Boganmeldelse

Carley Michael Jabara, 1939: the alliance that never was and the coming of World War II

1999, ISBN 1-56663-252-8 (alk. paper) Ivan R. Dee, Publisher, 1332 North Halsted Street, Chicago 60642.

[Der mangler britisk-fransk støtte til de hvide !!!
Findes der noget i sovjetiske arkiver om Litvinovs forhold til Stalin]

Der er tale om et faghistorisk studie, der bygger på kilder, (diplomatiske rapporter, dagbogsnotater, breve, private og officielle, o.l. inkl. sovjetiske) og bogen er derfor et nyttigt bidrag til komplettering og nuancering af de almindelige fremstillinger.

Det kan klart konstateres, at Storbritannien og Frankrig forhandlede på skrømt - indtil det var for sent. Molotov og Stalin var mistænksomme - også ud over det rimelige. Carley nævner ikke de to landes interventionspolitik med støtte til de hvide. Det har dog nok bidraget til mistænksomheden.

Litvinov er bogens helt, for sin vilje til et internationalt samarbejde om at bevare freden.

Carley skal roses ikke at være bange for at placere en rimelig grad af skyld for de mislykkede forhandlinger på Chamberlains klassebevidste antikommunisme - som han prioriterede højere end Englands sikkerhed.

Det er også opløftende, men helt rimeligt, at se gengivelsen af Molotovs vurdering, at den tysk-sovjetiske ikke-angrebspagt skulle købe tid uden kommentarer i øvrigt.

Jeg har forsøgt i citaterne at holde mig til Carleys stavemåde, også hvor den afviger fra mit staveprograms.

Citater:

