdet" er, at USA kan regne med, at Saudiarabien altid kan og vil øge produktionen, hvis nogen holder igen på produktionen for at få prisen op. p. 26.
Da USA i 1942 gik ind i 2. Verdenskrig var det Verdens største olieproducent. Man var allerede da opmærksom på, at det stigende oliebehov ville blive et problem, derfor skulle der spares på de egne ressourcer og mest muligt skulle importeres.
Altså for sikre olieforsyningen til det amerikanske militær, skulle man fremme udnyttelsen af Mellemøstens olie !! Det kom til udtryk i et udenrigsministerielt strategipapir.
14. februar 1945 mødtes præsident Roosevelt og kong ibn Saud på USS Quincy. p. 35 De talte sammen, gennem tolk, i 5½ time, uden referat og ingen anden amerikaner deltog. Resultatet blev en amerikansk luftbase i Dhahran. Man formoder, at der blev indgået en aftale om amerikansk forsvar af Saudiarabien inkl. Huset Saud til gengæld for amerikanske firmaers dominans i oliefelterne, p. 36 og 38. Det betyder bl.a. amerikansk hjælp til saudisk politi og de interne sikkerhedsstyrker.
I begyndelsen af 2. Verdenskrig besatte England og Sovjetunionen Iran. De aftalte, at alle tropper skulle være ude 6 måneder efter krigens afslutning. Der måtte en ambassadørhenvendelse til, før Stalin trak sine styrker tilbage i maj 1946. Inden havde Sovjetunionen støttet oprettelse af den selvstændige republik Azerbaijan. p. 39
Klare beskriver, at på samme tid, var Grækenland og Tyrkiet truet af kommunistisk undertrykkelse. [En mere virkelighedstro beskrivelse finder man hos Ganser, man forbavses over, hvor effektivt det amerikanske indoktrinerings(uddannelses)system er ! OJ] Det gav Truman anledning til "his famous Truman Doctrine speech of March 12,1947, in which he pledged unstinting American assistance to any nation threatened with Communist subjugation." p. 40.
050157 kommer the Eisenhower Doctrine, der bekræftes i Kongressen. Præsidenten kan indsætte amerikanske tropper i Mellemøsten for at forsvare venligtsindede lande mod Sovjet-støttede angreb. Forsvarsministeriet begyndte at levere våben og støtte til Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) p. 41. I juli 1958 indsatte Eisenhower så amerikanske tropper i Libanon til forsvar for præsident Camille Chamoun. p. 42. I 1962 - 1970 under borgerkrigen i Yemen, sender Kennedy kamptropper til Saudarabien.
Nixon doktrinen, juli 1969, (De koloniserede lande skal selv betale for deres besættelse). Og så kom der rigtig gang i våbenleverancerne (og installering af amerikanske militærrådgivere). De mange fremmede soldater, deres alkoholforbrug [kvinder nævner Klare ikke - men det er/var måske ikke et problem i Mellemøsten] og korruptionen gav anledning til nye problemer. Militærleverancerne gav også anledning til våben-keynesianisme. Shahen af Iran brugte i 1970erne 14 milliarder USD på amerikanske våben, og han finansierede sultanen af Omans bekæmpelse af marxistisk inspirerede oprørere i Dhofar-provinsen. p. 44.
Carter bestilte også lastfly og skibe, der kunne forsyne tropper i Den persiske Golf, forhandlede baseaftaler med Oman, Kenya, og Somalia og på Diego Garcia, p. 46
I 1981 solgte Reagan AWACS fly til Saudiarabien "however, Reagan did seek something in return: Saudi financial support for the Central Intelligence Agency's clandestine campaigns to overthrow the Soviet-backed regimes in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and elsewhere ....When supporters of Khomeini's revolutionary regime in Iran began to agitate for a similar revolution in Saudi Arabia, the president vowed that the United States would never allow the Saudi royal family to be overthrown the way the shah had been." p. 47-8
Da Iran var ved at få overtaget i krigen med Saddam i 1982 fik han amerikansk hjælp.
International Energy Agency (IEA), mente 2001, at olie-landene i Den persiske Golf skulle investere 523 milliarder USD frem til 2030 for at imødekomme behovet. Hvis de skulle låne det beløb, måtte de tillade udenlandske firmaer at investere i deres olieindustri. Og det ville de ikke. Ikke engang Saudiarabien. "As the NEPDG recognized, changing the minds of key Persian Gulf governments on this matter would require substantial American effort." p. 80 [I god overensstemmelse med Naomi Klein The Shock Doctrine, blev "the American effort" Iraq-krigen. - og den har vel kostet væsentligt mere end den halve trillion USD ! Så selv om Klare ikke skriver/ser det, så er det ikke USAs interesser, den krig varetager - men en lille gruppe oliehøvdinges !]. Klare skriver p. 81, at det er sanktionerne mod Iraq, der holder Iraqs produktion nede på 3.7 millioner barrels/dag - mod en top på 6 millioner barrels/dag. Så min konklusion er, at man kunne have skaffet den irakiske olie på markedet med beskedne investeringer, at resten af Mellemøstens olie også kunne bringes til markedet ved hjælp af ½ trillion USD - efter Sachs' skøn koster krigen mellem 1 og 2 trillioner. Det eneste, der ikke ville være det samme, er Cheneys og hans olie-venners mulighed for at berige sig.
Det er svært at hjælpe de upopulære venne-regimer, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, og UAE uden at det virker som indblanding i deres interne anliggender. Problemet har to sider, hvordan skjuler man over for de pågældende landes indbyggere, at regeringerne de facto støtter Israel og hvordan støtter man regeringerne mod den indre opposition. [Det kan jo være svært, "avoiding the appearance of intrusion into local affairs" (p. 81), når det netop er det, man gør. Men at USA iblandt har held med det, ses bl.a. i Europa, se Ganser, OJ].