... it focuses on relations among France, Britain, the Soviet Union, and Nazi Germany. xiii
the Soviet Union was not an important factor or a desirable ally. Xiv
British resources were spread too thin to provide adequate security in both Europe and Asia. xiv
If war came, the French army would have to bear the high cost in blood of fighting on land, and it was just this calculation that so embittered French generals and politicians. xiv
A Soviet alliance would guarantee victory - yet it would also lead to the spread of communist revolution and Soviet influence in Europe. xv
In Duroselle’s and Weber’s view of decadence, anti-communism did not play an important role, but in my view, it did. xvii
anti-appeasement Conservatives accused Chamberlain and his circle of confusing their class interests for those of their country. Xvii - xviii
The Anglo-French rejection of numerous Soviet initiatives to improve relations during the interwar years, or to create an anti-Nazi coalition, especially during the period 1935-1938, greatly increased Soviet mistrust and cynicism. xviii
LEADING PARTICIPANTS IN THE DRAMA, ukommenteret liste med årstal for funktioner, xxi-xxv
Churchill - Chamberlain // sammenhold med Buhle // klassekampen vigtigere end den nationale kamp, for USA og Chamberlain m.fl.
“A Long List of Disappointments” 3-28
Nazi Germany threatened both France and the Soviet Union. They could either stand together, with Britain, or fall separately. Litvinov and Coulondre were critics of appeasement and advocates of collective security against Nazi Germany. 3
At the end of November 1939 fighting erupted at the periphery when the Soviet Union attacked Finland in what proved to be a short but bloody Winter War. Conservatives in France and Britain were anxious to help Finland, and some were anxious to make war on the Soviet Union. The Red Army was easy pickings, so it seemed, and a target infinitely more appealing than the formidable Nazi Wehrmacht. 5
In’1918 the Soviet nationalization of private investments and the denunciation of capitalism. 6
The French and British refused until 1924 to extend de jure diplomatic recognition to the Soviet government, refused early on to trade with it, or then to extend credit for trade. 6
Why should we lend new money to the Bolsheviks, said Western financiers, when they won’t pay Russia’s old debts? Because it’s profitable, replied Soviet traders, and they tried to make it so. It may surprise but Bolsheviks made good businessmen, and Soviet-Western trade slowly increased. 6
The Comintern’s activities were ineffectual and amateurish, but they vexed and frightened Western governments - vexed Soviet diplomats also because the Comintern disrupted their pragmatic approaches to the West. 6
Anglo-Soviet relations were ruptured in 1927, and Franco-Soviet relations nearly so a short time after. Some improvement later occurred, and the British resumed diplomatic relations in 1929. 7
The red scare was periodically brought out and exploited by conservatives to fight national elections in 1924 in Britain and in 1919, 1928, and 1936 in France. In the United States, too, the red scare served the right. But the U.S. government withdrew from European politics in 1919 and refused until 1933 to recognize the Soviet Union. 7
Most historians associate the cold war with the period after 1945 and with the great struggle for hegemony between the United States and the Soviet Union. Red scare and reds, containment, peaceful coexistence, anti-communist electoral campaigns and fear mongering were all part of the post-1945 cold war. Yet these conspicuous signs of the cold war were nothing new. They were popular and commonplace during the interwar years. 7
Geography forced France to face the fundamental question early on. Even at the beginning of the 1920s the center Radical party, and especially one of its leaders, Édouard Herriot, stood for closer relations with the Soviet Union to recreate a balance of power in Europe and restrain a resurgent Germany. 7
Litvinov 8-10
Litvinov stated repeatedly that the only way to assure European security was for France, Britain, and the Soviet Union to lead a coalition of states determined to deter Nazi aggression, or to defeat it in war should deterrence fail. As long as Germany was controlled by the Nazis, said Litvinov in 1934, so long would Germany be a “mad dog that can’t be trusted, with whom no agreements can be made, and whose ambition can only be checked by a ring of determined neighbors.” 9-10
In the latter half of the 1930s the best-known British proponent of better relations with the Soviet Union was Churchill, who had earlier been an anti-communist “diehard,” determined to “down the Bolshies.” 10
Vansittart, [10-13] ... was the strongest and most courageous of the small band of British officials who fought unsuccessfully to alert the British government to the Nazi peril. 10
... the foreign secretary was still his boss. One of them, Anthony Eden, who did not like such a strong and willful permanent under secretary, said he was “in mentality” more a secretary of state than a permanent official.’ Eden therefore wanted to get rid of him. 10
Vansittart sought to recreate the alliances of the First World War with Italy and Russia. That Italy was fascist and Russia communist did not matter if they would stand with Britain against Nazi Germany. Herriot and Litvinov had similar ideas. 12
Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan Mikhailovich Maiskii. 12-
Churchill: Hitlerite Germany is “a huge, scientifically organized war machine, led by commonplace American gangsters.” 13
... the new foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, put a stop to the Soviet rapprochement. “ 14
[France] Among the realists during the 1930s were Herriot, Joseph Paul-Boncour, a socialist, and Louis Barthou, an anti-communist conservative. ... In 1932 the French government signed a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union; in 1933 it sent a military attaché to Moscow; and in early 1934 it signed a provisional trade agreement. Paul-Boncour’s role in the Franco-Soviet rapprochement is little recognized by historians, but in 1933 he pushed for a Franco-Soviet trade agreement and began to talk to Litvinov and the Soviet ambassador in Paris about collective security against Nazi Germany. 14
[French ambassador, Charles Alphand i Moskva], “Our capitalists,” he said, “are frightened by you.” 15
Barthou adopted the Herriot/Paul-Boncour policy as his own, but he was killed the following October by Croatian fascists who assassinated the Yugoslav king Alexander in Marseilles. His successor, Pierre Laval, was a slippery, come-lately conservative with few fixed opinions. ... He was a strong anti-communist, one of the only principles to which he stuck fast. 16
“Give us credit,” Marshal K. E. Voroshilov, the commissar for defense, would later say, “for not being so stupid as to get mixed up... in matters [French domestic politics] which do not concern us.” 16
On March 9 [1935] the Nazi government announced the existence of the Luftwaffe, the German air force, and a week later Hitler announced the reintroduction of conscription and a German army strength of 500,000 men, These actions were further incentive for better Franco-Soviet relations, but two powerful Quai d’Orsay officials, secretary general Alexis Léger and political director Paul Bargeton, were against them. 17
[Laval] So he went to Moscow in May 1935 to sign the mutual assistance pact in great pomp and circumstance. Shortly thereafter the Soviet Union also signed a mirror accord with Czechoslovakia, thus reinforcing the Franco-Soviet agreement and the 1925 Franco-Czech mutual assistance pact. 17
However skeptical Litvinov might have been, the Soviet government between 1935 and 1937 pressed the French for staff talks and for access to war materiel from the French defense industry. The French government promised the goods but never delivered. 18
There was no doubt in Warsaw about who was “Enemy No. 1.” Such calculations had led the Polish government in January 1934 to conclude a nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany. 18
The growing strength of the left frightened French conservatives and heightened their fears of closer relations with the Soviet Union, 18
But Litvinov would never get the clarity he wanted. In March the Rhineland crisis erupted while the French Parliament was debating ratification of the Franco-Soviet pact. The Soviet embassy in Paris was discouraged by the weakness of the Anglo-French response to the German military occupation of the demilitarised zone along the left bank of the Rhine. Hitler’s action violated a crucial provision of the treaty of Versailles. 18-9
Mandel gained a reputation as the premier’s [Georges Clemenceau] exécuteur de basses oeuvres, his hatchet man, a role for which he earned both fear and respect.
Mandel was a conservative but also a Jew, which did not fit well on the political right where anti-Semitism was common. 19
In 1936 he advocated the formation of a National Union government, and he pressed relentlessly for a Franco-Soviet military alliance. 19
“I told Eden ...,” said Baldwin, “that on no account, French or other, must he bring us in to fight on the side of the Russians.” 20
In September 1936 Potemkin warned the French foreign minister. Yvon Delbos, that a “policy of capitulation” to fascist aggression would lead France to the loss of its allies and to isolation. Delbos protested that the government sought to avoid war, and that there was a growing fear of revolution in France. The British ambassador in Paris meddled in French domestic affairs, telling his French counterparts that more strikes in France would be considered undesirable in London. Potemkin was astonished: “Why does France permit the interference of a foreign government in its internal affairs?” Delbos replied that French “friendship” with Britain allowed to it certain liberties. The juxtaposition between French complacency toward certain friendly British “liberties” and French sensitivity toward unfriendly Soviet “interference” could not have gone unnoticed by Potemkin.
In any event, Potemkin’s warning had no effect whatsoever. In October Léger, the French Vansittart without the courage or vision, advised the Soviet chargé d’affaires that Franco-Soviet relations would suffer if the Soviet Union did not pursue a less aggressive policy in Spain. Léger was smug about Franco’s advance toward Madrid, which, if successful, would mark the beginning of the ebb tide of bolshevism.’ The negative strategic consequences for France of having another fascist state established on its borders, along with Germany and Italy, did not seem to matter. As Collier, Vansittart’s stalwart amanuensis, noted in 1937: “People . .. Seem to lose all consideration for the interests of their country, as opposed to those . of their church or of their class, when they deal with affairs in Spain...” 21
But the blood purges [Stalins] - along with the Popular Front victory and the Spanish Civil War - occurred after the French and British governments had moved away from a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. 21
An Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance would certainly triumph, but at what cost. War meant ruin, the decline and collapse of the old European order; victory risked the spread of communism on the crest of the advance of the Red Army into Europe. Hence the Stalinist purges merely hardened opponents and inhibited partisans of better relations. 22
Now domestic ideological fears of the French Communist party spilled over into foreign policy and destabilized fragile Franco-Soviet ties. 23
Blum suggested that talks were being “sabotaged” by the general staff and by the war minister, Édouard Daladier, Soviet orders for war materiel were also being blocked by the military bureaucracy. Potemkin commented that the Soviet government was beginning to doubt French sincerity in furthering the buildup of Soviet arms. ... The French war ministry blocked the sale of modern military, especially naval, materiel, likewise because of anticipated British objections. It did not mind, however, selling obsolete equipment to the Soviet Union. 24
The Soviet government had no intention of forcing itself upon the French, replied Potemkin, but it was a mistake for France to be constantly looking over its shoulder at Germany in expectation of its next outburst and to be subordinating its foreign policy to direction from London. 24-5
Schweisguth noted Gamelin’s order: “we should not hurry, but avoid giving to the Russians the impression that we were playing them along, which could lead them into a political volte-face [i.e., a rapprochement with Germany].” 25
[1937] The Soviet commissar for defense, Marshal Voroshilov, reacting angrily to the additional questions posed by Schweisguth, refused further discussions. The Soviet general staff had indicated what it was prepared to do in the event of German aggression against France and had asked in return what the French would do in the case of a German attack on the Soviet Union. Instead of an answer, the French had put more questions. 26
French policy seemed incomprehensible to Surits [Soviet Ambassador in Paris] because of the government’s betrayal of its own national interests, especially in Spain. The only way he could explain it was in the domination of class over national interests, and in French submission to British power, perceived to be the only real protection against Nazi Germany. For France and especially for Britain, it was evident that the Soviet Union would play the decisive role in the struggle against fascism and that the defeat of fascism would lead to the growth of Soviet influence in Europe. At this cost, victory over fascism was undesirable. [!!!!!!] The French, said Surits, were headed toward “complete capitulation to Hitler and [Benito] Mussolini. 27
At the end of 1937 the Soviet government was deeply worried ... Ambassador Coulondre warned Paris against the dangers of a Soviet withdrawal from Europe because of the failures of collective security. It was a “long list of disappointments”, Litvinov said, ... Coulondre advised that the negative consequences of the purges on the Red Army would correct themselves quickly ... the entente with the Bolsheviks was not the result of sentimentality, any more than was the French alliance with the tsars. ... When we negotiate with people like the Nazis, who habitually brandish a pistol in our faces, it’s best not to give the impression that we are denying to ourselves the support of one of our strongest allies. 27-8
January 1934 Franco-Soviet trade agreement. 28
a plan for trade credits or a loan to the Soviet Union to solidify political relations. This project was sabotaged by the Banque de France, among others, in January 1936, about the same time a similar project was scuttled in London by Eden. 28
When Litvinov granted an interview to the French correspondent in Moscow of the influential Paris daily Le Temps, he did not need to be as reserved as he might have been with Coulondre, and he was not. He gave a lecture on Hitler’s methods, and no one can deny now that he was right. Thus, according to Litvinov, when Hitler declared that he wanted to undo the territorial clauses of the Versailles treaty, he said to the French, all the clauses except Alsace-Lorraine (which was French territory); to the Poles he said, except Danzig and the Polish corridor; and so on. 28
Commenting on this interview, [m. Litvinov], Coulondre did not need to add much more than he had already conveyed to Paris: “... if the Soviet Union is not with us, it will be against us.” 29
Anglo-French relations were nearly as strained as relations with the Soviet Union. ... France wanted security against a resurgent Germany and wanted British support to maintain it. ... The British government did not wish to see France dominate Europe and therefore welcomed the resurgence of German economic and political strength. 29
Neville Chamberlain, who succeeded Baldwin as prime minister in May 1937, opposed the dispatch of large ground forces to France and held back financial resources to expand the British army before 1939. 30
Implicit in Chamberlain’s defense policy was letting someone else do the fighting in Europe, presumably the French, or better, the Russians. In 1936 the British government could send two divisions to France; in 1937 it did not plan to send more than five. “Two, and two more later,” Stalin would later facetiously remark. This was a long way from the approximately sixty British divisions on the western front during the First World War. In 1935 Marshal Philippe Pétain reckoned that the British army was for the “parade ground” only, not for fighting in Europe. 30
Behind its frontier fortifications, the Maginot line, the French army did not plan to take the offensive against Germany for its putative allies, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, or to defend Austria. 31
... “War somewhere else,” said the French. ...Fight to the last Frenchman, the British seemed to say; ... the French reply, let the burden fall on the Czechs, Poles, and Russians. 31
... while the British did not want France to improve its security through closer relations with the Soviet Union, the British would not give France the military and political support it needed in lieu of closer Franco-Soviet relations. 32
Sargent agreed: “I have never quite been able to accept the truth of M. Litvinov’s dictum about the ‘indivisibility of peace. 33
Baldwin told Conservative colleagues in 1936: 33
And there was no change in attitude when Chamberlain became prime minister. He said in cabinet in November 1938: 33
The British Secret Intelligence Service considered the Soviet Union to be the real enemy, and so of course did the French general staff. 33
It was facile, self-deluded thinking, for once Hitler had glutted him self in the east, he could turn back west with far greater strength, as Churchill, for one, had observed. 33
In view of these Anglo-French prejudices and malevolent ideas - about which Litvinov and his ambassadors were well informed - it might appear remarkable that the Soviet government stuck with collective security for as long as it did. ... But as the British ambassador, Chilston, pointed out, the Soviet government new of no better policy and so was left with collective security, however ineffective it might be. 33-4
CHAPTER TWO “Thou Art Weighed in the Balance and Found Wanting 35
Churchill was a master of the English language and an eloquent speaker who despised Nazism and Adolf Hitler and condemned the British government for failing to see the obvious danger threatening Europe. 35
Churchill rose again in the House on October 5, 1938 ... the Czech war crisis in September. 36
Churchill recovered quickly from his discouragement with the purges. He had to, because, as he told Maiskii, without the Soviet Union a grand alliance would not work. 38
Chamberlain wanted nothing to do with Churchill’s grand alliance, and the Foreign Office quickly rejected Litvinov’s call for an international conference. 38
And while Chamberlain was prepared to deal with Hitler, he would not countenance an alliance with Stalin. 40
The Polish government would under no circumstances allow the Red Army across Poland to assist Czechoslovakia against a German invasion. The Romanian position was less categorical and subject to flexibility if France would show firmness in supporting the Czechs. The Romanian king Carol had even said privately to Paul-Boncour and Gamelin in 1936 and 1937 that he would find some way to allow Red Army forces across northern Romania. .... How can we believe that France will come to our rescue, asked King Carol, when France would not protect its own vital interests against the German occupation of the Rhineland? 41
Leger told the Czech minister in Paris, Osusky, that the French government did not wish to proceed further with military conversations because they were a powerful source of conflict between right and left in France. 43
News in the West of the continuing Stalinist purges impeded the defense of Czechoslovakia. Litvinov tried to conduct Soviet foreign policy without noticing them, but in the West the purge trials were most certainly noticed. “There is something rotten - very rotten - in the State of Russia,” noted Sir Lancelot Oliphant, assistant permanent under secretary in the Foreign Office: it’s “a weak reed to lean on.” This was a prevalent view. On the other hand, Coulondre and Colonel Auguste-Antoine Palasse, the French military attaché in Moscow, provided information on the strength of Soviet armed forces, which identified shortcomings in offensive [!!!!] capabilities but generally bespoke of an ally worth having, with a formidable potentiel de guerre. 43-4
On May 19, 1938, a brief war scare developed, and Czechoslovakia called up a class of reservists based on what turned out to be erroneous reports of a German military buildup. 44
On May 22 Bonnet called in the Polish ambassador in Paris, Juliusz Lukasiewicz, to ask what the Polish policy would be. “We’ll not move,” replied Lukasiewicz. 44
Lukasiewicz was equally categorical: “the Poles considered the Russians to be enemies .. 44
Although French officials often pointed out to the Poles that they had an interest in supporting Czechoslovakia and in resisting German aggression against it, the Poles saw matters otherwise. 45
Coulondre noted that the Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance would win a war against Nazi Germany but Poland would be crushed by the Red Army and Soviet influence would extend into central Europe, perhaps into Germany or even into France itself. Fear of victory paralyzed the French as much as fear of defeat. 46
The Anglo-French spoke loudly in Prague about the need for concessions and softly in Berlin where Hitler “ignored all their demarches.” To Maiskii’s surprise, so he said, Halifax made no attempt to defend British policy. 48
In France there was no disagreement on this point - disagreement came in what to do about it. A large majority of the French did not think they had sufficient military and economic strength to act on their own to stop Hitler in Czechoslovakia. Hence the French needed allies, and here, according to Surits, began all the great divisions within the French government and French opinion.
“Simple logic” would suggest the Soviet Union as a natural ally. and this view was held by a range of opinion from the French Communists to cabinet minister Paul Reynaud on the right. The Soviet Union, according to Reynaud, had what Britain did not have, and which was essential in any war with Nazi Germany: powerful land and air forces. ... It had not once consulted the Soviet Union before important decisions and only reported them after the fact, and then not always. In spite of its mutual assistance pacts with the USSR and with Czechoslovakia, the French government had never requested joint discussions of defense issues. 49
With regard to the acquisition of war supplies, Daladier promised deliveries and his apparat sabotaged and delayed. 50
... another hypothesis, that the Soviet Union was contemplating intervention to aid Czechoslovakia, even if France should stand aside. Coulondre thought this an unlikely possibility, but he also noted that Litvinov did not ask idle questions. “This is a man who is direct. .. And comes to the point.” 51
Draw the bayonet, said Litvinov, as the Czechs had done in May, and the situation might take another direction. Hitler was bluffing and preparing a vast theatre production of threats and military demonstrations to induce France and Britain to surrender. 52
So much so that Wilson was “very nearly in a panic,” not knowing what “trouble” to expect next from Hitler. “And from this derived Wilson’s readiness to pay off Germany at any price.” 52
Maiskii pointed to the danger of a Nazi Mittel Europa if Czechoslovakia fell, a greater danger for France and Britain, he observed, than for the Soviet Union. Wilson avoided saying it, but Chamberlain did not believe this hypothesis to be true. He thought the Soviet Union had the most to fear from Nazi eastward expansion, and this prospect did not trouble the prime minister. 52-3
It started at the end of August ... The German ambassador in Moscow, Friedrich Werner von der Schulenberg, went to see Litvinov ... raised the issue of the Czech crisis and asked about British, French, and Soviet intentions. ... and we also will fulfill our obligations to Czechoslovakia.”» Bonnet heard about it. He then directed Payart, the French chargé d’affaires in Moscow, because Coulondre was on leave, to ask for clarification from Litvinov. 53
The following day. September 2, Payart saw Litvinov ... As for concrete military assistance to Czechoslovakia, the issues should be addressed by a meeting of the general staffs of the Soviet Union, France, and Czechoslovakia. We are ready to participate in such talks, said Litvinov. 54
After Anschluss, Litvinov reminded Payart, the Soviet Union had proposed a conference of interested powers. It considered that such a conference now, including Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, might gain the moral support of the American president Franklin Roosevelt and would have the best chance of discouraging Hitler from further adventures. But the parties must act quickly before Hitler committed himself. 54-5
Payart’s account of the meeting largely corresponded with Litvinov’s but added an interesting detail. Romanian foreign minister Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen had recently informed his Czech counterpart Krofta that while the Romanian government would object to the passage of Soviet ground forces, “it would close its eyes to overflights of its territory”. 55
And while Payart’s first cable to Paris did not mention Litvinov’s proposal for staff talks, a following cable (published only as a footnote in the Documents diplomatiques francais), inexplicably dated two days later, added this crucial point. Had Payart simply forgotten to include it in his first record of conversation? Litvinov worried that Payart might not convey the message accurately, and he therefore asked Surits to report its contents directly to Bonnet. Indeed, he feared that Payart was looking for an evasive or negative reply in order to lay any responsibility for failure on the Soviet government. Bonnet undoubtedly was, but not Payart. 55
Surits ... had learned ... “that any time staff talks were discussed in the French cabinet, British opposition was always raised as an obstacle. One minister indicated that British officials had given him the definite impression that the British government “most of all” feared Soviet intervention in European affairs because the success of Soviet arms “could pave the way to communism in central Europe.” 55
Labour leader Hugh Dalton ... concluded that “It was a very grave matter that Bonnet should have lied to British Ministers about Russian intentions” - and Dalton might have added, to his own people as well. 56
This dispatch was not received by the Direction politique, the political directorate of the Quai d’Orsay, until September 20. Although it is doubtful whether Payart’s report would have made any difference, the Direction politique on September 6 circulated a note concluding that Litvinov had been “evasive” with Payart. 57 [!!!!!!!!!!!!???????]
Because of the French government’s refusal to enter into staff conversations with the Red Army high command, “the Soviets have ... towards us a certain mistrust which can explain, if not justify, a reserve which is no longer appropriate in the present circumstances.” 57
The Czech president, Benes, advised Aleksandrovskii that the French and British were applying “frantic pressure [for further concessions] with direct threats of leaving Czechoslovakia to the mercy of Hitler.” And Chilston told Potemkin that the French, in his opinion, were “not at all disposed to fight.” Here was British effrontery at its worst. since Chamberlain was “not at all disposed to fight.” 57
September 11. Coulondre, Potemkin ... it doubted French loyalty to its treaty obligations. ... Unfortunately Payart’s cable concerning his meeting with Litvinov put the emphasis on diplomatic measures. and this created some concern in Paris. Coulondre affirmed that French determination to support Czechoslovakia was unshakable and that such support might be necessary in the coming days. In these circumstances it was essential that there be no misunderstandings between France and the Soviet Union. Potemkin reiterated the three points of Litvinov’s meeting with Payart, to wit: League action with a view to obtaining at least tacit Romanian support for Red Army passage rights; an Anglo-Franco-Soviet conference and joint declaration warning Germany against an attack on Czechoslovakia; and general staff conversations. ... Only a careless interpretation of Litvinov’s statement, said Potemkin, could lead anyone to think that it was evasive or unclear. 58
Coulondre’s account of this meeting contains some differences. Litvinov’s three-point plan is clearly laid out. But Potemkin’s fourth point concerning ; Soviet determination to fulfill its obligations, along with France, is nor repeated. 58
... saw Litvinov in Geneva. According to Litvinov, Bonnet declared that the British had rejected Litvinov’s call for a trilateral conference, and that he did not know what the British were doing in Berlin to avert war. When Bonnet advised that Halifax had informed the French government that Britain had no obligations toward Czechoslovakia, he threw up his hands. 59
‘When Bonnet said to the Polish envoy [Lukasiewicz] that if Poland does not want... to help Czechoslovakia, then at least do not hinder Romania; the ambassador gave me to understand, that Poland on this point will not agree, and that Romania without its consent can make no decision.” Bonnet thought Poland might change its position, said Litvinov, “but this song we have heard for a long time.” And Litvinov reported another French song: “Bonnet confirms that France has not put nor will put any pressure on Czechoslovakia This was untrue. 59
[Bonnet’s account] Bonnet concluded that the Soviet Union would subordinate its action to League approval and the consent of Romania, and that this would provide the Soviet Union with an escape clause at the moment when France had committed itself. Bonnet’s conclusions are surprising, first because Litvinov did not lock himself into the League framework; he saw League action as a strategy, among others, to bring Romania on side, which Comnen suggested was possible. 59-60
Coulondre soon learned of the failure of the Bonnet-Litvinov meeting and confidentially informed Fierlinger, his Czech counterpart. It must be a misunderstanding, thought Coulondre, in view of Potemkin’s statement of the same day to him. Fierlinger then went to o see Potemkin, who thought there was no misunderstanding but rather a deliberate “game” by Bonnet. 60
Apparently the French ambassador did not understand, or did not say, that Bonnet’s reserve had prompted Litvinov’s mistrust and thus the commissar’s own reticence. 61
Payart was beside himself and told the Swedish minister in Moscow that Bonnet “was clearly trying to hide the contents of the conversation from members of the French government.” Not only from them, added Maiskii, but also from French diplomats abroad: “I was astonished to learn” that Corbin, for example, was unaware of the Payart-Litvinov meeting five days after it had occurred. 61
Litvinov drew his own conclusions. On September 14 in Geneva he saw Herriot and Paul-Boncour, the architects of the Franco-Soviet rapprochement. ... Litvinov repeated his statement to Payart about which his colleagues were “apparently insufficiently briefed.” ... Fierlinger heard from Potemkin about this meeting: “Herriot and Paul-Boncour were surprised by the positive and firm position of the USSR.... Bonnet has hidden everything... .”76
Early on September 15, 1938, Chamberlain and Horace Wilson flew to Berchtesgaden to negotiate with Hitler about the fate of Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain had discussed his mission with neither the French nor the Czechs, but he agreed to the principle of the cession of Czech territory to Nazi Germany. Soviet alarm at this development made its way into the Moscow rumor mill and then into the newspapers. Coulondre reported that the Soviet government feared a four-power pact (Britain, France, Germany, Italy) directed against it. 62
Coulondre warned, again, that among Soviet policy options would be rapprochement with Germany. 62
(77. Coulondre, nos. 694-696, Sept. 17, 1938, DDF, 2e XI, 278-Z79.)