"If the administration's energy plan was to succeed, the United States would have to become the dominant power in the region, assuming responsibility for overseeing the politics, the security, and the oil output of the key producing countries." p. 82
[Her har vi samme fundamentale selvmodsigelse, som i forholdet mellem USAs forfatning og racismen, torturen, aflytningerne, fængslinger uden dom o.s.v. Hvordan kan det være nødvendigt for USA at blive den dominerende magt i området og påtage sig ansvaret for kontrollen med landenes politik, sikkerhed og olieproduktion, når de pågældende lande lever af at sælge deres olie på det frie marked. Og den eneste hindring herfor er amerikanske sanktioner mod nogen af dem. (se for Iraqs vedkommende også p. 94-6). Og ikke engang Klare, der er klog, ved noget om området og om oliehandel og -produktion og dertil har skrevet netop denne bog som en kritik af regeringens oliepolitik ser netop denne fundamentale modsætning. Atter undres man over effektiviteten i det amerikanske indoktrineringssystem ! - og får en bekymrende fornemmelse for meningen med den forskydning bort fra fri, kritisk tankevirksomhed, der har været udviklingstendensen i den danske gymnasieskole i den lange tid, jeg fulgte den ! OJ].
"As the administration saw it, a greater level of security in the Gulf required progress on three fronts: first, the stabilization of Saudi Arabia under the House of Saud; second, the removal of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and his replacement with a stable government capable of substantially boosting oil output; and, third, an escalation of pressure on the Iranian government leading, eventually, to the emergence of a leadership friendly to the United States." p. 84. Hvis vi betragter USAs Mellemøstpolitik, som en gammel væg med mange lag maling, så er det et af de øvre lag, ikke det allerøverste, de officielle pæne ord - men også langt fra bunden - de virkelige reelle hensigter. Og Klare standser altså ved et af mellemlagene.
Allerede i forholdet til Saudiarabien og House of Saud er der indbyggede selvmodsigelser "on August 6, 2002, ... the Washington Post revealed that a consultant to the Defense Policy Board - a high-level advisory group of senior officials - had designated Saudi Arabia an enemy of the United States and called for the seizure of Saudi financial assets, induding its oil fields, if the government did not terminate its support for Islamic terrorism. According to the Post, the consultant, Laurent Murawiec of the Rand Corporation, accused senior Saudi officials of complicity with terrorist attacks on the United States: "The Saudis are active at every level of the terror chain, from planners to financiers, from cadre to foot-soldier, from ideologist to cheerleader."" p. 84 Det havde han jo ret i, men meget heraf var jo skabt med USAs viden og på USAs bud. [Så der er klart tale om selvskabt plage. I hvilken udstrækning der også er tale om bevidst politik, som Naomi Kleins Shock Doctrine kunne tale for, er usikkert. OJ]
Saudiarabien har et stort shiitisk mindretal, som formentlig nemt kunne bruges til at true - måske endda afsætte - House of Saud. p. 86. Samtidig havde en kraftig stigning i indbyggertallet medført et fald i gennemsnitsindkomsten. Ses de 2 forhold i forbindelse med tilstedeværelsen af amerikanske soldater, USAs støtte til Israels besættelse af Palæstina, og House of Sauds korruption har de saudiske fyrster al grund til at ryste i bukserne. p. 87-8 [og USA al grund til at skaffe sig af med den klods om benet, hvis altså målet er sikkerhed i området og ikke shock-terapi. OJ]. Men "Many prominent Saudis, such as Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador, were friends of senior American officials (induding the two Bush presidents) and investors in firms managed by prominent Republicans, including former secretary of State James Baker III and former secretary of defense Frank Carlucci." p. 89 [Så igen strider private interesser mod USAs interesser, OJ]. Se Carlyle Group og 9-11. Klare gennemgår problemerne i den forbindelse, p. 89 - 94. Baserne kan man ikke undvære, så længe Saddam sidder ved magten. Derfor skal han væk først. Faktisk blev baserne lukket straks efter Baghdads fald. Tropperne er ude af Saudiarabien sept. 2003, p. 90. (Men de rejste ikke så langt, kun til "Qatar, where the Central Command has established a new, multibillion-dollar command center and operations facility at Al Udeid Air Base." p. 91 De andre to problemer havde man ikke lyst til at rode i. p. 91-3.
Den amerikanske tankegang afsløredes i de omhyggelige forberedelser med hensyn til besættelse af de iraqiske olieinstallationer. [Og den manglende beskyttelse af kulturelle og historiske værdier, OJ]
Alligevel skete der store ødelæggelser og meget blev stjålet. Siden er anlæggene udsat for sabotage. Sabotagen har medført ansættelse af 6500 vagter (Erinys, SA) og "In October 2003, the Department of Defense began using skilled marksmen from the 327th Tiger Force (an elite unit of the 101st Airborne Division first deployed in Vietnam) to shoot saboteurs on the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline." p. 101.
Se også Iraq-krigens indflydelse på oliesiden. Og om privatisering, Muttit.
Også i Iran tilstræber Bush-regeringen et regime-skifte. Det er dog en politik, der går tilbage til Clinton. Og til den ende støtter man Mujaheddin-e Khalq (MEK), (som State Department har på sin terrorist-liste, [den slags bliver kun forståeligt i lyset af Naomi Kleins Shock Doctrine.] p. 110.