Litvinov revealed “Bonnet’s deceit” on September 21 in a speech at the League of Nations, where he described the statements made to Payart and Coulondre in Moscow. 63
And yet Litvinov was still willing to encourage a stronger Anglo-French policy. And also a stronger Soviet position, because in a separate cable on the same day Litvinov recommended a partial Soviet mobilization, perhaps simultaneously with France, where the position appeared to be stiffening. Matters had gone too far to scare off Hitler with mere joint declarations; stronger action was needed, and quickly. 64
On September 22 Chamberlain rushed back to Godesberg to give Hitler the good news only to discover that the Fuehrer had upped his demands and threatened war before the end of September if Czechoslovakia did not at once agree to the German occupation of the Sudetenland, lock, stock, and barrel. 64
[det havde vel været tidspunktet for et skift i politik]
[set i bakspejlets skarpe lys burde Komintern være gået offensivt ud med en tysk-sovjetisk pagts uundgåelighed]
In London, Halifax told Masaryk on September 24 that the prime minister thought Hitler was someone with whom one could negotiate, and that once he had obtained the Czech Sudetenland, he would leave Europe in peace. Masaryk could not believe his ears, so Halifax repeated what he had said. The Czech minister gave a more detailed account to the Soviet chargé d’affaires, who passed it on to Moscow. 65
[MEN den 22. havde Chamberlain oplevet Hitlers “prisforhøjelse” er han langsom i opfattelsen, eller er kommunikationen i Foreign Office langsom ?]
By the end of September the Soviet mobilization was massive, including sixty infantry divisions, sixteen cavalry divisions, three tank corps, twenty-two tank brigades, and seventeen air brigades spread out along the Polish and Romanian frontiers. 65
[det har heller ikke været meget omtalt !!!!!]
British, who were capable of sending only two partially equipped divisions to France - and these were not even mobilized. [hvordan skal det forstås ?]
On September 26 the Foreign Office published a communiqué warning that if Hitler attacked Czechoslovakia, France was bound to go to its aid and that Britain and the Soviet Union would stand by France. In Paris one might have thought that the British communiqué would have been welcomed, which is why Bonnet did lot like it. He attempted to prevent its publication in the French press and put out a rumor that the communiqué was a Vansittart forgery. The appeasement press duly picked up the refrain. Mandel openly accused Bonnet of weakness and treason. Bonnet thought Mandel, Reynaud, and others of a like mind were “crazy.” ... He .... had good connections with the press and encouraged them to oppose a hard line against Germany. 65-6
Chamberlain also disliked the Foreign Office communiqué and kept trying to finesse around those of his colleagues who were reluctant to capitulate. 66
There was sometimes a direct correlation between unwillingness to fight and unwillingness to fight alongside the Red Army. In October, after the Munich crisis was over, Vuillemin recommended that France “break with the Soviets. 66
Aleksandrovskii [formentlig sovjet-ambassadør til Tjekkoslovakiet ikke med i List of participants] 67
The Soviet warning failed to douse the Polish craving for Teschen. ... the French and British were disturbed by the Polish position, especially since it could spin the crisis out of control, leading to war, with Poland in the Nazi camp. 67
Colonel Józef Beck was the Polish foreign minister and a key subordinate of Marshal Józef Pitsudski, the Polish nationalist leader who had died in 1935. ... Yet they tended to carry on the business of state as though Poland was a great power - dangerous conduct in the 1930s as Nazi Germany grew stronger and more predatory. Beck leaned toward Germany in the late 1930s, which brought Poland into conflict with the Soviet Union. 68
Litvinov regarded him as a Nazi pimp. Nevertheless, as long as the Soviet Union pursued a policy of collective security and close relations with France, it sought periodically to improve relations with the Poles. For the Soviet government knew that Poland was one of the keys to French misgivings about the Franco-Soviet mutual assistance pact. Beck was unresponsive to Soviet overtures. Polish opposition to collective security and Polish collusion with Nazi Germany immensely irritated Soviet and French diplomats and led ultimately in September 1939 to Poland’s disappearance. 68
In spite of Coulondre’s advice, Bonnet was willing to act as an intermediary to persuade the Czechs to hand over Teschen if Poland would “change camps.” 69
Coulondre recommended to Paris on September 24 that staff talks begin immediately with the Soviet Union, a recommendation he repeated three days later. Although Quai d’Orsay officials supported Coulondre’s recommendation, the French deputy chief of staff, General Colson, did not like to see the Red Army building up its forces on the Polish frontier, since Poland still hesitated on which side to join. But at the height of the crisis, on September 28, Bonnet sent a brush-off to Coulondre. 69
There was just one loose end to tie up: the Polish desire for Teschen. On September 30 the Polish government issued an ultimatum. ... the Czechs had capitulated, ... How quickly time would pass: the Polish victim of 1939 was only months following the Polish aggressor. 70
... but the House voted 366 to 144 in favor of the government’s policy. 71
A somber and shamed Daladier came back to Le Bourget airport thinking he would receive rotten eggs from the crowd gathered to wait for him. Instead they cheered. “What asses!” Daladier was heard to mutter. 71
On October 4 the vote in the Chamber of Deputies in favor of Munich was 535 to 75. Roll of dishonor and of honor: the latter included Henri de Kérillis on the right, Jean Bouhey, a Socialist, and the seventy-three Communist deputies. Even Blum jubilated that peace had been saved. 72
Litvinov in Paris, on his way home from Geneva, had an unavoidable meeting with Bonnet, who sought to justify Munich by the need to buy time for rearmament. I doubt, replied Litvinov, that time for rearmament will compensate for the loss of the one-and-a-half-million men of the Czech army and its strategic position in Europe. ... Izvestiia noted that the Anglo-French capitulation, while appearing to have avoided war, had only made it inevitable. 72
And it considered the joint declaration of peaceful intent signed by Chamberlain and Hitler on September 30 - which Chamberlain had waved at London crowds - as a British offer of its good offices to facilitate German eastern ambitions, conditional on leaving western Europe in peace. This “complicity,” as it was perceived in Moscow, gave the Munich accord a sword’s point directed at the Soviet Union. 73
Coulondre speculated on Soviet options. Moscow had lost all confidence in collective security but would not openly denounce it. at least for the moment. The only other option was a Soviet-German rapprochement at Polish expense. Such a policy would be a pis-aller. last resort, but might divert Hitler away from the Soviet Union at least for a time. “I have reason to believe that this idea is already in the minds of Soviet officials”,. said Coulondre. 73
There had been no popular support for Czechoslovakia, apart perhaps from a bothersome sense of unwanted obligation. 73
[Surits] ... all this anti-Soviet campaign of lies and slander, ... was intended not only to justify capitulation but also to hide the real fear of the right before the possible success of Soviet arms in war. 74
In fact, according to Surits, the French right hoped to provoke the Soviet Union into denouncing the mutual assistance pact. The ambassador was careful to say that the Daladier government did not entirely share the program of the right. 74
The ambassador [Maiskii] would have been angrier still if he had known that the Foreign Office at the height of the Munich crisis had forwarded to the Quai d’Orsay a report from their embassy in Moscow denigrating Soviet military strength because of the purges. The Quai d’Orsay, probably Bonnet himself, leaked the information verbatim to the anti-communist Paris daily Le Matin, greatly embarrassing the Foreign Office since the report could be traced to Chilston. It was awkward to be exposed Like this, justifying Soviet allegations and suspicions. 74
Coulondre ... paid a farewell call to Litvinov. ... Litvinov observed that the French government, having negotiated a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union, had then systematically evaded military talks to strengthen it, even when Czechoslovakia was threatened. “Now I have to conclude,” he said, “that the French government never thought to actualize at any point the assistance envisioned by the pacts [including Czechoslovakia] and that there was thus no need to conduct further enabling negotiations.” According to Litvinov’s account, Coulondre replied that this statement was too categorical, noting that the British had discouraged the French government from concluding a military agreement. There was no need to say it; Litvinov was well informed. 75
When Coulondre asked what could be done now, Litvinov replied that the position lost in Czechoslovakia could not be retrieved or redressed. It was a catastrophic defeat. The Anglo-French could do one of two things: capitulate completely, conceding hegemony in Europe to Nazi Germany, or they could decide at last to resist. In the first case, Hitler would take a little time to digest his new conquests before turning perhaps on the British Empire. He would probably think it too dangerous to attack the Soviet Union. In the second case, France and Britain would have to turn to Moscow, and then “they will try to speak to us in a different language.” [Litvinovs referat] 75
According to Coulondre, Litvinov emphasized the possibility of a Nazi-Soviet rapprochement in the event that Hitler decided to advance in the west, though Litvinov did not refer to it in his account of the meeting. 76
But Coulondre warned ... that the Soviet government, having learned from past experience, would demand “precise guarantees of assistance” in any future agreement with France and Britain. 76
Coulondre set what should have been the Anglo-French agenda for the coming months in emphasizing the importance of getting Poland and the Soviet Union to cooperate against the real enemy of both. Nazi Germany, 76
(116. Coulondre, no. 283, Oct. 18,1938, AN Papiers Daladier, 496AP/11.)
Litvinov instructed Surits not to be dragged into political discussions of unknown purpose with Bonnet, nor even to offer solely personal opinions. 77
Chamberlain remains convinced that a European ‘peace settlement’ can be achieved through diplomatic negotiations with Hitler and Mussolini without recourse to stronger measures.” Chamberlain was willing to go a long way in making concessions to achieve this end, and was contemplating no resistance to German expansion in southeast Europe and Turkey. On the contrary, he calculated that the creation of Mittel Europa would bring Hitler into conflict with the Soviet Union. Chamberlain believed there was no immediate threat of a big war, nor therefore any reason for all-out British rearmament, 79
What can be said with certainty in the aftermath of the Munich crisis is that there were two worldviews of the European situation and two alternative policies for dealing with it. Time would tell which worldview and which policy would prevail. 81
[og så har du holdt Hitlers udenfor]
1939 Will Be the Decisive Year” 82
To Chamberlain’s mind, the French should try to conciliate Italy and most certainly not be dragged into war on account of the Soviet Union. 82
At the end of November, at an Anglo-French meeting Paris, Bonnet assured Chamberlain that the Franco-Soviet pact was so hedged with League unanimity and consultations that Chamberlain’s worries about France being dragged into a war by Russia were groundless. 83
... the arrival in Paris on December 6 of Joachim von Ribbentrop, ... to sign an understanding with Bonnet to maintain “peaceful and good neighborly relations.” 83
Oliver Harvey, Halifax’s private secretary, who could scarcely be accused of communist ideas, recorded in his diary: “... the real opposition to re-arming comes from the rich classes in the [Conservative] Party who fear taxation and believe Nazis on the whole are more conservative than Communists and Socialists: any war, whether we win or not, would destroy the rich idle classes and so they are for peace at any price... 84
The Anglo-French became less complacent and more interested in the Soviet Union when in January 1939 other rumors circulated that Holland and western Europe were the targets of Nazi ambition. 85
Collier argued that it had been a mistake to keep the Soviet Union “at arms’ length” because “it gratuitously advertised to Hitler and Mussolini and the Japanese that they can deal with each of us in isolation. 86
Anastas I. Mikoian, the commissar for external trade, replied three days later that the Soviet government was willing to renew credit negotiations based on the conditions proposed by the Germans. 89
The French and British governments learned of the planned negotiations during the course of the fortnight before they were to begin. Anglo-French reaction was almost indifferent, which may surprise readers in view of Coulondre’s many warnings of the danger of a Nazi-Soviet rapprochement. At the Foreign Office, Collier, who was always on the alert for signs of improved Nazi-Soviet relations did not make much of the reports of imminent negotiations. From Moscow, Payart reported news of Schnurre’s expected arrival in Moscow and speculated that the talks might go beyond purely economic issues. 90
... the cancellation of Schnurre’s trip to Moscow. 90
The News Chronicle article was republished in the Moscow papers without comment, prompting Payart to observe that in earlier days such a piece would have provoked Soviet indignation. It appeared that the article might have been Soviet inspired, Maiskii having connections with Bartlett, and it signaled Soviet disappointment with collective security and the preparation of Soviet opinion, in case of need, for a radical change in foreign policy. Payart’s warning was clear: the Bartlett article “can be considered as the beginning of a possible turning point, and as such it deserves the most serious attention.” 91
Soviet officials gave more encouraging messages to the French and British embassies in Moscow. In a discussion with Ambassador Seeds, Litvinov expressed his repugnance at improved Soviet-German economic relations; so many German technicians, said Litvinov, meant so many German spies. 91
It was ironic, was it not, continued Potemkin, that Nazi Germany was more willing than France to sell the Soviet Union war materiel? And here Potemkin touched upon a long-standing grievance dating back to 1936: French sabotage of Soviet orders for military supplies. 91
We should hasten to take advantage of this situation, Payart warned, or we run the risk of a Soviet volte-face toward Nazi Germany. 92
Naggiar, like Payart before him. warned Bonnet categorically that if they did, the Soviet Union could come to terms with Germany - whatever Litvinov’s preferences. 94
On March 9 ... Maiskii reported .... According to the press mogul Beaverbrook, Chamberlain had admitted to Churchill that his policy toward Germany had failed. Of course he would continue his efforts to ease Anglo-German tensions, but he no longer believed in the possibility of “solid friendship with Berlin.” This realization, said Beaverbrook, explained the British shift toward the Soviet Union, a shift well supported by public opinion. 97
At this point Stalin intervened by firing a shot across Anglo-French bows. On March 10 he gave a much-noticed speech at the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 97 [diskuteres 98-99]
March 14 ... Vansittart followed up with Maiskii ... But Vansittart had his own worries, for he asked with some apprehension if in Moscow there was really an interest in talking to Hudson about political issues. Judging from some of Vansittart’s remarks, Maiskii observed, Stalin’s recent speech had had the necessary effect. An interesting aside by Maiskii indicating that the speech was a “signal,” as Surits called them, to warn against taking the Soviet Union for granted or trying to lead it down the garden path. Maiskii gave vague assurances that Litvinov would see Hudson to discuss appropriate issues. 98-9
The next day. March 15, the German army marched into Prague. 99
On March 17 rumors circulated :hat Germany had issued an ultimatum to Romania to accept draconian political and economic demands, and that Hungary was also being threatened. 99
Maiskii’s accounts of meetings with Halifax, Vansittart, Hudson, and Butler show a British government more interested in improving relations with the Soviet Union than do the British records of the same meetings. A case in point is Vansittart’s loss of temper over Hudson’s report of his talk with Maiskii on March 8. These discrepancies in Soviet and British records may indicate that Maiskii’s British counterparts were not reporting their enthusiasm for better relations because of Chamberlain’s opposition. A suspicious reader might suggest another explanation, that Maiskii fabricated or exaggerated British enthusiasms. But Maiskii’s Communications are too numerous and too consistent in their message for fabrication and exaggeration. 102
“Personally I do not exclude the possibility,” Surits observed, “that Bonnet, who is far from enthusiastic about fighting for Romania and would have preferred a more evasive reply from us, is deliberately trying... to increase our mistrust of Romania.” Then, as an afterthought, Surits added: “But it is of course possible that this time he is not lying.” 102
March 23, eight days after the Nazi entry into Czechoslovakia. After Naggiar’s first reports of meetings with Litvinov and Potemkin, Bonnet sent an audacious cable to Moscow denying that France had abandoned collective security during the Munich crisis. No government had done more than France to assist Czechoslovakia. Here was a statement sufficient to justify a caricature of the lying, double-talking Bonnet. The French government, he also advised Naggiar, was doing everything possible to speed the conclusion of Soviet orders for war materiel No Soviet official would have believed it, and Naggiar scribbled in the margin of the cable that nothing was in fact done. (58. Bonnet to Naggiar, no. 52, Feb. 25, 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/9; and Bonnet to Naggiar, no. 53, Feb. 25, 1939, ibid.) [NB marts/februar] 104
... the British government ... countered with a four-power declaration calling for consultations in the event of a threat to the political independence of any European state. The signatories of the declaration - Britain, France, Poland, and the Soviet Union. ... Litvinov on March 21 and received a favorable reply the following day. But Litvinov expressed doubts as to whether Poland would go along.
Daladier did too. He advised Surits that he had agreed to the four-power declaration but thought Poland might refuse to sign, and that the British would then withdraw their proposal. 105
For Litvinov this was a difficult time. By early 1939 the Stalinist purges had decimated the Narkomindel; many of his friends and close associates had disappeared. “How can I conduct foreign policy,” he said to Naggiar in February, with the Lubianka prison across the way? In March Payart found Litvinov to be tense because of criticism in Moscow of his policies. Common wisdom in the diplomatic community was that Litvinov’s days were numbered. Voroshilov, for one, was said to favor a Soviet-German rapprochement; but Stalin opposed it. Among Litvinov’s few surviving colleagues were Potemkin, Surits, and Maiskii. 105
On March 24 the Polish foreign minister Beck rejected the British proposal, not wishing to provoke Hitler. ... Germany annexed from Lithuania the German-speaking port city of Memel, and the Romanian government signed a preferential trade agreement with Germany. 106
... on March 25 Beck proposed a modest compromise to Hitler concerning Danzig. 106
Noel, the French ambassador in Warsaw, reiterated in January 1939 that many Poles feared the Germans less than the Russians; forced to a choice, they would collaborate with Germany. 106
The Polish government, having taken Soviet territory in 1919-1920, understandably feared that the Soviets might one day want to take it back. Little wonder, Sir Howard Kennard, the British ambassador in Warsaw, commented after Munich, that collective security had foundered on Polish opposition. 107
And Chamberlain concluded: Was it worth while to go on with Russia in that case? I must confess to the most profound distrust of Russia. I have no belief whatever in her ability to maintain an effective offensive even if she wanted to. 108
And thus Chamberlain concluded that a four-power declaration was “dead,” proving Daladier’s misgivings to be correct. 108
Litvinov responded by reading to Hudson the statement he had sent to Stalin for approval. Basically it said that for five years the Soviet Union had been making proposals for collective security, all of which had been ignored or rejected by the French and British governments. They had instead chosen appeasement, making surrender after surrender and achieving nothing more than to encourage the aggressors’ appetites for more. In spite of it all, the Soviet government had not abandoned its willingness to cooperate with other countries wanting to resist aggression. But having made so many unsuccessful proposals in the past, the Soviet government felt that it now must wait for France and Britain to take the initiative. If they made proposals, the Soviet Union was prepared to “examine and discuss” them. Litvinov added that the Munich policy had destroyed “international confidence and ,.. the authority of the great powers among the small states.” It would not be restored if future Anglo-Franco-Soviet cooperation was limited to simple question-and-answer exercises. 109
Some differences appear in the British and Soviet accounts of this meeting, According to Seeds’s cable, Hudson declared that there was no use regretting the mistakes of the past, it was time to think about the present and future. Litvinov said the Soviet government “would be prepared to consult with H. M. Government and other governments regarding all suitable measures of resistance whether diplomatic or military or economic. He made it clear that he had in mind the possibility of resistance by force of arms.” 109
Litvinov concluded that Hudson came to Moscow only to feel out the Soviet government on its willingness to collaborate and conclude a possible military alliance, perhaps looking for specific Soviet proposals - though “of course this does not mean that England is now striving for such an agreement. England wants only to have in hand all the elements necessary to make a decision in the future under the appropriate circumstances.” 111
Hudson also conducted lengthy negotiations with Mikoian concerning trade matters, and though no deals were struck, there were no mishaps either. On political issues Hudson also talked to Potemkin, and during this conversation Hudson hewed more closely to the Vansittart line. 111
Potemkin was reminded of Gogol’s Khlestakov, the inspector, who presented himself as an important person but who in fact was not. 111
As Litvinov put it to Surits: “The Hudson mission had produced no results, though it is true we expected none, and the goal itself of the mission was not clear either to us, or apparently to the English themselves“ 112
On March 29, in a well-known story which therefore bears mention only in passing, Ian Colvin, a Berlin correspondent of the News Chronicle, reported information to the Foreign Office suggesting an imminent German attack on Poland. In the discussion of what to do, Cadogan suggested a British guarantee of Poland intended to discourage German aggression. Chamberlain and Halifax agreed, and on March 31 the guarantee was announced in the House of Commons. Colvin’s information proved to be erroneous. 113
In these last developments in March, the British neglected to involve or inform the Soviet government. The British failure to do so, consistent with Chamberlain’s desire to keep the Soviet at a distance, had the predictable result of irritating Litvinov. 113
90. “Record of a conversation ... with ... Cadogan,” secret, Maiskii, Mar. 29, 1939, DVP, XXII, bk. I, 238-240; and Cadogan’s untitled note, Mar. 29, 19391 €4692/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23062. [citater - “Why do you laugh?] 113-4
... according to Litvinov, it offered the British an escape clause on the Polish corridor and Danzig. 114
The “Soviet Government ha[sl had enough,” Litvinov told Seeds, “and would hence forward stand apart free of any commitments.” 114
“And where is the ‘second front’ to be?” asked Lloyd George. “Poland,” replied Chamberlain. To this reply Lloyd George roared with laughter and mocked the prime minister. 114
Lloyd George succinctly summed up the British and French dilemma. No agreement with the Soviet Union meant no second front in Europe. 115
Maiskii’s correspondence shows that some British officials and ministers saw the need for immediate action “to get on” with Moscow. Unfortunately this British message to the Soviet government, through Maiskii, had to be camouflaged at home because of Chamberlain’s opposition. 115
“Russia Has 100 Divisions” 116-
Both French and British military sources considered the Red Army to be a formidable force, whatever its imperfections. 116
[Palasse] The Red Army could put 250 divisions in the field one year after mobilization. It could defend its territory. and its offensive capabilities, though limited, could seriously wound an enemy. 117
In early 1939 the British government could immediately send to France two divisions to join approximately eighty-five French divisions facing Nazi Germany By all accounts the Soviet Union could more than equal this strength at the outset of war. 117
Chamberlain repeatedly referred to the military weakness of the Soviet Union in spite of evidence to the contrary. Not wanting to ally with the Soviet Union, Chamberlain made use of any argument to justify his position. 117
Chamberlain came under heavy attack at home from the opposition parties for not bringing in the Soviet Union. They accused him of being driven by “ideological” motives. Chamberlain denied it: the Poles also objected to the Soviets, and so did fascist Spain and Salazar’s Portugal, among others, including Canada. 118
Nu, khorosho, fine, then, as the Russians Like to say “We know very well,” Litvinov wrote on April 4, “that to hold back and stop aggression in Europe without us is impossible and that the later they [the Anglo-French] appeal for our help, the higher our price will be 118
With Litvinov, Grzybowski tried to slip away from hostile Polish Statements against the Soviet Union, but the commissar would not let him do it.
Polish policy was dangerous given Hitler’s avidity for conquest. Litvinov observed. As for Poland’s “neutrality,” he had not noticed it during the Munich crisis. 119
But the Foreign Office flatly rejected Maiskii’s informal suggestion of a visit by Litvinov to London to prepare negotiations. Sargent and Cadogan, both as hostile as ever to the Soviet Union. 119
With each passing day in Paris a prewar atmosphere was growing stronger, Surits reported. Everyone was persuaded that war could not be avoided and that it would have to be conducted under conditions far worse than the previous autumn. First the occupation of Prague, then the invasion of Albania had transformed the public mood. 123
But Surits feared betrayal: we should negotiate but “not assume any obligations without reciprocal guarantees.” 123-4
On the supposition that the Soviet government wanted to cooperate with France and Britain, Litvinov proposed a minimum four-point position, it can be summed up briefly: mutual assistance in case of aggression against any of the three signatories; support for all states neighboring the Soviet Union, including the Baltic countries and Finland; rapid agreement on the specific forms of mutual assistance; and agreement not to conclude a separate peace. We can expect “urgent and complex negotiations” with the French and “especially” the British, said Litvinov; we need to monitor British public opinion and try to influence it. 128
[Cadogan] There is further the risk - though I should have thought very remote one - that, if we turn down this proposal, the Soviet might make some “non-intervention” agreement with the German government. 128-9
(29. Cadogan’s note, Apr. 19, 1939)
Bonnet handed the French proposal for a trilateral agreement to Surits on April 25. 130
Collier warned that the “Russians are not so naive as not to suspect this, and I hope that we ourselves will not be so naive as to think that we can have things both ways.” Soviet support was worth having, whatever its shortcomings, and “we ought not to boggle at paying the obvious price - an assurance to the Russians, in return for their promise of help, that we will not leave them alone to face German expansion.” Anything less would not only be cynical but doomed to failure.131
Litvinov considered Bonnet’s proposal of April 25 to be “insulting,” but he still wanted to hear more from Paris and London. 131
Litvinov was willing to bargain for his original proposals, but he would not be carrying on the negotiations. On May 3 he was replaced by Viacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Stalin’s No. 2 man and chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars. 133
The immediate cause of the dismissal, speculated Payart, appeared to have been Halifax’s last indication to Maiskii (on April 29) that the British government would again propose a Soviet unilateral guarantee, rejecting in effect Litvinov’s eight-point tripartite alliance. 134
Franco-German economic discussions, ... began in December [938 at the time of Ribbentrop’s visit to Paris. ... Daladier thought about inviting Hermann Goering to Paris ... trade negotiations, which appeared on the verge of success in March. ... In January-March 1939 the British also conducted negotiations with Nazi Germany. ... All this activity was cut short by the German occupation of Prague. 135
As for Nazi-Soviet relations, the ambassador Merekalov reported from Berlin in early March being invited to a lunch for the diplomatic corps hosted by Hitler. A brief conversation between Merekalov and Hitler was polite. 135
... meeting between Merekalov and the state secretary of the German foreign ministry, Ernst Weizsäcker, on April 17, the day Litvinov finalized his proposals for an alliance with France and Britain. .... Litvinov’s instructions to request a halt to German interference in the Skoda fulfilment of Soviet contracts. ... Merekalov made no report of offering political opinions except to say that the Soviet Union hoped that the threat of war would be ended. ... . Weizsäcker’s report of the meeting, on which most historical accounts are based, indicates that Merekalov made a strong opening for better political relations. It is not impossible that Weizsäcker’s account was correct, and that Merekalov concealed his own political observations, but if so, he was not acting on Litvinov’s instructions. 136
[Litvinov] His replacement, Molotov, was an entirely different sort of man. ... Molotov had not been outside the Soviet Union and spoke no foreign languages. ... It was not a secret that he and Litvinov intensely disliked each other. 137
May 4, .. Potemkin ... He saw the Turkish president, Ismet Inönü, who was critical of the French and British governments for failing to oppose German eastward expansion. 137
Ismet reckoned ... Anglo-French policy ... expectation ... the French and British could be arbiters of Europe. 137
Unfortunately they had miscalculated, and Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Albania had been swallowed up. The remaining independent states in eastern Europe, according to Ismet, had lost faith in Anglo-French support and were contemplating whatever accommodation they could make with Hitler. 138
Payart cabled to Paris that the British proposal was, to say the least, unfortunate “... at a time when we need to bring in the USSR and to take it at its word rather than to give it new reasons to withdraw on itself... .” 138
Britain had made proposals, asking for Soviet help without wanting to give anything in return, and wanting to dispose of Soviet support as bosses whenever it suited their interests, without taking into account those of the USSR. 139