På side 112 skriver Klare: "But no matter how costly the effort grows, we cannot remove our forces from the Gulf as long as we remain committed to a strategy of maximum petroleum extraction." Det er da ganske enkelt noget vrøvl. Landene i området lever af at sælge olie. Lader man dem i fred, kan de nemt tiltrække de nødvendige investeringer og levere olie til en rimelig pris - og det er i deres egen interesse. - Det der "nødvendiggør" de amerikanske styrkers tilstedeværelse er, at USA vil overtage oliekoncessionerne, amerikanske firmaer vil købe anlæggene og den olie, der ligger i jorden - MEN til underpris. Klares analyse har på det punkt en mærkelig begrænsning ! Man kunne argumentere mod dette mit synspunkt med, at det ville være andre, der bestemte over leverancerne, med deraf følgende risiko for prischok og stop i leverancerne. Men vist var 1973-4 et slag for USA og Europa - men det overvandt vi da hurtigt, så der er intet i historien, der bare antyder, at det skulle blive et alvorligt problem. Og som Klare skriver p. 114: " In my view, price shocks and supply interruptions - and perhaps even blackmail - are precisely what the president's energy strategy holds in store for the United States."
Derimod har Klare aldeles ret i, at der er "No Safe Havens", at "Diversification" (at satse på andre olieområder end Mellemøsten) ikke løser problemet. Kapitlet No Safe Havens, p. 113 - 145, gennemgår de alternative muligheder. Figure 6 PROVEN RESERVES, PRODUCTION, AND EXPORT CAPACITY OF SELECTED NON-PERSIAN GULF OIL PRODUCERS, END OF 2002 p. 117 resumerer sagen.
[Egentlig er det jo ganske simpelt. Olien er en endelig ressource. Der opstår forsvindende mængder ny olie, så i praksis kan man regne med, at der ikke kommer ny olie til. Man kan diskutere, hvad der er "proven reserves" og hvad der er "probable reserves", men ikke den kendsgerning, at de forsvinder ved brug. Hvornår olien slipper op, er det usikre punkt, ikke at den slipper op. Olien er en praktisk energikilde og den har hidtil været så billlig, at den er anvendt, hvor andre energikilder kunne anvendes. Men olien er også råstof for hele den kemiske industri. Og som sådan kan den ikke erstattes. En langsigtet strategisk tænkning fører derfor til, at man erstatter olien med andre energikilder, hvor man kan og så snart man kan. (NB, det er også Klares opfattelse !). Det synspunkt kom først frem i forbindelse med den første oliekrise som et indlæg fra Rom-Klubben (1973).
Langsigtet strategisk planlægning strider mod kapitalismen, specielt mod dens moderne amerikanske form, (den, der vil hurtige gevinster), som ikke er A.P. Møllers og Wallenbergs kapitalisme, men Percy Barneviks og Jan-Erik Petterssons kapitalisme.]
En væsentlig faktor, som man i skyndingen kan overse, er, at det ikke alene er USA og Europa, der har et stigende olieforbrug. Alle de olieproducerende lande, og Kina og Latinamerika har det også. Denne faktor er med i Klares behandling. Et tredje komplicerende forhold, er at forkerte udvindingsmetoder, herunder for hurtig udvinding kan medføre en indsivning af saltvand, som vanskeliggør/umuliggør en fuldstændig udvinding. (p. 122, under Venezuela). Afsnittet behandler også korruptionens indflydelse. En fodnote p. 124 lyder således: "In February 2004, Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo ordered an investigation into allegations that a Halliburton subsidiary had paid $180 million in bribes to Nigerian officials in the 1990s - when Dick Cheney was still running the Company - to secure a $4 billion contract for the construction of a liquefied natural gas plant. The allegations are also being investigated by the U.S. Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission."
Et eksempel på amerikansk u-freds-stiftelse har Klare med (p. 128 - 129): "Further roiling this incendiary mix, the Bush administration has provided funds to some of the anti-government organizations in Venezuela and Chavez has threatened to retaliate by cutting off oil deliveries to the United States; whether this will lead to a more severe clash between the two countries cannot be foreseen, but it is hardly out of the question".
Eksempler på "Ethnic and sectarian conflict" med overtoner af olieinteresser nævnes p. 130-1, Chechnya, Georgia, (Abkhazia, Adzharia) (Georgien har 150 Special Operations Forces instructors,og andre militære specialister (137), Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh, befolket af armenere), Angola, (MPLA/UNITA), "Although most of Angola is now enjoying a respite from war, separatist forces are still battling in Cabinda."
9-11 medførte verden over en opblomstring af sympati for USA (p. 136). Men den er vel efterhånden forduftet. Bl.a. fordi "kampen mod terrorismen" fra sin tidligste begyndelse blev brugt til at styrke USAs herredømme over Verden og de andres olie, ligesom "kampen mod narkotika", bl.a. i Colombia.
I kapitel 6 når Klare til det farligste i hele spillet "The U.S.-Russian-Chinese Struggle in the Persian Gulf and Caspian Basin", som når som helst kan kamme over i en åben krig. Foreløbig slås de hemmelige tjenester pr vikar. [Meget lidt kan tages for pålydende i det spil. Og mon de involverede hemmelige tjenester selv kan holde styr på, hvem der er ven og hvem der er fjende. Hvilken rolle/hvis spil spiller Pakistans Musharraf, islamisterne, al Qaida, familien Bugti, familien Bhutto, baluchiske bevægelser ?] Bogen er jo allerede 4 år gammel, så der er løbet meget spildevand ud i det Kaspiske Hav siden og Klare graver vel kun 1 til 2 spadestik, men de fleste vil alligevel lære en del ved at læse kapitlet.
Allerede Truman bekymrede sig om Irans olie. Både Rusland og Kina leverer våben til Iran. Kina har haft fælles militærøvelser med Kyrgyzstan. (147). Rusland, Kina og USA har kamptropper udstationeret i området.
For så vidt angår Grækenland og Tyrkiet bør denne beskrivelse læses sammen med Gansers afsnit om den samme periode i de to lande. Hele Gansers bog, og Mumia Abu-Jamal, We Want Freedom, kapitel 6 om COINTELPRO viser, at korstoget mod kommunismen blev taget ganske alvorligt i sig selv i de ledende amerikanske kredse. I hvilken udstrækning der er tale om, at midler er blevet til mål; i hvilken udstrækning der er tale om konkurrerende mål; i hvilken udstrækning, det ikke er målene, men dele af regeringsapparatet, der konkurrerer, bør diskuteres, men Klare bidrager her ikke meget til større klarhed.
Klare understreger Ruslands betydning specielt i form af det eksisterende olierørledningsnet og Putins meget bevidste prioritering af Ruslands indre udvikling, p. 153. Han understreger også USAs interesse i at transportere olien udenom Rusland, p. 154 ff. Det er mærkeligt, at amerikanere, inkl. Klare, er så fikserede på at have kontrol med både råolien, raffineringen og transporten, at de ikke kan se, når det er billigere at købe sig til servicen end at stjæle den. Det adskiller sig da ellers ikke fra den outsourcing af den amerikanske industriproduktion, der faktisk finder sted parallelt. Tænk hvor rart vi alle sammen kunne have det, hvis USA havde grebet de fredelige muligheder, der lå i Sovjetunionens opløsning i stedet for at satse på at være "Den eneste Supermagt" og bestemme alting, inkl. at DSB, Posten og sygehusene i Danmark skulle privatiseres.
Rusland sælger kerne- og raketteknik til Iran. I 1995 en aftale om færdiggørelse af reaktoren i Bushehr, p. 160. "The Russians insist that because the Iranians will use the Bushehr reactor for civilian purposes only, the contract is entirely legitimate under the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT)." p. 160 [- og det er ikke bare noget russerne påstår, i.h.t. NPT er det sådan. Men der står også i NPT, at kernevåbenlandene, skal fjerne disse våben.]
Det man har opnået ved ikke at gå ind i en gensidig fordelagtig sameksistens, men tværtimod at udvide amerikansk militær tilstedeværelse i det Kaspiske område, ved at gøre de midlertidige baser til permanente (156) er netop, at tvinge Putin/Rusland til at "reassert its global prestige and to reimpose its sway over what was once the Russian/Soviet empire." "Most notably, in December 2002, it installed a squadron of combat planes and seven hundred support troops at a military base near Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, not far from the U.S. base at Manas International Airport. Ostensibly, the Russians are there to provide air support for the Joint rapid-reaction force authorized by leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in May 2001 under the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a loose association of several former Soviet republics. (p. 157). "The United States has provided Georgia with more than $1.3 billion in aid over the past ten years - a relatively hefty amount for a country of only 5 million people" ,158.
Den eneste vinkel jeg kan finde nogen logik i spillet er, som tidligere beskrevet, at det man slås for, ikke er USAs interesser, men en gruppe privatpersoners ! Og det skal selvfølgelig sløres.
Kina var selvforsynende med olie til 1993. p.164. "'Chinas energy security is the first concern," a top CNPC official acknowledged in December 2003."The Companys interests are second." As of 2003, these firms had secured important ties with energy enterprises in more than a dozen countries, induding Angola, Burma (Myanmar), Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Peru, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Thailand, Venezuela, and Yemen." p. 169. De vigtigste i kursiv.
Man må undre sig over, at amerikanere har så svært ved at se, at en stor del af Kinas olieforbrug bare er outsorced amerikansk forbrug. !
"Sudan, strategically located in the northeast corner of Africa, with access to the Red Sea, has become another factor in China's overseas energy plans. Shunned by the United States and other Western powers for its ties to radical Islamist movements, its egregious human rights record, and its brutal war against secessionist forces in the south, Sudan has had considerable difficulty attracting foreign partners for the development of its considerable oil reserves - thus providing Chinese firms with an opening they could not find anywhere else." p. 171 Eller er det omvendt, at USA dyrkede separatisterne i syd, da Sudan havde indgået en olieaftale med Kina ?
"The increasing involvement of American troops in these conflicts is an unavoidable consequence of the dependency dilemma: the reality that we need more and more imported petroleum every day to sustain a way of life that was born and established when the United States was largely self-sufficient in energy. Because most of our overseas sources of petroleum are unstable or unfriendly or both, we will continue to have to fight" p. 180 [Et forslag til alternativ: KØB den olie I har brug for !]. Det er vel næppe dyrere end at holde landene besat. Og moralsk og politisk er det meget dyrt. Og det er så sandt, så sandt - skaden er vel allerede sket ! Og så glemmer Klare endda torturen, hemmelige fængslinger, rendition og aflytninger.
""Realist" thinkers contend, along with the members of the study group on national energy policy convened by the Center for Strategie and International Studies, that the United States, as the world's only superpower, "must accept its special responsibilities for preserving access to worldwide energy supply."' But this is not a defensible position - not when so many lives are at stake and alternatives are available." p. 183-4. OG HER ER JEG OG KLARE HELT ENIGE. Hvad jeg ikke begriber er kun, hvorfor foreslår han ikke simpelthen at købe sig frem. Det var da den naturlige udvej i en kapitalistisk verden. Men uanset hvad USA gør, så slipper olien op, før eller siden, derfor er resten af Klares forslag, kapitel 7, "Escaping the Dilemma", relevant. Der er et "urgent need to prepare for the transition from a petroleum-based to a postpetroleum economy." p. 185 "[We] are [not] promoting our nation's long-term interests by gorging ourselves on cheap oil at the expense of our children's and our grandchildren's welfare." p. 186. Der er brug for "a "Paradigm Shift" on Energy" p. 187.
1. At skille energipolitikken fra den oversøiske sikkerhedspolitik, specielt at få afbrudt alliancen med Saudiarabien.
2. At reducere afhængigheden af importeret olie. Da 2/3 af olien anvendes til transport, som er relativt nemt at gøre noget ved, er der et godt potentiale heri.
Hans forslag om hydrogen-baserede brændselsceller holder ikke som fremstillet. Hvordan kan man fremstille hydrogenen ? Teoretisk bør det være muligt ved solceller og ved vindkraft. Lykkes det, at få et økonomisk forsvarligt hydrogen-system på den basis til at køre, har man samtidig fjernet det største problem ved de 2 energikilder: Energien er svær at opbevare og transportere og den kommer meget uregelmæssigt.