We could, said Potemkin, point out the defects of the British proposal while agreeing to it on conditions put forward in effect in Litvinov’s proposals of April 17. 139
The next day, Thursday, May 11, the Polish ambassador in Moscow, Grzybowski, called on Molotov to advise that his government objected to Bonnet’s trilateral guarantee of Poland. Further, it would not participate in a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union. 141
Molotov ignored Bonnet’s proposals, though these might have been taken up and transformed into something close to Litvinov’s original program. 142
“The Russians Will Give Us More Trouble” 144
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN’S opposition to a Soviet alliance was critical to the failure of trilateral negotiations during the summer of 1939 and a major contributing factor to the beginning of the Second World War. 144
Chamberlain to Hilda, May 14,1939 (uddrag) 144
!!!! It is an odd way of carrying on negotiations. To reply to our reasoned & courteous despatch by publishing a tendentious & one sided retort in their press [on May 10-11]. But they have no understanding of other countries mentalities or conditions and no manners, and they are working hand in hand with our opposition. 144 [det kan jo bare stilles på hovedet !!!!! og det viser, hvor amerikanernes manglende forståelse for andre kulturer kommer fra.]
The French were more open to a Soviet alliance. ... But both Payart and Bonnet had already indicated to the Russians that there had been differences with London. Indeed, Payart was quite candid about it with Potemkin. 145
Bonnet could not be true even to himself. Contrary to what some historians may say, the French government was not so quick to resume the diplomatic initiative. Bonnet instructed Payart “to take a back seat and let Sir W. Seeds make the running... ». He later confided to the British ambassador that while an agreement with the Soviet Union was necessary, London and Paris should be careful not to allow themselves “to be dragged into war” by the Soviet government. 146
Molotov’s proposals of May 14, Maiskii later reported, put the British government in “a difficult position” because public opinion strongly favored “an alliance with Russia.” Every day there was new evidence of public support. 147
Friday, May 19, ... debate in the House of Commons ... Churchill and Lloyd George, among others, berated the government for failing to secure a Soviet alliance. “I beg His Majesty’s Government to get some of these brutal truths into their heads,” said Churchill. “Without an effective Eastern front, there can be no satisfactory defence of our interests in the West, and without Russia there can be no effective eastern front.” 148
On May 10 Maiskii reported a recent opinion poll showing that 87 percent of those questioned supported an immediate Soviet alliance. 149
Maiskii advanced the same arguments that Daladier had made the day before in Paris. The essential idea, said Maiskii, was to prevent war, and the only way to do this was “by organizing such a combination of forces that Germany would not dare to attack,” or as Maiskii put it, a force so powerful that Hitler could see no possibility of victory. “Herr Hitler was not a fool and would never enter upon a war which he was bound to lose. ... The only thing he understood was force.” 150
. Chamberlain to Hilda, May 28, 1939, [udsnit] 150-1
[afslører ham igen]
Bonnet recorded: ‘There is today such a strong movement of public opinion in France and Great Britain in favor of an agreement with the USSR and such a conviction in the world and in France, among so many people, even among the most moderate, that the fate of Peace depends on it, that if negotiations fail, it is necessary at any price that the blame fails upon the USSR and not on us.” 151-2
23. “Visite de Monsieur Souritz du 26 mai 1939 ...,” MAE Papiers 1940. Cabinet Bonnet/16, ff. 266-268. N.B., the same note in the AN Papiers Daladier, 496AP/13, has a different, less negative conclusion, 282
This recognition spread even to Seeds in Moscow, and he as much as told Potemkin that if talks did not succeed, “it would be impossible to blame” the British government. (24. “Record of a conversation ... with ... Seeds,” secret, Potemkin, May 20, 1939, DVP, XXII, bk. I, 384-385.
In a stormy meeting with Seeds and Payart on May 27, Molotov accused the British and French governments of bad faith. ... These proposals gave the impression that Britain and France were not really interested in an alliance. ... the League’s mechanisms for assistance against an aggressor were wholly inadequate. “One of our cities is bombarded, we appeal to the League of Nations,” and any state whatever, say Bolivia, could block assistance to us. I am obliged to ask myself why such League references apply in these proposals when no such stipulations appear in the British guarantee to Poland. 152
By Seeds’s lights, Molotov had a peasant’s “foolish cunning.” But the commissar was anything but foolish.
Payart and then Naggiar, who returned to Moscow at the end of May, saw Molotov differently They reported deep Soviet mistrust of Anglo-French proposals, which had been fed by the events at Munich. Even Payart did not find Seeds’s defense of the British proposal entirely convincing. 153
On May 31 Molotov spoke to the Supreme Soviet, ... He ... recalled Stalin’s speech of March 10, restating that while the Soviet Union was committed to collective security. it would not pull other people’s chestnuts out of the fire. ... Reciprocity, equal obligations, and guarantees to all the states on the Soviet western frontier must be the basis of any agreement. As a cautionary note, however, Molotov added that these negotiations did not exclude the possibility of “commercial relations” with Italy and Germany. 153-4
While Chamberlain had complained about Soviet press leaks there had in fact been very few in Moscow; most were coming from Paris and London. The situation was so bad that Naggiar cabled Bonnet to complain. The “spectacular publicity” surrounding the negotiations was making the Soviet government even more suspicious, as was the impression in Moscow that British concessions had been grudgingly extracted one by one. (30. Naggiar; nos. 424-427, June 1, 1939, MAE Papiers Naggiar/10. 154
The reader may wonder if the loquacious and well-connected Maiskii leaked any of this information, but Molotov long after noted that Maiskii was not kept informed of the details of the negotiations and could not have been responsible. 154
On June 2 Molotov made counterproposals for ironclad, well-defined commitments and in effect returned to Litvinov’s proposal of April 17. 154
To this report Molotov replied quickly that without the Baltic guarantee against direct or indirect aggression, there could be no agreement. By “indirect aggression” Molotov meant the Czech precedent, which he had raised with Seeds on May 29, an internal coup d’état, or a change of policy directed or compelled by an aggressor. This was not a question of a “technical formula” but one of substance. If we can reach agreement on the substantive issues, said Molotov, it will not be difficult to find the appropriate wording. 155
The wording of Maiskii’s account of the meeting is somewhat more positive than that of Halifax 156
Chamberlain wrote to Ida: I cant make up my mind whether the Bolshies are double crossing us and trying to make difficulties or whether they are only showing the cunning & suspicion of the peasant. On the whole I incline to the latter view, but I am sure they are greatly encouraged by the opposition and the Winston Eden LG group with whom Maisky is in constant touch. 157
We left the story of Nazi-Soviet relations in April 1939 when the Soviet ambassador, Merekalov, visited the German foreign ministry to discuss the fulfilment of Soviet contracts with the Skoda factories in defunct Czechoslovakia. The main purpose of the meeting was economic, but as Litvinov had reminded Payart in March, “there was a close interdependence between political and economic relations.“ 159
On May 5, two days after Litvinov’s dismissal, Schnurre told Astakhov that the suspended Skoda contracts would be honored. On the same day in Ankara, the new German ambassador to Turkey, Franz von Papen, met with his Soviet counterpart, A. V. Terent’ev. 159
Merekalov had returned to Moscow in late April, and the Soviet chargé d’affaires, Astakhov, took over in Berlin. 159
The German press also noted that German-Polish relations were worsening, and that German demands now went beyond the annexation of Danzig and an extraterritorial road across the Polish corridor to East Prussia. Germany wanted the entire corridor. 160
Astakhov’s records of these meetings indicate that he was reserved and noncommittal. .... Schnurre, however, in his account of their meeting on May 17, put into Astakhov’s mouth the desire for improved relations -which in Astakhov’s report comes from Schnurre. Astakhov gave the standard line dating back to the civil war period (1918-1921), that the Soviet government was ready to improve relations with any state willing to meet it halfway. 160
As was often the case in accounts of these meetings, Schulenberg said he was cautious, though the Soviet account shows the ambassador pressing Molotov hard There was one point of agreement, however: Molotov was reserved in responding to German overtures. 161
Both of us [Halifax and Chamberlain] ... Well, the only thing is to go on and pay no attention to them hoping that something of what we say may get past the official barriers in Germany and Italy. I still believe that our best plan is to keep up contacts with Rome where I am certain war is looked upon with terror.. 58. Chamberlain to Ida, June 10, 1939. 163
Trouble was that the Germans wanted to talk to Molotov, not to Chamberlain. 163
On June 13 Weizsäcker saw the British ambassador in Berlin, Sir Nevile Henderson, to intimate that the conclusion of an Anglo-Soviet treaty would make more difficult an Anglo-German understanding. This was a clever move while the Germans worked on Molotov to come around. Naggiar reported that Halifax’s statement in the House of Lords and others in the Commons by Chamberlain and Sir John Simon had accentuated Soviet mistrust. 163-4 [????? hvad havde Stalin/Molotov for ønsker/planer/preferencer]
If the Anglo-French did not wish to agree, then Molotov proposed a straight treaty of mutual assistance, operative only in the case of direct unprovoked attack on the signatories. “It seems to us that the English and French want to conclude a treaty advantageous for them and not advantageous for us, that is, they do not want a serious treaty, responding to the principles of reciprocity and equality of obligations.” 164
Molotov now argued against them on narrow legal grounds: the Supreme Soviet had not approved these additional guarantees. Most readers will know, however, that it was Stalin, not the Supreme Soviet, who made these decisions. Molotov also conditioned the added guarantees on the conclusion of mutual assistance pacts with Poland and Turkey. While Molotov’s insistence on introducing indirect aggression into the treaty can be ascribed to previous Soviet carelessness, the refusal to guarantee the western European states was either peevish or obstructive. 168
Meanwhile the Baltic States looked on nervously. They preferred a year of Nazi occupation to a day of the Soviets - which is what worried the Soviet government. 169
In early June Estonia and Latvia signed nonaggression pacts with Germany, and German officers made inspection trips to their frontier fortifications. 169
What was needed was a “classical” military alliance with concrete terms and conditions. No effort should be spared to obtain Polish and Romanian cooperation; no time should be lost in concluding an agreement on Soviet terms in spite of British and French reservations. Unfortunately, Naggiar noted later, “We did nothing in this regard, except at the last minute.” This series of the French ambassador’s cables is nothing less than a sweeping indictment of Anglo-French policy. (80) 171
“We want a gesture,” scribbled Naggiar, “the Russians want a concrete agreement involving the assent of Poland and Romania.” The Soviet government. having been disillusioned in the past, would accept nothing less than an ironclad military alliance 171
Once again Chamberlain explained his position to Hilda. 172 somewhat humiliating.
.. wrote Maiskii, ... Moreover, Chamberlain 1 “intensely dislikes and fears Churchill.” In fact, Churchill’s entry into the cabinet would be only a prelude to Chamberlain’s departure. 173
Surits agreed with Molotov, ... Our partners do not want “a real agreement” but are afraid of the public reaction if negotiations fail. 174
“Although there was no mistaking the strong distrust evident in all that Molotov said,” Schulenberg reported, “he nevertheless described a normalization of relations with Germany as being desirable and possible.” This is not exactly what Molotov’s record stated. 176
Schulenberg ... July 1 he returned to see Potemkin. .... He had neglected to report Ribbentrop’s avowal that the anti-Comintern pact with Italy and Japan was directed not at the Soviet Union but against “international tendencies which the three governments considered a danger to the existing social and political order.” Now the pact had evolved from this initial objective - even if it retained its original name - and was aimed primarily against Britain. Schulenberg also let it drop that Germany might assist the Soviet Union in improving relations with Japan. This was no doubt to sweeten German offers since the Red Army was again involved in serious fighting with the Japanese Kwangtung army along the Manchurian frontier. “In response to Schulenberg’s provocative chit-chat, Potemkin noted, I limited myself to the dry observation that nothing prevented Germany from showing the seriousness of its intent to improve relations with the USSR.” 176-7
Rome and Berlin, at least until September, were apparently not planning any new ventures, reported Gel’fand: both Hitler and Mussolini feared war, but they counted on Polish capitulation. The British and French did not wish to fight for Danzig, but they did not want to admit it, for now. 177
Molotov to Astakhov, July 28 ... approving of Astakhov’s reserve in dealing with Schnurre. ... The following day Molotov, conceded that an improvement of economic and political relations was possible. ... “The matter... depends entirely on the Germans. We of course would welcome any improvement of political relations between the two countries.” 179
While the Germans continued their pursuit of Moscow, British officials carried on a corresponding flirtation with their German counterparts ... It is unclear and in dispute how seriously these conversations should be taken, but the fact is that during June and July Wilson saw Helmuth Wohlthat, a senior official in charge of the German four-year economic plan, in London. He repeated more or less what Halifax had earlier said to the German ambassador: that Hitler had gone too far, and that it was up to him to renounce further resort to aggression. If he did, there might be Anglo-German cooperation; if he did not, there would be war. On July 18 Wilson saw Wohlthat again, reiterating what he had said in the earlier conversation and emphasizing that “the initiative must come from the German side.’ These were almost verbatim Molotov’s words to Astakhov. 179
Hudson ... acting on his own initiative ... Imprudently proposed a grandiose scheme for Anglo-German economic cooperation, colonial development, and a large British loan to Germany, subject of course to peaceful international conduct and disarmament. 179-80
The news of Hudson’s meeting leaked to the press on July 22 due to Hudson’s indiscretion, and aroused suspicion that Chamberlain and his circle were at it again. 180
This letter reveals Chamberlain’s mind regarding relations with Germany and also indirectly with the Soviet Union. The prime minister’s annoyance was generated as much by Hudson’s stealing his and other colleagues’ ideas as because of the press leakage. And Chamberlain’s fatuous attitude toward the Germans is in striking contrast with Molotov’s hard-nosed position. Both were leaving the door open to Hitler, but Molotov appears to have had fewer illusions. 181