Og her er vi så nede under Klares punkt 3.
3. Fremskynde overgangen til en efter-olie-økonomi.
"Without government-sponsored research, incentives, and mandates, the transition to a postpetroleum economy will never get off the ground." p. 200 Det har han ganske ret i. Men man må nok starte med en kampagne, a la "Vor Fælles Fremtid" og AIDS-kampagnen. For det bliver svært - derovre. Også fordi de valgte byplanløsninger er netop lagt an på hver sin bil !
Ethanol i benzin er en dårlig ide, i hvert fald så længe fremstillingen ikke sker på basis af landbrugsaffald. Det er umoralsk at bruge mad til fremstilling af benzin. Indtil nu har det vist sig at medføre prisstigninger på korn, øget inddragelse af natur til landbrug, nettoenergiudbyttet er meget lavt - og der skal nok dukke flere problemer op. Klare skriver, fodnote p. 195: "At present, most ethanol comes from the fermentation of corn, a process that consumes up to seven gallons of oil for every eight gallons of alcohol it creates. Clearly, this is not a viable solution to America's energy dilemma."
Formentlig får man mere energi ud ved at brænde halm og træ end ved at omdanne det til ethanol - hvad, der endnu ikke fungerer, men hvad der forskes i. Husholdningsaffald kan også forgæres til methan (samme kemiske stof som naturgas).
Desværre må vi jo konstatere, at forslag til løsninger er en mangelvare. Klares forslag går ikke ud over, hvad vi diskuterede i forbindelse med halvfjersernes oliekrise.
Det er typisk amerikansk - mangel på risikovurdering
på langt sigt - At transportere olie og gas under havet, det Kaspiske eller
Østersøen, giver risikoen for en meget stor miljø-ødelæggelse. Og hvornår
har vi sidst lavet noget holdbart ? (Det er vel 5000 år siden, Pyramiderne).
"This history helps to explain why the very first military objective of Operation Iraqi Freedom was to secure control over the oil fields and refineries of southern Iraq, and why, following the initial U.S. incursion into Baghdad, American forces seized and occupied the Oil Ministry while allowing looters to overrun all the other government buildings in the neighborhood....American troops continue to guard the pipelines that carry Iraqi crude to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan and to protect oil facilities elsewhere in the country. Some of this work is being turned over to private guards and Iraqi police units, but American forces will continue to play a crucial role in defending Iraq's highly vulnerable petroleum infrastructure ...Moreover, soldiers from the other regional commands are increasingly being committed to oil-related operations of this sort. Already troops from the Southern Command (Southcom) are helping to defend Colombias Cano Limon pipeline" 5 - 6.
Slowly but surely, the U.S. military is being converted into a global oil-protection service. p. 7
"Dependence also entails a massive shift in economic resources from the United States to our foreign suppliers. Assuming that oil is priced at $30 per barrel,[prisen er nu januar 2008 ca. 100 USD/barrel] the total bill for imported oil over the next twenty-five years should reach a colossal $3.5 trillion." (p. 11)
"Just how tight this bond has become was made painfully evident in the spring of 2004, when violence in three countries - an assault on an offshore oil terminal in Iraq, a series of bombings and shootings in Saudi Arabia, and the killing of oil workers in Nigeria - depressed global petroleum output and produced record-high gasoline prices in the United States." p. 20.
"When countries with few other sources of national wealth exploit their petroleum reserves, the ruling elites typically monopolize the distribution of oil revenues, enriching themselves and their cronies while leaving the rest of the population mired in poverty." p. 22.
"In 1942, when the United States entered World War II in earnest, it was the world's leading oil producer and was thought to possess nearly half of total world reserves - meaning that we had few other suppliers to turn to should our own reserves be exhausted. This situation, in turn, implied that we would face serious difficulties if the war lasted longer than expected, or if another serious conflict erupted in the coming years." p. 28.
"By 1943, a consensus had emerged in the higher levels of the Roosevelt administration, as codified in the Foreign Petroleum Policy of the United States, a policy statement released by the State Department in April 1944. "In order to assure the adequacy for military and civilian requirements of strategically available reserves" the paper read, "a broad policy of conservation of Western Hemisphere petroleum reserves should be adopted."Instead of exporting oil from Western Hemisphere sources to markets elsewhere, the United States should promote the "substantial and orderly expansion of production in Eastern Hemisphere sources of supply, principally the Middle East." p. 30
"American firms first began looking for petroleum in Saudi Arabia in 1933, when the Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL) obtained a sixty-year [!! som man nu forsøger at få i Iraq] concession over a large area in al-Hasa (the Eastern Province) along the kingdom's Persian Gulf coast." p. 30-1. USA havde anerkendt ibn Sauds regering i 1931, men diplomatiske forbindelser oprettedes først i 1939 og residerende ambassadør kom der først i 1943. p. 31. Det var det år, hvor Roosevelt erklærede, at forsvaret af Saudiarabien var af afgørende betydningen for det amerikanske forsvar (p. 33). "[T]he U.S. government was ... deeply involved in maintaining an international environment in which private companies could operate with security and profit." p. 35.
"[T]he U.S. government was ... deeply involved in maintaining an international environment in which private companies could operate with security and profit." p. 35.
"the White House sought to shift the burden of the fighting to the countries in the region....we are willing to assist the Gulf states but we look to them to bear the main responsibility for their own defense and to cooperate among themselves to insure regional peace and stability." p. 43.
"- the takeover of the American embassy in Tehran by Islamic militants on November 5,1979, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan seven weeks later - and in each event Washington saw a significant threat to the safety of the Persian Gulf oil fields." p. 45
"But when Iran gained the upper hand, in 1982, the Reagan administration - perceiving a potential Iranian threat to U.S. oil interests in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia - began to aid the Iraqis with loans, intelligence support, and covert arms transfers." p. 48
"Abandoning reliance on local surrogates, Carter decreed that the United States would henceforth assume the primary responsibility for the defense of the Gulf. This was the Carter Doctrine, enunciated in his state of the Union address on January 23,1980..... Access to Persian Gulf oil was a vital national interest, Carter declared, and to protect that interest the United States was prepared to use "any means necessary, including military force."
"The record makes it clear, though, that the president and his senior associates initially viewed the invasion of Kuwait through the lens of the Carter Doctrine: as a threat to Saudi Arabia and the free flow of oil from the Gulf.", p.50
"Only when Fahd was shown satellite photographs of Iraqi tanks allegedly [!!] moving toward the Kuwaiti-Saudi border did Fahd conclude that Saddam Hussein posed a greater immediate danger than did the anger of his subjects. The king then granted his permission for the deployment of American ground troops, but not before he added a strict injunction: the troops must be withdrawn from Saudi Arabia the minute the danger from Iraq had passed. p. 51
"From Washington's perspective, American ground forces were the only sure way to protect Saudi Arabia. But, unbeknownst to the United States, Saudi leaders had been offered another option: reliance on the "Arab-Afghans," a multinational force of Islamic zealots who had battled the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s and had since fought in Bosnia, Kashmir, and elsewhere. Led, or at least financed, by Osama bin Laden, the Arab-Afghans were scattered throughout the Middle East and available for immediate service in any campaign deemed vital to the interests of Islam. Bin Laden enjoyed ready access to the Saudi royal family, having worked closely with Prince Turki bin Faisal, the head of the Saudi intelligence Service, while serving in Afghanistan." p. 52.
"As part of the first strategy, (direkte angreb på besættelsestropperne) bin Laden operatives bombed the SANG headquarters in Riyadh in 1995, killing five Americans, and attacked the Khobar Towers (a residential complex occupied by U.S. Air Force personnel assigned to Operation Southern Watch) in Dhahran in 1996, killing another nineteen. These attacks were followed, August 1998, by the bombings of the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and, in October 2000, by the attack on the USS Cole while it was berthed in Aden, Yemen." p. 54
The debate over ANWK was so vitriolic that it wholly monopolized the public discussion of the president's energy plan - thus obscuring many of its more alarming features." p. 60. "...the Cheney report calls on the President and other U.S. officials to "support initiatives by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria, Qatar, the UAE, and other suppliers to open up areas of their energy sectors to foreign investment - an uphill struggle at best, given these states' ingrained resistance to foreign ownership of their assets." p. 64 "The report also views Russia and the major Caspian Sea producers - Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan - as promising new sources. These countries were significant components of the once prolific Soviet oil industry but suffered a decline in oil production following the collapse of the USSR, in 1992. Their collective output began to rise again in the past few years, and now they seek to boost their exports to the West.", p. 65
Defense Planning Guidance {DPG) for fiscal years 1994-99, "detailed the particulars of implementing the strategy, among them holding on to America's lead in military technology, bolstering the Pentagon s efficacy to prevail in regional conflicts, and blocking any "European-only security arrangements" [!!!] p.68
"George W. Bush ...at the Citadel, the military academy in Charleston, South Carolina, on September23,1999,...declared that his principal goal was "to take advantage of a tremendous opportunity - given to few nations in history - to extend the current peace into the far realm of the future. A chance to project America s peaceful influence not just across the world, but across the years." og den fredelige indflydelse skulle opnås ved "a vastly enhanced capacity to "project our power" into distant combat zones" p. 69. "This emphasis on power-projection capabilities is extremely significant, because these are precisely the kind of forces it takes to fight regional oil wars and protect distant pipelines, refineries, and delivery routes....In a top-secret document, dated February 3, 2001, a high-ranking official of the National Security Council directed the NSC staff to cooperate with the NEPDG in assessing the military implications of the administration's energy plan." p. 70
"In fact, it is getting harder to distinguish U.S. military operations designed to fight terrorism from those designed to protect energy assets. ...All of which points to the president's preference for responding to risks of oil dependency by relying more and more on military force." p. 72
"United States has an interest in ensuring that all major consuming countries have an adequate supply of petroleum," p. 78
"Even this bland restatement of conventional wisdom acknowledges the critical importance of the Gulf; emphasize just two words in the report, and America's real dilemma comes into focus: Middle East oil "will remain central to world oil security," and so the Gulf will be a primary focus" of American energy policy. From this, everything else in the administration's Gulf policy follows. p. 78
"The administration's thinking is further revealed in the elaborate preparations made before the war to occupy Iraqi oil installations at the very onset of combat and to install a friendly oil-management team once the fighting had stopped.... the Working Group on Oil and Energy, which was filled with expatriate Iraqi oil officials sympathetic to Washington's war aims.... Although its membership was never made public, the news media did report on its meetings; according to these accounts, it called for the opening up of Iraq's previously state-owned oil sector to outside investment." p. 99. "(As of this writing, Chalabi had been cut off from official American support because of suspicions that he had provided secret U.S. intelligence data to Iran.) p. 100.