“You don’t need offensive forces sufficient to win a smashing victory...,” Chamberlain went on to say. This being the case, why was Chamberlain so hostile to an alliance with the Soviet Union. If one accepts the prime minister’s logic, the acknowledged defensive strength of the Red Army should have been an important asset to Poland in particular and to the alliance in general. Most military sources rated the Red Army’s defensive power as formidable, a point that seemed justified by a sound thrashing then being administered to the Japanese Kwangtung army by Soviet forces on the Manchurian frontier. Chamberlain’s position on a Soviet alliance was illogical, given his views on a defensive military strategy, and incomprehensible, except insofar as his views were ideologically motivated. 181
Maiskii did not believe Chamberlain’s Statement in the House of Commons that Hudson had acted without his knowledge, though this was true. If Chamberlain had been thinking about the negotiations in Moscow, would have immediately dismissed Hudson, but of course he was not. 182
Molotov later said that the Soviet government had concluded the nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany to avert an Anglo-German agreement, fears of which had been increased by the talks between Hudson and Wohlthat. ref. Til note 112 182
Note 112: Molotov to Terent’ev, very secret, Sept. 3, 1939, DVP, XXII, bk. 2,12.
[Er det her Molotov henviser til Hudsons forhandlinger, er det ikke “later” !!! og Carley forsøger at styrke en tvivl om Molotovs troværdighed - her er han vist ude i et ideologisk ærinde, den opfattelse styrkes af formuleringerne i næste afsnit:.]
There was in fact no possibility of an Anglo-German agreement, though Soviet mistrust of Chamberlain was well founded. Maiskii recognized that the prime minister was hemmed in by public opinion and Parliament but that he still possessed immense powers of persuasion and finesse. With more time and patience, Molotov might have obtained agreement with Britain. But time and patience were running out in Moscow, and the Germans had come a-courtin’. 182
6. Molotov Is Suspicious 183
Molotov showed interest in the German overtures, or at least a willingness to hear more. But Molotov was suspicious, as Schulenberg observed: he trusts neither us nor the British. 183
“I am convinced,” wrote Seeds,
that the arrival in Moscow of a British military mission is the only proof of our sincerity which the Soviet government are likely to accept... every member of the Politbureau consider the present British government as imbued with a spirit of ‘capitulating’ if possible to [the] Axis Powers but that the most influential section thinks, nevertheless, we can be squeezed by our press and public and by Russian pressure, relentlessly applied, into an agreement with this country. But such agreement must be absolutely water-tight and must clearly indicate military action. (. Seeds, no. 172, July 23, 1939.) 183-4
... the French and British governments made plans, though neither expected a quick agreement or perhaps any agreement. .... This did not trouble Halifax. As long as miliary conversations were ongoing, he reckoned that “we should be preventing Soviet Russia from entering the German camp.” 184
[Chamberlain] told Admiral Sir Reginald Drax, head of the British mission to Moscow, that “the House of Commons had pushed him further than he had wished to go.” 184
... British government chose to send its mission to the Soviet Union on a chartered merchant ship. ... Finally, Halifax “thought it might be ... rather provocative to send a cruiser into the Baltic.” 185
And the British delegation was told to avoid discussion of Soviet aid to Poland and Romania; the Soviet would have to negotiate with the Polish and Romanian governments. Such instructions were given in spite of knowing that the issue of passage rights was crucial to the Soviet Union. 185
According to Ismay, French instructions “deal... solely with what the French wish the Russians to do, and throw no light on what the French will do.” 185
Doumenc complained to Leger that he was going to Moscow “empty-handed,” not a good negotiating posture for supplicants. 185
Maiskii left a record of his lunch with Drax. Conversation was mostly harmless until Maiskii asked why the delegation was not flying to Moscow or going in a fast cruiser. Drax gave a polite reply about too much baggage and putting officers out of their beds. “I could not believe my ears,” wrote Maiskii. 186
“Staggering,” wrote Maiskii. Chamberlain was still up to his tricks. “He does not need a tripartite pact, he needs negotiations on a pact, in order to sell more dearly this card to Hitler.” 186
Over the remaining distance between the British and Soviet positions, sappers were closing the last span. Why was this? Maiskii asked himself; “because ... the basic interests of the two countries now coincide.” These interests were stronger than the ideological factors that divided them. Maiskii thought it ironic that Chamberlain should preside over the British government that built an Anglo-Soviet bloc against Nazi Germany. He concluded this entry with a reference to the eventual world proletarian revolution, but his thought was clear - the talks in Moscow would succeed. 186
Butler cast suspicion on Soviet commitment to the independence of the Baltic States ... Molotov was angry, and Tass issued a corrective: “Mr. Butler... misrepresented the position of the Soviet Government. In actual fact the differences of opinion do not concern le question of encroaching or not encroaching upon the independence of the Baltic States, since both parties are in favor of guaranteeing that independence; they concern the question of leaving no loopholes in the formula about ‘indirect aggression’ for an aggressor. 187
Although Molotov did not suggest it, the leaks were probably intentional - to prepare public opinion for a failure of negotiations and to place the blame on the Soviet government. This was essential, as Bonnet had put it earlier. 187
Molotov also wanted to know if the military missions would be furnished with the necessary plenipotentiary powers, A telling question, as it turned out. Seeds concluded that “Molotov was a different man from what he had been at our last interview and I feel our negotiations have received a severe setback.” 187
Seeds was more blunt in a private letter to Sargent. .... Can nothing be done to make people at home. KEEP THEIR MOUTHS SHUT? 188
Nothing could better demonstrate the seriousness of Soviet intentions, said Potemkin, than the composition of the Soviet delegation, which would be headed by the commissar for defense, Voroshilov, and included the chief of the general staff of the Red Army, B. M. Shaposhnikov. Doumenc and Drax were not of the same stature. Naggiar also forwarded Molotov’s question concerning the powers of the Anglo-French delegations. And a few days later Naggiar asked again about the positions of the Polish and Romanian governments on passage rights. 188
More significant, however, were the personal instructions for Voroshilov, head of the Soviet delegation. Among these were the following: “first of all,” identify the plenipotentiary powers of the Soviet delegation and ask for those of the French and British side. “If it turns out that they do not have plenipotentiary powers to sign a convention, express astonishment, take them by the hands and politely ask for what purposes did their governments send them to the USSR.” 188-9
Soviet instructions anticipated every weakness of the Anglo-French delegations, and their scornful tone foretold no good result. Staff talks were on a collision course for failure at the very moment when German overtures became more pressing. 189
The Soviet press attache, A. A. Smirnov, was at the German foreign ministry on July 31 and met the deputy head of the press bureau, B. von Stumm. Germany had “no aggressive plans against the Soviet Union,” Stumm said. 189
“We haven’t forgotten what Hitler wrote in his book [Mein Kampf],” replied Smirnov. .... Stumm, “ ... what’s written in that book is out of date, and we shouldn’t take it seriously. “ But Mein Kampf with its visions of eastern conquest was never far from the Soviet mind. 190
On August 2 Astakhov saw Weizsäcker on routine business. After going through the usual German lines about better relations, Weizsäcker said that Ribbentrop would like to see him, which was a surprise for Astakhov. ... The Soviet Union had many raw materials that Germany needed, said Ribbentrop, and “we have many manufactured products which you need.” ... the conclusion of an economic agreement could be the beginning of an improvement in political relations. ... “National socialism is not an item for export, and we are far from contemplating its imposition on anyone at all. If your country also holds a similar view, then a further rapprochement is possible.” Astakhov replied with equivalent flimflam, and then with the familiar line that the Soviet government did not consider ideological or internal differences incompatible with friendly international relations. ... Ribbentrop asked that his observations on Nazi-Soviet relations be forwarded to Moscow. Astakhov agreed, adding, “I do not doubt that my government is ready to welcome any improvement of relations with Germany. 190-1
On Ribbentrop’s orders, Schulenberg went to see Molotov on August 3 to follow up on the conversation in Berlin. ... . By now the German suggestions were familiar, but Schulenberg went over them again, offering a variation of Schnurre’s proposals for a three-step improvement in relations - economic, press, cultural. ... Molotov ...: hoped for the conclusion of an economic agreement, but political problems remained. The anti-Comintern pact was impossible for the Soviet government to ignore, since it encouraged Japanese aggression in the Far East. And Molotov reminded the ambassador that the German government refused to participate in international conferences at which there was a Soviet presence. ... [I don’t] intend to try to justify past German policy,” replied Schulenberg, “[I] only want to find a way to improve future relations.” 191
Schulenberg added that his government would respect Soviet interests in the Baltic region and in Poland. Germany would not renounce its claim to Danzig but the question could be settled peacefully, unless another path was imposed on it. Molotov observed that it depended first on Germany whether this “other path” became necessary. Schulenberg protested: Polish “dirty tricks” were provoking Germany. 191
Schulenberg’s account gave a rather more positive gloss to this conversation than did Molotov’s. “ (24. “Record of a conversation... with ... Schulenberg,” secret. Aug. 3,1939, DVP, XXII, bk. I, 570-572; and Schulenberg to German foreign ministry. Most urgent, Aug. 4, 1939, DGFP, D, VI, pp. 1059-1062. Cf. Roberts, Soviet pp. 84-85. )
[citater]
Astakhov’s communications to Moscow were important in defining the details of a possible territorial modus vivendi. But Astakhov’s cable of August 10 appears to have been particularly important in alerting Moscow for the first time to direct German warnings that war was imminent and that the Soviet government would have to up its mind quickly where it stood. 194
“They haven’t read ... or understood my dispatches,” Naggiar complained: passage rights were a key issue and could not be avoided. 195
34. Naggiar’s minute on his cable, nos. 860-863, August 12, 1939.
‘ Seeds asked if the government definitely wanted progress in the talks. If not it would be a pity, “as all indications so far go to show that soviet military negotiators are really out for business.” 196
Saturday, August 12, ... Negotiations ran into early trouble when Voroshilov, following his instructions, put his written powers on the table and asked for those of Doumenc and Drax. [de havde ingen] 196
On Sunday, August 13, Voroshilov asked how they envisaged the role of the Soviet Union in the event of aggression against the prospective allied powers, and in particular Poland and Romania. As Doumenc put it, “The Marshal, with a sort of apparent easygoing directness, put us against the wall.” 197
The following day, August 14, Voroshilov repeated his question. ... then he cut them short. I want a clear answer to my very clear question concerning the joint action of the Armed Forces of Britain, France and the Soviet Union against the common enemy ... should he attack. 197
The Anglo-French delegation informed their Soviet counterparts on the following day, August 15, that they had referred Voroshilov’s questions to Paris and London for reply. General discussions continued while replies were awaited: the Soviet delegates offered one hundred divisions to buttress the defense of Poland. Doumenc had to be inventive, since the French had no offensive plans to go to the aid of the Poles, though to admit it was scarcely possible. 198
Voroshilov let these discussions go on until August 17 when he finally interrupted them, .... The French and British governments still had not replied, so further meetings were put off until August 21. 198
In London the deputy chiefs of staff, ... report .... “certain general observations on the broad question of the use of Polish and Roumanian territory by the Russian forces.” Voroshilov could have written the report. It was “no time for half-measures,” said the deputy chiefs; the “strongest pressure” should be brought to bear on Poland and Romania. 198
The supply of arms and war material is not enough. If the Russians are to collaborate in resisting German aggression against Poland or Roumania they can only do so effectively on Polish or Roumanian soil; and ... if permission for this were withheld till war breaks out, it would then be too late. The most the Allies could then hope for would be to avenge Poland and Roumania and perhaps restore their independence as a result of the defeat of Germany in a long war. 199
A treaty with the Soviet Union was “the best way of preventing a war”; if it failed, Poland and Romania could pay the price of a possible Soviet-German rapprochement. (44. “Committee on Imperial Defence, Deputy chiefs of staff subcommittee,” meeting of Aug. 16, 1939, C 11506/3356/18, PRO FO 371 23072. 199
It was worse than that: neither Noel nor Musse was prepared to apply the full rigor of his instructions. Noel feared to compromise his personal position in Warsaw. Musse was vulnerable to Polish influence and questioned Soviet good faith as much as did the Poles.’ 200
“Strong internal political reasons” dictated the Polish position - that is, large Ukrainian and Belorussian minorities in eastern Poland. 200
On August 21, in response to Naggiar’s urging, the French government authorized Doumenc - though the British never sent similar instructions to Drax - to sign the best agreement he could get in Moscow. “Too late,” noted Naggiar. 200-1
On August 12 Astakhov reported Molotov’s instructions (of the previous day) to Schnurre. ... What about the Polish question? Asked Schnurre. ... the Germans ... wanted to discuss territorial-political” issues “in order to free their hands in case of a conflict with Poland... .... and they were willing to male offers to prevent an agreement [???] - disinterestedness in the Baltic, Bessarabia, eastern Poland, not to speak of the Ukraine. In exchange the Germans wanted only “the promise of non-interference in a conflict with Poland.” In a further letter on the same day, Astakhov warned that war in Poland was coming fast. 201
On Sunday, August 13, as the military talks in Moscow were getting down to serious business, Schnurre returned with an even more pointed message to Astakhov: “Events are moving very fast, and we cannot lose time.” The Soviet Union would have to decide whether it was a friend or foe of Germany. 201
Molotov dropped his previous reserve and suspiciousness. Would the German government be prepared to sign a nonaggression pact? Asked Molotov. Would it be willing to exercise its influence on Japan to end fighting on the Manchurian frontier? 201
Regarding the timing of Ribbentrop’s visit, Molotov appreciated the German government’s willingness to send a high-ranking official to Moscow, unlike the British who had sent only Strang. Before his arrival, necessary preparations had to be made; the Soviet Union did not wish prematurely to create a public “storm.” 202
... end of the afternoon the game was apparently concluded, because Molotov called the ambassador back, handing him a draft nonaggression pact and informing him that Ribbentrop could come to Moscow on August 26-27. 204
On August 20 Hitler, anxious to settle so he could move against Poland, sent a cable to Stalin insisting on an earlier meeting. Stalin agreed on the following day. On August 21 Tass announced the signature of a Soviet-German trade agreement; on August 22 that Ribbentrop was expected in Moscow on the morrow to conclude a nonaggression pact. 204