"The Bush administration's ultimate goal in Iran is the same as it was in Iraq: a change in regime." p. 105. "In response, the Iranians agreed in October 2003 to suspend all objectionable programs and to permit more thorough inspections of its nudear facilities by the IAEA.....The sanctions imposed by the United States have proved an even bigger obstacle to foreign investment. Under Executive Order 12959, signed by President Clinton in 1995 and later renewed by President Bush, American firms are barred from any significant investment in Iran; under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (extended for five years in 2001), the government is required to penalize any non-U.S. Company that invests in Iran." p. 106-7 "Hence Washingtons anxiety over Iran's continuing deployment of Chinese-made antiship missiles at both entrances to the Strait of Hormuz and on a number of small islands (Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs. p.108 "Rumsfeld...explained in an August 2002 Speech, [The administration's approach] is based on a "dual-track policy" combining economic and diplomatic pressure on the regime with support for antigovernment forces within the country....:. Thus, the existence of an elected government in Iran is irrelevant. "Our policy is not about Khatami or Khamenei," Khalilzad declared, "it is about supporting those who want human rights, democracy, and economic and educational opportunity for themselves and their fellow countrymen and women,"" p. 109
"First, the conspicuous presence of U.S. oil firms is bound to arouse hostility from people who reject American values or resent the great concentration of wealth and power in America's hands. Second, the very production of oil in otherwise under-developed societies often skews the local economy - funneling vast wealth to a few and thus intensifying the preexisting antagonism between the haves and the have-nots...., A more conspicuous U.S. presence in other Gulf countries is likely to provoke similar expressions of anti-Amerian venom." p. 21 og p. 129
"Within days of the terrorist attack, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan had agreed to provide logistic support or overflight rights for the U.S. assault on Afghanistan, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan allowed American forces to establish temporary bases on their territory." "In petitioning Congress for this aid, administration officials consistently stressed the importance of these countries in combating international terrorism. But it is clear from government documents that the war against terrorism intertwined with our Caspian oil policy." p. 137
"The temporary bases established at Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan and at Khanabad in Uzbekistan to support American combat operations in Afghanistan during the war against the Taliban are now being converted into permanent installations." 139.
"For the past thirty years, Colombia has been lacerated by a four-way struggle between the central government, leftist guerrillas belonging to the FARC and ELN, right-wing paramilitary organizations, and heavily armed drug cartels." p. 140 Kort over Colombia: Cano Limón-Coveñas Pipeline. "though American support for Plan Colombia and associated programs usually stresses the perniciousness of the drug trade, in 2002 the Bush administration announced another objective: helping the Colombian government protect its oil pipelines from guerrilla attack. p. 140-1. Colombias olieeksport til USA er faldet fra 468000 barrels/dag i 1999 til 256000 barrels/dag i 2002. p. 142.
"As one indication of the Pentagon's growing interest in the region, NATO supreme Commander General James Jones declared in May 2003 that the carrier battle groups under his command will shorten their future visits to the Mediterranean and "spend half the time going down the west coast of Africa." p.145
side 146: "The great powers have always battled for control over important sources of wealth and advantage. European states fought over the resource-rich territories of the Americas and Africa; imperial Britain vied with Russia for control of Central Asia and with the Ottoman Turks for Egypt and the Levant." "After examining a number of recent wars in Africa and Asia, I came to a conclusion radically different from Huntington's that resources, not differences in civilizations or identities, are at the root of most contemporary conflict.
("Alexander M. Haig testified in 1980, "then one can only conclude that the era of the 'resource war' has arrived."p. 148).
"President John F Kennedy built on these precedents, ordering U.S. planes to the region in 1963 when Yemeni forces linked to President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt attacked Saudi Arabia." p. 12. UNDERSØGES NÆRMERE jeg modtager gerne forslag til kilder.
"Postwar America understood that petroleum supply would be just as critical in future conflicts as it was in the two world wars, hence our keen interest in the Persian Gulf. As I explained in chapter 2, the Truman administration believed that Soviet gambits in Iran, Greece, and Turkey were ultimately aimed at oil fields farther south. Washington countered by sending arms and other forms of military aid to friendly states in the area and by establishing a permanent naval presence in the Gulf. To be sure, these and subsequent moves in the region were framed in ideological terms, as part of the global Crusade against communism - but they rested on a classic geopolitical foundation." p. 149.
"The Middle East and Central Asia are sites of wide-ranging internal division and conflict that any major player can exploit to gain an advantage or to obstruct its rivals." p. 152
"Some analysts regard Putins principal goals as inoffensive and even beneficial: namely, promoting economic growth at home and restoring stability on country's southern perimeter, particularly in the Muslim-majority areas of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Higher Russian oil output, they reason, is entirely in line with America's vital interests; so is Moscow's desire to quash terrorism, especially given that the Caspian basin has proved such a fertile ground for Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. But other analysts view Russian policy in a far more sinister light, as part of a concerted effort on Moscow's part to reassert its global prestige and to reimpose its sway over what was once the Russian/Soviet empire. This latter view is especially popular among neoconservatives, who have never quite abandoned their cold-war-hardened suspicions of the Russian leadership." p. 155 "The Russians gave their tacit approval to American use of former Soviet bases in Central Asia as staging areas for operations against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and collaborated in the delivery of arms and logistic support to the anti-Taliban forces of the Northern Alliance." p.156.
"In an effort to sideline Russia, American officials have urged the Kazakhs and the energy companies to build an oil and gas pipeline beneath the Caspian Sea to the BTC starting point in Baku. Predictably, Moscow has furiously resisted these initiatives. In January 2002, President Putin proposed the establishment of a "Eurasian Gas AIliance" that would unite all Central Asian producers in an integrated transportation system that would rely, to a considerable extent, on lines crossing Russia to markets in the West." p. 159
"China is a rising power, and its surging economy is generating an ever-expanding thirst for imported energy." p. 161 "Of greatest concern to Beijing is the Uighur Separatist movement in Xinjiang, a low level insurgency waged by advocates of an independent Uighur State. Such a State existed briefly after World War II, and the Chinese authorities fear that the region's Turkic-speaking majority (of which the Uighurs form the largest component) will seek to resurrect some version of it." p. 162 "But many American analysts, who foresee China growing into a major military rival, blanch at any sign of geopolitical initiative on Beijing's part."
"Chinas sale of missiles and arms technology to Iran - is not very comforting to Washington. According to the Congressional Research Service, Beijing has supplied Iran with advanced C-802 antiship missiles and C-801K air-to-surface missiles along with older-model SA-2 surface-to-air missiles. The Chinese are also believed to have provided technological assistance and specialized equipment to Irans Shahab ballistic missile program." p. 173.
"China is also believed to be seeking a doser military relationship with Saudi Arabia. Beijing has provided arms to the Saudis in the past - most notably a 1988 delivery of several dozen CSS-2 "East Wind" intermediate range ballistic missiles - but has not been a major military supplier in recent years. However, with both countries seeking new strategic partners in an effort to balance American dominance in the Gulf, Riyadh and Beijing are believed to have discussed a new round of arms transactions, The Saudis are already planning to build a large refinery in China, and this project could set the stage for a reciprocal arrangement in the military field....some Washington analysts view these arms deliveries with rising alarm. p.174
"China has also become a major military supplier to the Sudanese government, providing Khartoum with a wide variety of basic combat systems, including J-5,J-6, and F-7 combat planes (the Chinese versions of Soviet MiG-17, -19, and -21 aircraft), Type-59 and -62 tanks, and Type59 artillery pieces." p. 173-4.
"[T]he Shanghai Five, as this treaty organization was created at a 1996 meeting in Shanghai of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The resulting accord, the "Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field Along the Border Areas." i August 1999, the Shanghai Five agreed to hold regular consultations for their senior military officers and to establish a joint antiterrorism center in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Prodded by Beijing, the group added Uzbekistan to their ranks in 2001 and agreed to formalize the alliance as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). ....In a particularly striking development, Chinese troops joined with Kyrgyz forces in October 2002 to conduct a joint counterinsurgency exercise on Kyrgyzstan's side of their mutual border - the first such joint training exercise on foreign territory that Chinese forces are known to have engaged in." 172.
"Indeed, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, though it was driven by a number of factors, can be seen as part of a long-term drive to perpetuate America's dominance in this vital area; it can also be read (and, in Beijing, no doubt was) as a, demonstration of our determination to retain control over the spigot of the Persian Gulf oil stream." p. 175
"The Sino-Russian relationship is especially unpredictable. China and Russia have cooperated in the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and have collaborated in fighting Muslim extremists in Central Asia. Russia is also China's major supplier of arms and military technology - providing $1.3 billion worth between 1997 and 1999 - and the two countries established a "strategic partnership" in July 2000, the same time, Moscow has frustrated Chinese efforts to obtain more energy from Russia, most notably by refusing to permit the construction of a long-promised pipeline from Angarsk, in Siberia, to Daqing, in northern China." p. 177
"The bill - including the cost of keeping troops in Iraq and the Gulf, the Caspian basin, and Colombia, along with their supporting elements at home - will easily exceed $150 billion per year. Given the enormity of the federal deficit and the attendant need to rein in govenment spending, we can sustain these expenditures only by pinching pennies at home - notably on domestic infrastructure and services, induding, of course, health care and education." p.182.
"Politically and morally, the price will be just as steep. To retain our access to oil and to secure permission to deploy our troops where we deem them necessary, in such oil-rich states as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, we will have to crawl into bed with some of the world's most corrupt and despotic leaders - plying them with ever more arms, military training, technical assistance, diplomatic support, and White House access while ignoring their contempt for democracy and their egregious human rights violations. And the numerous victims of these regimes will come to view America not as a standard-bearer of democracy but as a greedy prop of dictatorship." p. 183
"Every year, the Citizens of this country consume more oil than the year before, and their appetite for the stuff shows no sign of abating. Convincing people to consume less, and to begin preparing for the day of petroleum scarcity, will no doubt prove a formidable task. Consider, for example, that automakers reported an increase in sales of large, gas-guzzling pickup trucks and SUVs in early 2004, despite record-high gasoline prices." p. 187
1. Separating Energy Policy from Our Overseas Security Commitments
"Banning such commitments would in no way preclude our rushing to the aid of victims of armed aggression, in accordance with the UN Charter. What it would preclude is oil-for-protection agreements between the United States and our overseas petroleum suppliers. While eschewing new arrangements of this sort, we must also extricate ourselves from those we have already agreed to. The most significant of these is our unseemly alliance with Saudi Arabia". p. 189 "The same basic logic should apply to major oil suppliers in other regions: Washington must refuse to provide military support in return for access to oil, but could assist these states, as appropriate, in enhancing their self-defense capabilities and forming regional cooperative security arrangements...... And we must abide by our own human rights legislation and deny military aid to any government guilty of egregious violations." p. 192 [Klare glemmer her helt USAs egne brud på menneskerettighederne !]
2. Reducing Our Dependence on Imported Oil
"Transportation accounts for approximately two-thirds of America's net oil consumption; it also happens to be the easiest type of petroleum use to control. (Other modes of oil consumption, notably industrial uses, petrochemicals, and home heating, are likely to prove far more resistant to restriction.)" p. 193
"Reducing their oil consumption has been the focus of a great deal of research in recent years, and the results can be grouped into four basic approaches: first, improvement in the fuel efficiency of existing vehides; second, the introduction of nonpetroleum fuels (especially ethanol) for existing engines; third, new and improved forms of automobile propulsion, especially hybrid (gas/electric) engines and hydrogen-powered fuel cells; and, fourth, the far more widespread use of mass transit.....Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) Standards. ..In 1975, when the Standards were adopted, light trucks accounted for a relatively small share of the market - SUVs had not yet been introduced. By 2001, they accounted for more than half of light-vehicle sales in the United States; and because they have lower average mpg requirements than do automobiles, the average fuel efficiency of America's light-vehicle fleet has fallen in recent years. " p. 194
"Hybrid vehicles combine a small, highly efficient gasoline engine with a battery-driven electric motor....These vehicles consume far less petroleum than conventional automobiles do; the Toyota Prius, for example, can travel more than fifty miles on a single gallon of gasoline. Road-ready hybrids are already available from Toyota and Honda." p. 195-6
3. Hastening the Transition to a Postpetroleum Economy
Orla Jordal, 2007
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