The Soviet ambassador in Warsaw reported that the Polish press was full of derisive comments about cooperation with the Soviet Union. 204
The Polish refusal to conclude with the Soviet Union was a political “illness,” according to Noel. [!!!!]
Note 70. German-Soviet nonaggression pact and secret protocol, signed by Ribbentrop and Molotov, Aug. 23,1939, DVF, XXII, bk, 1, 630-632,
The pact included a secret protocol, the terms of which are well enough known but can be summarized. “In the event of territorial-political reconstruction,” Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Bessarabia, and Poland east of the Narev, Vistula, and San Rivers would fall within the Soviet “sphere of interest.” Lithuania and the rest of Poland were assigned to Germany. “The question of whether It is in the interests of both parties to preserve the independence of the Polish government and what will be the borders of this government can only be finally clarified in the course of further political developments,” Both sides agreed to keep the protocol “strictly secret. Ribbentrop had wanted to add some flowery passages about German-Soviet friendship, but Stalin declined. 207
The British Foreign Office took the sudden turnabout with less equanimity. Sargent complained about the lapse in British intelligence: how could they have been taken so unawares? This was an ironic twist since he had previously derided the danger of a German-Soviet rapprochement as Litvinov’s “empty threat.” Collier had been monitoring the potential danger for years and had often clashed with Sargent. 207 [De er åbenbart sådan, skal skyde skylden på en anden service. Find aktuel parallel.]
... Jules Jeanneney, asked Daladier if “Russian-German collusion” had caught the general staff off guard. “No. ‘We have for a long time considered it a possibility, but all the same what deceit by Stalin. He was amusing our military mission in Moscow with interminable demands.” Passage rights, for example, across Poland; they were tough to obtain, explained Daladier, the Poles finally consented. Then, this proved insufficient for the Russians. Daladier’s explanation to Jeanneney was untrue, but like Bonnet he was anxious to put the blame on the Soviet government for the failure of negotiations. 208
It was not a question of whether Stalin trusted Hitler more than the Anglo-French; Stalin trusted no one. It was a question of buying time or of sauve qui peut - a stampede to safety. 209 (Naggiar)
Here is how Molotov put it in his reminiscences: If we hadn’t moved toward the Germans in 1939, they would have invaded all of Poland right up to our old border. That’s why we came to an arrangement with them. They had to agree. They took the initiative on the nonaggression pact. We couldn’t defend Poland because it didn’t want to deal with us. Inasmuch as Poland would not deal, and war was close at hand, give us just that part of Poland that we believe indisputably belongs to the Soviet Union 209-10
Unless one considers Anglo-French policymakers - Chamberlain, Halifax, Daladier, Bonnet - to have been fools, which they certainly were not, their policies toward the Soviet Union in 1939 were less a blunder than a calculated risk which went wrong. 211
It seems incredible that the Soviet government could have abandoned its deep, long-standing hostility to Nazi Germany and its commitment to collective security during a fortnight in August, but that is what the available evidence shows. It is also untrue that Molotov kept heaping fresh demands on Seeds and Naggiar. The basic Soviet position was marked out and known in 1935. There was little difference in Litvinov’s original offer and the various iterations of it produced by Molotov. Neither “indirect” aggression, nor the Baltic guarantee, nor passage rights, nor a military convention were new issues or fresh demands. Daladier lied through his teeth when he said he was surprised by the Soviet demand for passage rights. Not only was he not surprised, he anticipated that the issue would be raised and he instructed Doumenc not to agree to it. 211
Stalin made the same mistake as the French and British: he thought he could do business with Hitler, or at least put off the inevitable confrontation until the Soviet Union was stronger. 212
Stalin had to choose between fighting sooner or later; he chose to fight later, if at all. It was a calamitous miscalculation. Mandel, who had figured out Hitler early on, knew at the time what should have been done. “We sat and twiddled our thumbs,” he said, “until Poland was crushed. We should have fought at the start.” This was not hindsight; it was good advice, and Stalin should have followed it. In 1942 Molotov admitted, “We were both at fault 212
(Georges Mandel, Clemenceau’s chef de cabinet, 1917-1919; depute, 1920-1940; French cabinet minister, 1934-1936, 1938-1940). [Det skulle han vel have overbevist sine egne om - i tide - hvorfor skulle Stalin/Molotov have tillid til hans råd ???]
7. “A Situation of Delicacy and Danger” 213
With “Russia in the bag,” Nazis boasted, the British will not dare to fight. ... foreign communists were stunned, and many quit their parties in disillusionment. 213
In fact, Anglo-French officials put on a brave face but saw their strategic plans for a long grinding war and strangling blockade of Nazi Germany gravely compromised. 214
In the early morning of September 1 almost sixty German divisions invaded Poland. On September 2 Chamberlain spoke in the House of Commons not of a declaration of war but of further negotiations. ... After years of criticizing the Soviet Union for its inability to sustain offensive operations, the French high command launched the drole de guerre, the phony war, not a general offensive, and let Poland be crushed in a fortnight - about what Drax had predicted to Voroshilov a few weeks before. 214
Apart from preventing German invasion forces from driving up against Soviet frontiers, the Polish collapse offered Moscow the additional and satisfying advantage of recovering Ukrainian and Belorussian territories captured by the Poles during the Russo-Polish war of 1919-1920. 215
But the British government went further than mere passive caution; it actually sought to encourage an Anglo-Soviet rapprochement. The British initiative broke a pattern of twenty years: it had been the needy and isolated Soviet Union that had sought better or at least businesslike political and economic relations while the French and British had often rejected Soviet overtures. 216
Not just diplomats in London and Paris had to get used to new European realities; some Soviet diplomats did also. Maiskii had taken it for granted that an Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance would be concluded in August. He was not quite sure what to make of his government’s volte-face, noting in his journal: “Our policy obviously represents a kind of sudden reversal, the reasoning behind which is for the present still not entirely clear to me.” 217
When the Comintern in Moscow ordered that a new line be followed in favor of peace and against the “imperialist” war, the British Communist party lost half its membership. 217-8
After a row at the outset of war over the British blocking delivery of machine tools contracted by the Soviet Union, the British and Soviet governments concluded a barter arrangement in early October: Soviet timber for British rubber and tin. 223
On October 6 Churchill invited Maiskii to the Admiralty for one of his habitual nocturnal meetings. (Resumeres) 223
Halifax’s account of the meeting does not entirely square with Maiskii’s, for in the British account it is the ambassador who states .... 226
Sir Arthur Rucker, Chamberlain’s principal private secretary, put it this way in mid-October [1939]: “Communism is ow the great danger, greater even than Nazi Germany ... 230
Maiskii was a busy man in October 1939, seeing British ministers, officials, and politicians almost every day. There appears to have been no more talk of Soviet mediation of a peace conference, but a great deal of discussion continued about possible trade negotiations. 230
... the Finns mobilized their army in October 1939 and spat defiance at Moscow. Molotov interpreted these acts as provocative, and even in the British Foreign Office some clerks found the Finns to be “most tiresome,” 234
... a shooting incident on the Russo-Finnish frontier on November 26, 234
Collier’s proposal ... This was all music to the ears of the British ambassador in Helsinki, Thomas Snow, who was an anti-red incendiary, against any Finnish concessions. 235
... the Soviet embassy in Helsinki reported the Finnish military buildup and the highly visible and suspicious presence of numerous British nationals in the Finnish capital. 235
[November] Shortly afterward Churchill raised the issue in the War Cabinet, reiterating his view that it was in British interests to see the Soviet Union hold a strong position in the Baltic and that it would be a mistake “to stiffen the Finns against making concessions to the U.S.S.R.” 235-6
Collier ... persuaded Halifax to take a harder line. 236
Finland was not the only source of Soviet suspicions of Britain. Turkey and the Caucasus were others. 236
... outbreak of war between Finland and the Soviet Union on November 30, 236
The papers on these topics were all in green, top-secret jackets for good reason; in fact, some papers are still withheld from the files, until 2016. The idea of raiding Baku nevertheless continued to be studied by the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee of the chiefs of staff. 236
In hindsight Maiskii asserted that British policy was to extend the right hand of friendship and at the same time, with the left, to “sow the seeds of anti-Soviet intrigue in all the corners of the world. “ 236
But the war also threatened any Anglo-Soviet relations at all. Seeds, in Moscow, thought they should be broken off and a blockade thrown up around the Soviet Union. 237
On December 14 the Soviet Union was thrown out of the League of Nations. Molotov, a hardened Bolshevik, took it amiss. 238
At the end of December 1939 the Soviet Union found itself almost completely isolated. Its relations with France, Britain, and the United States were severely strained. A few months before, it had been involved in serious fighting with Japan on the Manchurian frontier. The Red Army had thrashed the Japanese, but the situation was still uncertain. Relations with Italy, Turkey, and even its ally China were under stress. It had been expelled from the League of Nations.. 239
Lloyd George’s message was simple: don’t play into the hands of those who want a rupture. Not everyone stood for this position; some people such as Churchill were against it. 240 [Hvad var Churchills opfattelse, imod “rupture” ??]
Lloyd George only laughed: “Excuse me, an old man, understanding a thing or two about international political and military affairs. I don’t want to offend you. But from my personal experience, I know war is war. And especially in this war, which, in my view is the last great struggle of capitalism for its right to existence. “ [!!!!!] 240
[selv kloge gamle mænd kan tage fejl]
8. Epilogue: Anglo-Soviet Relations Are Like a Taut String 242
... in 1927 when the government broke off diplomatic relations with Moscow. 242-3
“The only charitable conclusion,” A. J. P. Taylor observed, “is to assume that the British and French governments had taken leave of their senses.” [hvad med simpel klassekamp !!!]
Molotov met :he German ambassador many times in the autumn and winter of 1939-1940, but not for running after Nazi Germany or agreeing to every German demand, though he agreed to some. Discussions concerned border incidents between Soviet and German ground and naval forces, the settlement of frontier disputes, the evacuation of citizens of German descent from the Baltic states, and the transshipping across Germany of war materiel for Finland. When Schulenberg invited Molotov to visit Berlin, the commissar was in no hurry. I am too busy, he said. When Schulenberg asked Molotov to send a Soviet ship west of the British Isles to obtain weather information to assist German air attacks on Britain, Molotov first delayed and then declined the German request. He also declined to provide safe harbor to German ships on the Kamchatka peninsula off the Bering Sea. Soviet negotiators concluded an important trade agreement with Germany in February 1940, but the bargaining was hard. 244
The Cripps version confirmed this position but then added the menace that if an improvement of relations did not take place, “... Russia would have to proceed in other directions with trade and political agreements.” There is no such threat recorded in the Soviet record of the meeting. Was Cripps here playing the role of a British Maiskii? 247
On March 13 the Russo-Finnish ended. Soviet terms were relatively generous considering that the Finnish army was beaten. 247
:. “I am becoming very alarmed,” said Butler: “... There is a certain noble purity about British policy which tends - provided right is on our side and the human brain dictates the logic of an action - to add one enemy after another to those opposed to us.” Butler’s position is the more remarkable because less than a year before he had been Chamberlain’s only supporter in resisting pressure for an Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance. He was, and is, sometimes dismissed as a weakling appeaser, but in these circumstances he held his ground in an unpopular cause. And this was not the only one, for he continued to maintain his earlier position that a truce in the war should not be excluded if the nonbelligerent powers became involved in peace negotiations. 247-8
And in early April the Soviet government temporarily suspended shipments of raw materials to Germany because of the latter’s failure to deliver agreed-upon commodities to the Soviet Union. Yet Molotov made a vitriolic speech against France and Britain at the end of March. The usual contradictions marked both Soviet and British policy, but it may also have been camouflage to hide from German notice Soviet feelers in London. 249
German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. 249
... some British officials did not want an alliance with the Soviet Union, even after June 1941. 250
The Soviet government also saw weakness and lack of will on the British side, and the Bore War did nothing to reassure them. But it came to an end in April 1940 when Germany invaded Norway, getting there just as the British started to mine Norwegian waters. 250 [Her er der en - ukommenteret - uoverensstemmelse med foregående citat]
In May the Germans launched their armored offensive through the Ardennes, crushing the Anglo-French armies and leading to the miraculous evacuation at Dunkirk. The only positive development for the Allied cause was the appointment of Churchill as prime minister in May. ... In the east the Soviet government reacted to the French collapse by annexing the Baltic states, Bessarabia, and Bukovina. ... The British government sent Cripps to be ambassador in Moscow. 250
It was also at this time, as France collapsed, that the French government made one last, dying effort to move closer to the Soviet Union. It was a sad event. Eirik Labonne, the resident general in Tunis, was hurriedly named ambassador to replace Naggiar, recalled at the beginning of the Winter War. ... When Labonne arrived in Moscow on June 12 the French armies were in headlong retreat, and when Labonne met Molotov on June 14, German forces were occupying Paris. 250
Molotov was polite but evasive. He reminded Labonne that for a long time France had pursued a policy toward the Soviet Union “which one could not characterize as friendly.” 251
In the autumn of 1940 the Soviet government calculated that ninety-four German infantry and armored divisions were now on its eastern frontiers, up from trifling numbers in the spring. [geografisk retning afhænger af hvor man ser den fra !!??] 254
In this story neither side was virtuous, but there were individuals whose foresight and courage stand out. There are not just the usual villains ... heroes who are largely unknown now but who should be recognized. Litvinov. 255 + Maiskii, Vansittart, Butler and Cripps 256
Fear of victory over fascism drove appeasement as much as fear of Nazi power and virility. Victory over Nazism could not be achieved without a Soviet alliance and without an increase of Soviet prestige and a risk of spreading communism into Europe. 257
If Molotov’s reminiscences are correct, the Soviet government was prepared to delay war for as long as possible. Even a few months mattered. 259



 

Orla Jordal, 2007

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